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ABSTRACT 
Return-oriented programming is the predominant code-reuse attack, where short gadgets 
or borrowed chunks of code ending in a RET instruction can be discovered in binaries. A chain of 
ROP gadgets placed on the stack can permit control flow to be subverted, allowing for arbitrary 
computation. Jump-oriented programming is a class of code-reuse attack where instead of using 
RET instructions, indirect jumps and indirect calls are utilized to subvert the control flow. JOP is 
important because can allow for important mitigations and protections against ROP to be bypassed, 
and some protections against JOP are imperfect. This dissertation presents a design science study 
that proposes and creates the Jump-oriented Programming Reversing Open Cyber Knowledge 
Expert Tool, the JOP ROCKET.  This is a novel framework for jump-oriented programming (JOP) 
that can help facilitate binary analysis for exploit development and code-reuse attacks.  
The process for manually developing exploits for JOP is a time-consuming and tedious 
process, often fraught with complications, and an exhaustive review of the literature shows there 
is a need for a mature, sophisticated tool to automate this process, to allow users to easily 
enumerate JOP gadgets for Windows x86 binaries. The JOP ROCKET fulfills this unmet need for 
a fully-featured tool to facilitate JOP gadget discovery. The JOP ROCKET discovers dispatcher 
gadgets as well as functional gadgets, and it performs classification on gadgets, according to 
registers used, registers affected, and operations performed. This allows researchers to utilize this 
tool to be very granular and specific about what gadgets they discover. Additionally, there are a 
variety of options available to modify how the gadgets are discovered, and this will expand or 
narrow the quantity of gadgets discovered. This design science research presents original 
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significant contributions in the form of an instantiation and five new or highly reworked and 
enhanced methods. Some of these methods pertain directly to JOP, while others could be adapted 
and utilized in other reverse engineering projects. The JOP ROCKET allows researchers to 
enumerate JOP gadgets for software easily, allowing for a JOP exploit to be more efficiently 
constructed, whereas before the task would have been a time-consuming process requiring expert 
knowledge and the use of multiple tools. 
Keywords: binary analysis, code-reuse attacks, Jump-oriented programming, return-
oriented programming, JOP, ROP, reverse engineering, software exploitation 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Buffer overflows, were not new in 1995, when Peter Zatko, or “Mudge,” first made it 
publicly known, and then in 1996, when Aleph One made it much more widely known (Zatko, 
1995; One, 1996 Nelißen, 2002). As the 1990s continued on, this memory corruption bug as well 
as others led to the development of numerous exploits and malware, that took advantage of 
software vulnerabilities such as the buffer overflow. A software vulnerability may be the result of 
a program behaving in a fashion unintended or not anticipated by the programmer, and some of 
these can be weaponized and used to perform arbitrary computation (Krusl, 1998). Arbitrary 
computation could be benign in nature, such as executing a trivial Windows application, like 
Calculator, or it could be much more malicious, allowing an attacker to perform theft, 
modification, or destruction to the contents of one computer or even that of an entire network 
(Stroschien, 2017; Engebretson, 2013). While such vulnerabilities that manifested themselves in 
malware would be caught by antivirus industry and added to quarantine lists when caught 
discovered, that did nothing to curtail the onslaught of zero-day exploits (Bilge & Dumitras, 2012). 
A zero-day exploit is one that makes use of a hitherto unknown vulnerability, and for which 
defenses, such as earlier forms of antivirus, would lack protection, since having not been known, 
signatures would not exist. In the hands of a well-funded and capable adversary, a zero-day exploit 
could be used to such extremes as causing millions of dollars in loss to businesses and 
organizations, to crippling national critical infrastructure (Zetter, 2014). Indeed, lives could be lost, 
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or wars could be decided, based on the efficacy of an undetected zero-day vulnerability that had 
been fully weaponized. Typically, a memory corruption bug that has been weaponized will not lead 
to such dramatic results; however, the possibility exists of serious ramifications from a zero-day 
vulnerability, underscoring the importance of strong cyber security.  
The most direct way to achieve enhanced cyber security is through protections at a binary 
or system level, to prevent a malicious action from taking place in the first place. Inevitably, the 
continued development of numerous attacks utilizing memory corruption bugs led to the 
development of various protections and mitigations over the years (Bania, 2010). Broadly, these 
efforts were designed to curtail or stop such attacks. The situation evolved to what could be 
described as an escalating arms race, with both defenders and attackers, continuously innovating 
and improving techniques, alternatively to overcome protections or to thwart defenses. These 
mitigations include stack cookies, Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout 
Randomization (ASLR), Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET), and Control Flow 
Guard (CFG), to name a few of the most well-known ones that are most prevalent today. Each will 
be explained in detail in their appropriate section. 
As part of the arms race, one emerging attack methodology has been code-reuse attacks. 
This first took the form of return-into-libc buffer overflows. This involves using the stack overflow 
to call a function directly with the needed parameters (Nelißen, 2002). That technique would later 
be expanded to return-oriented programming (ROP) (Checkoway, et al., 2010; Roemer, et al., 
2010). The central idea with ROP is that to execute borrowed chunks of executable code that exist 
in the virtual memory of the process image. Each borrowed chunk will terminate in a RET 
instruction, and this is called a ROP gadget. This returns the instruction pointer to the next 
instruction or address that is on the stack. Thus, a user can easily chain ROP gadgets together, 
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simply by having the addresses fall one after the other in the stack. Because of the very nature of 
how the RET instruction works, it will always return and execute whatever is next on the stack. 
This result is the user can manipulate control flow, directing it from one gadget to the next, and in 
the process being able to achieve arbitrary execution. Instead of simply being able to call certain 
functions with parameters, now any arbitrary computation would be feasible (Shacham, 2007). 
This included being able to disable or circumvent mitigations that otherwise would have protected 
the binary from attack. 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of JOP utilizing a JOP dispatcher gadget and dispatch table to reach functional gadgets 
Code-reuse attacks have exploded in popularity since the formal introduction of return-
oriented programming, though the tradition dates back much further with return-to-libc (Shacham, 
2007). We have seen since then other code-reuse attacks develop, such as jump-oriented 
programming (JOP). JOP is a more advanced code-reuse attack that subverts control flow, allowing 
for arbitrary computation as with ROP, but in a very specific fashion. JOP can take on various 
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forms, both in a Windows environment as well as on other architectures. In a Windows 
environment, the most useful variation of JOP takes the form of the dispatcher gadget paradigm. 
JOP will be discussed exhaustively in chapter 2, but we can introduce it briefly here.  
The mechanics of how JOP works is a little more labyrinthine than ROP. With JOP, instead 
of using the stack to subvert control flow, we instead craft a dispatch table, as shown in  Figure 1. 
This dispatch table serves to replace the stack, as it provides the order in which the gadgets will 
occur. The dispatch table does this by providing functional gadgets that perform arbitrary 
computation, much in the same fashion as ROP gadgets. The difference here is that instead of using 
a RET instruction to return to the stack, the JOP functional gadget will instead terminate in an 
indirect jump or indirect call. This gadget will jump back to the address of the dispatcher gadget. 
The dispatcher gadget is a specialized gadget that is used to advance the instruction pointer 
forwards or backwards in the dispatch table (Bletsch, 2011). It does this by adding, subtracting, or 
otherwise modifying in a predictable fashion, the address of the dispatcher table. This address is 
to be contained in a register. For instance, if EBX contained the address of the dispatch table, the 
dispatcher gadget would modify EBX in a predictable fashion, such as by the following instruction: 
ADD EBX, 8 / JMP EBX. Thus, each invocation of the dispatcher gadget would modify where the 
dispatcher gadget begins execution; this provides the analyst with a means of subverting control 
flow. JOP can be useful if exploitation limited to the heap that may be achieved through corruption 
of the heap or UAF. 
JOP is a code-reuse attack that has been written about in the academic literature for the last 
decade, but it has only rarely been used in the wild for exploits, to the extent that some researchers 
have claimed erroneously that it has never been used. JOP is the code-reuse attack that this research 
will focus on.  
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As a point of information, this dissertation at times will refer to users of code-reuse attacks 
using a variety of terms, most frequently as analyst or user. This work takes a neutral stance, as 
many people who utilize code-reuse attacks may do so for purely benign purposes, such as security 
researchers, or others who may have appropriate authorization. Very occasionally, the user of code-
reuse attacks may be referred to as an attacker, but this too is used in a neutral sense, referring 
simply to an individual carrying out an attack, which may be for benign purposes. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, a user of code-reuse attacks may use them with malintent; this work is not 
directed at such persons. 
In response to code-reuse attacks, we have seen the rise and fall of various mitigations to 
try limit or mitigate their efficacy. Inevitably we have witnessed bypass after bypass emerge 
against these and other defenses, making these mitigations less and less useful, necessitating 
endless updates. Over the years, we have had additional mitigations evolve in response to advances 
in exploitation techniques, as with the release of the isolated heap mitigation being quickly 
followed up by the release of the deferred free mitigation, both addressing the Use-After-Free 
(UAF) bug (Bo Qu & Lu, 2014). A UAF a memory corruption bug that can be used to launch into 
a code-reuse attack 
Ultimately, the question is begged, if an attack is can overcome many of these mitigations, 
even if it raises the level of difficulty, how useful are these protections really? It may deter 
amateurs, but it will not prevent more dedicated individuals.  In recognizing the fallibility of these 
types of defenses, defensive efforts in the last few years turned more in the direction of control 
flow integrity (Carlini, et al., 2015). Control flow integrity in concept is a perfect solution and can 
provide total defense against ROP and JOP, as it enforces the control flow graph. Put simply, 
control flow integrity (CFI) is a theoretical defensive mechanism for try to prevent or reduce the 
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subverting of execution to unintended instructions. Strong CFI would make impossible all feasible 
control flow attacks, such as ROP or JOP, but in actual practice, a resilient CFI that is impervious 
to attacks and has no performance lags has been very difficult to achieve (Göktas, et al., 2014), as 
will be discussed in the literature.  A control flow graph represents all the valid paths a program 
can embark upon during the path of execution (Abadi, et al., 2009). 
Practical considerations have necessitated that efforts focus more on coarse-grained 
implementations of CFI that are software-based, such as Microsoft's Control Flow Guard (CFG) 
(Tang, et al., 2015). While CFG does offer some protection to certain classes of use-cases, there 
have been bypasses (Wojtczuk & DeMott, 2015). Software-based CFI by necessity must make 
sacrifices as there can be considerable performance overheads if one tries to do too much, and the 
end result is not complete defense, but just enhancing the difficulty. A hardware-based CFI has the 
potential to afford much greater protection by providing fine-grained CFI (de Clercq & 
Verbauwhede, 2017). Leading efforts for hardware-based CFI currently in development include 
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI), Dover Riscv, and CET. CET likely 
will become the more predominant form of CFI, as it is a joint effort by Intel and Microsoft and 
will eventually be deployed on new machines on the market. 
 While CET will be able to offer fine-grained defense against code-reuse attacks such as 
ROP and JOP, that does not mean it will be invulnerable to code-reuse attacks. Advanced code-
reuse attacks such as Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP) and DOP adhere to a 
control flow graph perfectly and yet still effectuate an attack successfully (Schuster, et al., 2015; 
Hu, et al., 2016). These data-based attacks have data side effects that can help facilitate an attack 
that likely can overcome CET as well as other CFI solutions. CFI is not equipped to deal with these 
types of attacks; these attacks are outside the scope, since they follow valid execution paths. Yet 
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while these attacks show tremendous potential for future attacks, their use thus far has been 
confined to academic journals; they simply are not much done in the wild, at least not that we have 
seen yet. 
 As this work will introduce a framework for advancing one particular type of code-reuse 
attack, we should then return to the issue of the merits of introducing a tool that may potentially 
help overcome defenses. We are to be reminded though that strong offensive security results in 
stronger defensive security, as shortcomings, opportunities for improvement, and vulnerabilities 
can be found, and then they can be remediated. Performing advanced code-reuse attacks, including 
JOP, COOP, DOP, or others, is not a trivial matter, it can involve a significant preparation. This 
extra difficulty, owning to the need to manually discover gadgets or to craft one’s own tools, is 
among some of the reasons why easier and simpler attacks such as ROP continue to be more 
prevalent. The tools available for ROP help provide the ease and reduces the learning curve, such 
that any motivated attacker could use ROP.  However, there will come a time when attackers may 
be forced to use more advanced code-given attacks. Being able to simplify the process for 
achieving these advanced code-reuse attacks is certainly a great need. 
 This chapter will introduce the reader to the research problem and how this research will 
address the topic. The chapter describes the creation of a framework that helps to reduce the level 
of complexity and manual labor needed to undertake certain advanced code-reuse attacks. This 
proposed framework will serve to enhance security research by providing the necessary features 
and search architecture to improve the state of studies in advanced code-reuse attacks. With the 
realization of the proposed JOP framework, analysts can have at their disposal a means to more 
readily produce necessary data for their exploits, and security practitioners then can make progress 
towards enhancing security. Chapter 2, consisting of the literature review, will introduce more of 
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the background for this subject matter 
Statement of the Problem 
 As mitigations become increasingly more advanced and more sophisticated, popular modes 
of code-reuse attacks such as ROP run the risk of being made irrelevant. Mitigations such as ASLR, 
DEP, and particularly CFG can greatly complicate matters for attackers.  CFG is present on 
Windows 8.1 on up, and that represents over 500 million instances of it in use. Yet many users 
still need to use Windows 7 or lower for legacy reasons, and CFG remains absent on such systems. 
Windows 7 with ASLR and EMET, as well as third-party solutions, such as VTint (Zhang, 2015) 
would provide an effective defense against ROP, but would still come short of defending against 
JOP, and that is to say nothing of the myriad other third-party ROP mitigations out there, as 
described in the literature review. Thus, one might assert that under certain circumstances, in a 
well-defended, hardened Windows 7 environment, JOP could be feasible means of attack, capable 
of overcoming all mitigations. In actual practice, JOP is rarely used in the wild, in part owing to 
the difficulty of setting it up. In an ideal world, all systems would utilize the far more hardened, 
secure Windows 10, where CFG would make JOP impractical. However, the fact remains that as 
of the end of 2018, Windows 7 is still on 36.9% of all personal computers and 42.8% of all 
Windows PCs (Keizer, 2019), and as of only December 2018, Windows 7 was the leading 
operating system (Keizer, 2018). Thus, the relevance of JOP is still high because of the prevalence 
of Windows 7 systems.  
CFG, additionally, is not impervious on Windows 10 with respect to JOP. As an 
approximation of control flow integrity, it has some shortcomings, due to practical considerations. 
In February 2018, researchers from University of Padua presented a technical paper that CFG’s 
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defense against indirect calls or jumps can be bypassed with a Back to the Epilogue (BATE) attack. 
They wrote that CFG works only if a target is aligned to 16 bytes. Failing that, the “unaligned” 
targets can be used in a bypass, owing to the 16-byte imprecision.  Their research concluded that 
even on Windows 10, with CFG, this allowed for there to be numerous gadgets on Windows 
libraries (Biondo, et al., 2018). With BATE, CFG could be bypassed, and then more common 
code-reuse attacks could be used. This will soon be remediated by Microsoft, but it demonstrates 
that future attacks that may arise may allow opportunity for JOP in a Windows 10 environment, 
although such possible attacks likely are to be remediated within a reasonable period of time.  
We inevitably return to the prospect of JOP, a significantly more advanced form of code-
reuse attacks. It is also far more limited than ROP, under the most ideal of circumstances. Although 
it is more challenging to use, JOP remains a valid and viable attack paradigm, one which can be 
powerful. Some tools, such as ROPgadget and Mona provide extremely limited functionality, but 
to such a limited extent as to be of only very marginal value (Salwan, n.d.; Van Eckhaute, n.d.). 
That is to be expected, as these are ROP tools, and they are highly effective in their problem 
domain; both provide an abundance of functionality and tools to help make the construction of 
ROP gadget chains uncomplicated and painless. That ease and functionality provided by those 
tools, is lacking within the province of JOP. As a far more complicated form of code-reuse attacks, 
the argument could be made that it more strongly needs some of that automation, to better assist 
security researchers. 
The problem is there is a lack of tools to automate and facilitate building JOP exploits, as 
the current workflow makes it a manual, tedious, time-consuming process (Bletsch, 2011; 
Checkoway & Shacham, 2010; Quiao, 2015; Davi, 2015; Erdődi, 2013; Min, 2012). A versatile, 
powerful framework that can account for the complexity of JOP could be a solution to the research 
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problem. In endeavoring to address the research problem, this work will endeavor to answer 
secondary research questions that will be useful in crafting such a solution: 
How can software most effectively implement in an automated fashion the discovery of 
JOP gadgets? 
How can software most effectively implement in an automated fashion a means of 
discovering dispatcher gadgets? 
How can software most effectively classify these gadgets into relevant categories and allow 
these to be displayed on demand, as a means to provide utmost utility to the security 
researcher? 
How can potentially unusable, highly impractical gadgets most effectively be expunged 
from results, in an automated fashion? 
How can software most effectively ensure that no potential JOP gadgets of value are 
missed? 
All the above are questions that will help guide the DSR process of creating a framework with a 
high degree of usability, versatility, portability, and customization. These are subproblems that 
need to be responded to, in order devise a solution to the problem statement. 
We can try to expand upon some of the above. First, existing tool sets lack functionality to 
directly discover JOP Gadgets. Both Mona and ROPgadget provide very limited functionality, but 
only such that it is a footnote in passing; neither is equipped for any serious undertaking with JOP. 
A team of researchers did develop a tool to find ROP and JOP gadgets for ELF binaries that were 
implemented with the NSA’s proposed CFI solution (Brandon, 2016). Their work was not suited 
for PE files, and they lack some of robust features necessary that this framework will endeavor to 
address. Finally, many existing reverse engineering tools could be used to manually search for the 
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opcodes for the desired indirect jump or call, or to search for the disassembled instructions. Either 
effort would be thought of as a manual search, and neither would adequately address the matter of 
unintended instructions.   
Manually searching for gadgets for code-reuse attacks can be a time-consuming matter 
without proper tools, regardless of whether it is for ROP or JOP. For instance, Roemer was 
attempting manual discovery of Turing-complete features. He spent three weeks doing manual 
analysis of Assembly in a Solaris libc file, to come up with 19 gadgets in his Turing-complete 
features gadget catalog for SPARC (Roemer, 2009). That is a considerable amount of time, and it 
addresses just one file. Roemer later developed a tool to facilitate this process, allowing for Turing 
features to be discovered more quickly on binaries. A manual process to exhaustively search for 
JOP Turing-complete features would require even more time and effort.  
Second, while some general-purpose reverse engineering tools provide the facility to 
discover gadgets, such as by manually searching for desired opcodes or disassembly, there is not 
a way to accomplish this in automated fashion. One specific gadget that is essential is the 
dispatcher gadget; this helps allow the instruction pointer to go forwards or backwards in the 
dispatch table, as a means of providing order to the control flow. There is not presently a publicly 
accessible dispatcher gadget finder. 
 Next, there is a need to provide classification for JOP gadgets.  ROP gadgets do not require 
classification, other than simply distinguishing between useful gadgets and those that are less 
likely to be so. ROP gadgets, unlike JOP gadgets, all end in RET, and they abound in plentiful 
numbers, so presenting a collection of useful ROP gadgets is often adequate for a good starting 
point. Some tools will group like gadgets with like gadgets, providing some informal sense of 
classification. With JOP, the necessities of control flow dictate that more careful classification 
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must be employed, as the gadgets will end in an direct jump or call to a specific register. Thus, 
having them ordered as such would be a significant improvement over simply providing them all, 
with no classification. Still, even that classification falls short; the ability to be very granular and 
specific, with respect to the operations performed in the gadgets, would allow an analyst to much 
more readily locate the needed functionality, rather than having to wade through endless 
possibilities or to have to perform an ad hoc search on the results. Thus, there is a need for 
classification based additionally on specific operation performed. 
Forth, the volume of data presented to users from some gadgets is overwhelming, 
depending on the binary. Moreover, many of these gadgets would have no practical use, and may 
have just been unintended instructions. For instance, if a user were attempting to add a value into 
EAX and then in the next line EAX is clobbered, that gadget would be useless for that purpose. 
Alternatively, if a user were seeking gadgets that performed the SUB operation, they would not 
wish to encounter an example such as the following: SUB BYTE PTR [EAX+0x53532],0x4 / JMP 
EBX. That gadget is certainly valid disassembly, but if its only purpose for being presented to the 
user was on account of the presence of SUB, then it should be excluded, as the chances of it being 
of practical use for exploitation would be remote. Thus, many gadgets may border on being 
unusable. Sometimes these are intended instructions; other times they stem from unique 
combinations of opcodes, creating unusual instructions that may have marginal value to security 
researchers. Because some of these potentially impractical gadgets stem from certain opcode 
combinations, there sometimes can be a deluge of such gadgets, thereby making it more 
challenging to find useful gadgets.  
Finally, there is a need to ensure no potential gadgets are missed. Some researchers have 
stated it likely is impossible with many binaries to do JOP without considering all unintended 
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instructions (Bletsch, et al., 2011). Depending on the technique employed or the tools in question, 
it could be easy to overlook some less than obvious gadgets. There are two ways to find gadgets: 
by looking at the opcodes and by looking at the disassembly that stems from the opcodes. Doing 
both of this is not adequate, as some gadgets could be missed. Thus, there is a strong need for a 
JOP tool that considers all possibilities of disassembly, not just those intended by the compiler, 
and this can only be done by iterating through all valid possibilities. With JOP gadgets being 
relatively scarce with many binaries, this is essential.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to utilize design science research (DSR) to create a powerful, 
versatile framework, to facilitate the creation of exploits that utilize JOP. This framework will be 
known as the JOP ROCKET, or Jump-oriented Programming Reversing Open Cyber Knowledge 
Expert Tool. The motivation for the JOP ROCKET is threefold. First, there is a lack of tools that 
address JOP. Constructing JOP through a manual process without tools is a time-consuming, 
tedious, and often difficult effort. As it currently stands, if a security researcher wanted to craft a 
JOP exploit, they would need to create their own tool set, or make use of tools not well-suited for 
that purpose. The process of finding suitable JOP gadgets would be made monumentally more 
difficult than need be. Second, the JOP ROCKET could help discover gadgets that would be 
missed by utilizing general-purpose reverse engineering tools. JOP will not generate nearly as 
many fruitful gadgets as ROP, so there is also an urgent need to make sure no gadget is missed. In 
many cases, there simply are not enough gadgets for a JOP exploit otherwise, and while other work 
addresses how to find these, it does so imperfectly. Finally, JOP can allow us to bypass mitigations 
against ROP that do not defend against JOP. This is important because once successful JOP 
  14 
 
exploits are created, they could be used to bypass many traditional mitigations that would have 
been unavailable due to anti-ROP defenses. Many tools, as described in the literature review, have 
heuristics to detect ROP, but would fail at detecting JOP.  
This research is focused on ensuring the JOP ROCKET is made to be a meaningful, fully-
featured artifact, to be used by a security practitioner. At present, the security researcher interested 
in working with JOP would have significant challenges, due to absence of tools. This work will 
help provide a robust solution to this problem. Additionally, although it is not designed for this 
purpose, the framework should also provide a response to some supplemental knowledge research 
questions: 
How common or uncommon on certain categories of gadgets, according to different 
classifications that may be applied? 
On average what is the breakdown of indirect jumps or calls to specific registers? 
These questions will not drive the creation of the design science artifact. However, the artifact 
should be able to answer these open knowledge questions as a by-product, with only minimal 
additional work being done. These questions are of value because they can allow the security 
researcher to have a better understanding of some of the intrinsic properties of JOP. This 
knowledge could help guide some of their decisions as they contemplate attack strategies.  
One of the hallmarks of design science is that it is intended to produce posterior knowledge, 
that which is known only after the conclusion of the research (Wieringa, 2014). This can help serve 
as a contribution to the discipline. It is felt that the above supplemental questions could be used to 
help draw out some of this posterior knowledge with respect to some of the intrinsic qualities of 
JOP. To be clear though, the work will not attempt a comprehensive, quantitative investigation of 
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JOP, and thus it will not make rigorous use of quantitative methodology. The results produced will 
be indications of what a more exhaustive study might confirm. 
Significance of the Study 
The JOP ROCKET is not likely to impact exploit development significantly. ROP is the 
dominant code-reuse attack for good reason, even in the face of numerous mitigations. Even with 
a framework such as the proposed JOP ROCKET, the fact remains JOP still will be complicated 
to use and set up. While JOP can be used in some situations where third-party tools make ROP 
impractical, many times it will be far simpler and easier to use ROP. In a Windows 10 environment, 
as mentioned, CFG will provide defense against JOP.  However, even in a Windows 7 
environment, where JOP could safely execute, the absence of appropriate tools would make the 
prospect of using JOP highly improbable. This would be from the standpoint of the researcher not 
wanting to invest significant time into a tedious manual process. Additionally, even if an analyst 
were interested in investing the time, they would not likely discover the unintended instructions, 
necessary to successfully execute JOP, unless they invested significant labor into the process. 
Many would-be JOP users might lack the expertise to find JOP gadgets, even with available 
general-purpose tools, through a manual process, and even if they were motivated to create their 
own tool set, they might lack the skills or the time. 
Thus, this framework could make JOP more accessible to security analysts and allow for 
more independent research to be done, thereby giving back to the community. The JOP ROCKET 
may allow researchers to discover hitherto unknown vulnerabilities and thereby patch against said 
vulnerabilities. This would serve to further harden systems, making them safer from malicious 
actors. Most researchers would be able to make little tangible progress in the domain of JOP-
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facilitated exploitation without significant efforts, including as mentioned, having to create a 
toolset, so the JOP ROCKET serves as contribution that helps eradicate such barriers. 
With respect to the significance of this study, the scope of this work primarily deals with Windows 
7, but it can also encompass Windows 8. CFG was released with Windows 8.1. Update 
KB3000850 (Kennedy & Satran, “Control Flow,” 2018). Windows 8 is a distinct operating system 
from Windows 8.1, as the latter was a free release to those who had purchased Windows 8 at retail, 
as a sort of mea culpa for some of the public’s perceived shortcomings. They marked it as an 
update, rather than an upgrade, to distinguish it from a service pack. In actual practice there is little 
difference between it and a service pack, other than some restrictions on how it is made available. 
It is important to note, however, Windows 8 remains unsupported, as users must install Windows 
8.1 or Windows 10 to continue to receive updates. Thus, at the current time of writing, it seems 
unlikely that home users would continue to use an unpopular operating system such as Windows 
8, when superior alternatives are available to them at no cost. Of note though and applicability to 
this research is that users of Windows 8 Enterprise from volume licensing must upgrade to 8.1 
through an upgrade process or clean install, for which a special Windows 8.1 product key is 
needed. That is not the case for OEM or retail customers who can upgrade easily as if it were a 
service pack. Due to this requirement, many small business administrators were upset about and 
did not wish to undergo the tedious, time-consuming process of upgrading to Windows 8.1 (Keizer, 
2013). While Windows 8 is not widely used, it is feasible there are some small businesses or 
organizations who obtained Windows 8 through volume licensing, but due to poor or inadequate 
IT staffing, may not have gone through the more complicated upgrade procedure. Such 
organizations that did not upgrade to Windows 8.1 and who are still using Windows 8 would then 
be susceptible to JOP attacks. 
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Although Windows 7 represents a significant share of Windows users out there, with it 
comprising 42.8% of all Windows OSs as of January 2019, support for Windows 7 will end 
January, 2020. However, upgrades will continue to be available at a cost to business users of 
Windows 7 Professional for an additional three years (Bacchus, 2019). This could significantly 
expand the viability of JOP in an enterprise environment for an additional three and a half years 
from the time of this writing. 
As Windows 7 and versions of Windows 8 that lack CFG, they provide a significant 
number of machines vulnerable to JOP. Once Windows 7 is phased out and these numbers 
diminish, we may see the importance of JOP come into play in other operating systems. Other 
work could produce similar results on other operating systems. It serves to underscore the need for 
stronger security, not only on Windows OS, but elsewhere as well, as very strong anti-ROP 
defenses potentially could be overcome. 
The broader implications of this study are noteworthy. In short, JOP provides a “side door,” 
an alternate way of gaining entry, through the use of code-reuse attacks. The JOP ROCKET makes 
an entire class of code-reuse attacks plausible, whereas before that simply was not the case due to 
JOP being a difficult and tedious, manual process. The JOP ROCKET would enable attacks 
potentially to bypass systems that lack CFG, such as Windows 7 or Windows 8. With nearly 43% 
of Windows computers lacking CFG, this a significant number of machines that could otherwise 
be employing strong security, including EMET or other anti-ROP defenses, but that now 
potentially could be vulnerable to compromise. The susceptibility of the Windows 7 and Windows 
8 operating systems to JOP underscores the need for strong control flow integrity (CFI). 
CFG can provide control flow integrity, but various attacks and bypasses have existed 
allowing opportunity for exploitation, before they could be remediated. In some cases, Microsoft 
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even ignored attacks on CFG (Wojtczuk & DeMott, 2015). CFG is an imperfect, software-based 
CFI solution, and as such it will always be vulnerable to emerging bypasses, just as other 
mitigations have given rise to myriad bypasses. The only complete solution for CFI would be a 
hardware-based shadow stack, designed to integrate with a control flow integrity solution, such as 
with the forthcoming CET from Intel and Microsoft. CET is planned to provide support to CFG to 
give it additional resiliency, making it truly impervious to any bypass for JOP. It still may be years 
out before this happens, and that does nothing for all the existing computers that would lack CET. 
This research underscores the need for stronger cyber security in the form of CFI. At present, 
Microsoft’s CFG is strong, but is it adequate? A strong argument could be made against that. 
Additionally, this research underscores the need for organizations and information security 
personnel to be cognizant of the threats posed by JOP, even if they utilize anti-ROP defenses. 
This research is significant also because it will answer important design science questions. 
Some of these questions do not concern themselves specifically with code-reuse attacks, but could 
be applied to other reverse engineering tools or techniques. How this work responds to these 
questions will materialize in the form of a new artifact, as an instantiation of a framework, and five 
methods that support the framework, as will be described in chapter 3. Some of these methods 
could be used with other reverse engineering tools. 
Nature of the Study   
This research is guided by the research problem, and the response will be a DSR endeavor. 
This work follows in the DSR traditions of Hevner et al. and Wieringa, to allow for the iterative 
development of a tool that would present an original contribution to design science and to the 
province of JOP research and development. It will closely follow the iterative processes described 
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by Hevner and Wieringa, as a means to best understand the research problems and allow for those 
to organically result in a strong artifact. Design theories explain how an artifact is able to interact 
with its intended problem context (Wieringa, 2014). Due to its very nature, a design science theory 
for any framework can be thought of as those a way to satisfy all goals, address all stakeholders, 
and satisfy all requirements (2014). Thus, the proposed JOP ROCKET artifact should be able to 
function and meet all these needs, not only under isolated conditions, but given any conditions. 
This design science theory will help guide this work, and it will be elaborated upon further in 
chapter 4. 
Objectives and Approach 
The objective is to develop an approach that fully responds to the problem definition and 
research questions that have motivated this research, as will be covered in more detail in chapter 
3. In so doing, DSR techniques will be employed that will culminate in the construction of an 
instantiation of an artifact, the JOP ROCKET, and its supporting methods. Briefly, we can assert 
that the artifact creates a practical solution to the problem of not having adequate tools to facilitate 
JOP. The JOP ROCKET is intended to produce output that is highly useful and relevant, and whose 
interface will be intuitive and require only nominal effort from the user. 
Because this research meets the requirements of a Ph.D. in Cyber Operations, it was felt 
that it would be too simple to create a tool that merely integrates with an existing dynamic tool, 
such as WinDbg or Immunity Debugger. To do so would be to detract from the necessary rigor 
such a doctorate must demand. Thus, a static analysis approach is employed, even though a 
dynamic approach with one of the aforementioned tools would reduce the workload tremendously. 
By embarking on a static approach, many simple, reverse engineering problems that we would not 
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need to be concerned with, had we taken the dynamic approach, then must have appropriate 
solutions devised. The approach here is to endeavor to organically devise solutions to some of 
these various problems, rather than relying on past work done by others. Some technical matters 
are handled with libraries such as Pefile or Capstone, simply for convenience sake. 
Assumptions 
Research can aspire to be well done but often imperfections may arise, despite the best 
efforts to have an approach that is flawless. As part of the process of research, we must make some 
assumptions to proceed forward. For example, it is assumed that the binaries that are utilized for 
testing purposes are representative of typical 32-bit PE files and there are not anomalies present. 
They could, however highly improbable, be aberrations and negatively influence the design of this 
program, leading to an artifact that is best equipped to deal with them, but not more representative 
examples. It is assumed that once accuracy for disassembly, accuracy for addresses, and accuracy 
for offsets is assured, and after testing provides verification in support this, that this will be true 
for all normal PE files that are analyzed. There could be unexplained software problems that 
somehow prevent this, but extensive efforts at verification of results would likely detect such. It is 
assumed that the disassembly produced by the Capstone disassembly engine will be fully accurate 
for the opcodes supplied. All preliminary testing done as part of this research has not turned up 
any errors that could not be accounted for, and Capstone is very widely used by several hundred 
leading reverse engineering tools, however, so its output likely can be trusted, and testing has 
revealed no discrepancies (“Showcase”, n.d.). It is assumed that the Python library Pefile will be 
accurate and work as intended, and Pefile is a frequently used, open source library, used as part of 
countless reverse engineering tools (Carrera, n.d.). However, if the library were to somehow work 
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improperly, it could result in false disassembly, wrong opcodes, wrong addresses, wrong offsets, 
or other anomalies. Throughout preliminary investigations into Pefile, no problems have been 
discovered.  
Scope and Limitations 
From the initial dissertation proposal, the scope has been narrowed down to focus 
exclusively on JOP, one of the more widely known forms of advanced code-reuse attacks.  All 
others required complicated, difficult setup, and they fraught with their own unique set of 
problems. Each would be worthy of exploration within a dissertation, but to group them together 
would unnecessarily inflate the scope to an untenable level. Moreover, so doing would detract 
from the clarity and focus needed to refine the JOP artifact iteratively, allowing it to become the 
best tool that it can be. 
Scope has also been focused specifically on 32-bit Windows PE files. Other architectures 
are dissimilar, and it is impractical to generalize about platforms and architectures that differ so 
widely. Because the scope is limited to 32-bit Windows, one limitation is scrutiny is not given to 
the vast 64-bit landscape. There are countless 64-bit applications used on a daily basis, which could 
lend themselves to exploitation with JOP. We also lose the ability to study how the new, expanded 
64-bit registers and the Microsoft x64 calling convention may affect JOP, in terms of the number 
of gadgets produced relative to each area of classification. How the new registers and the x64 
calling convention affect the overall usefulness of JOP gadgets produced would be worthy of study 
as well.  
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Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized into chapters, adhering to conventions for DSR dissertations. 
This first chapter has provided the reader with an introduction to the research problem, while 
providing the reader introductory material on code-reuse attacks and other relevant topics pertinent 
to this study. Chapter 1 has also introduced secondary research questions and discussed the 
significance of this study; it introduces the theoretical framework, while delineating scope, 
limitations, and assumptions. In chapter 2, the literature review will provide a more in-depth 
background to all relevant topics concerning code-reuse attacks, including JOP, ROP, COOP, 
DOP, as well as the prevalent mitigations in place, including ASLR, DEP, and various forms of 
CFI. Chapter 3 will provide a discussion on the research methodology, while exploring some of 
the design choices that will be made throughout the development of the tool, as it iterates through 
the DSR cycle. Chapter 4 then will discuss the results of the framework, while highlighting many 
of the contributions that are to be provided by this novel architecture. Chapter 4 additionally will 
provide validation and evaluation of the tool. In the final chapter, conclusions and 
recommendations are made for this research, while also proposing future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 2 will survey the literature surrounding this study, while providing the necessary 
background on code-reuse attacks as well as other relevant topics. First, chapter 2 will give insights 
into memory corruption bugs. It will provide a historical overview and then introduces many of 
the most prevalent memory vulnerabilities, giving information on stack buffer overflow, heap 
corruption, heap spraying, Use-After-Free, and Double-Free. While this is not an exhaustive list 
of possible memory corruption bugs, knowledge of these topics is necessary, these vulnerabilities 
and others are necessary to provide an attacker with that first opportunity to perform a code-reuse 
attack. The literature review will provide insights into relevant topics for the most prevalent code-
reuse attacks; these include return-to-libc, return-oriented programming, Turing-complete 
features, and jump-oriented programming. 
Chapter 2 will provide discussion the numerous mitigations that have developed to respond 
to memory corruption bugs as well as code-reuse attacks, such as Data Execution Prevention, 
Address Space Layout Randomization, and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit. Code-
reuse attacks are often used to bypass some of these protections, so knowledge of them is 
important. Other countermeasures specific to ROP will be discussed, such as Kbouncer, ROPecker, 
G-Free, and ROPGuard. 
 Chapter 2 will then introduce the concept of control flow integrity. Control flow integrity 
is important as a stronger, better solution against code-reuse attacks. Insights will be given into the 
NSA’s control flow integrity solution, Control Flow Guard, Control-flow Enforcement 
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Technology, Cryptographically Enhanced Control Flow, and Lockdown. 
Code-reuse attacks and the many countermeasures that have evolved do not make for light 
reading. To be truly fluent in code-reuse attacks, a deep understanding of these topics is necessary. 
This literature review will introduce the important contributions from scholars who have worked 
in this problem domain. The literature review can only provide a general survey of these topics; 
interested readers are encouraged to investigate these topics further. 
Memory Corruption 
When performing code-reuse attacks, one is not able to simply decide to start doing ROP 
or JOP at will. There must be a way to gain entry, to get one’s payload somehow be executed by 
the CPU. This initial foothold is often accomplished via memory corruption. Having done that, an 
attacker could then launch different varieties of attacks, e.g. ROP, return-to-libc, JOP, shellcode, 
etc. This research does not examine extensively at how to accomplish these tasks, although it does 
provide a gentle introduction. It is a given that an attack will necessitate having some means of 
supplying input, often alongside some vulnerability.  
Historical Perspective and Introduction 
While credit is often given to this disclosure by Levy under his nom de plume, buffer 
overflows were known as early as 1972, per a presentation of the Computer Security Technology 
Planning Study. However, knowledge of buffer overflow remained unknown to the public, until 
1995.  It was at this time rediscovered and published on Bugtraq and then finally popularized by 
Levy, writing as Aleph One in the hacking journal Phrack. Levy describes a buffer overflow as 
follows: 
On many C implementations it is possible to corrupt the execution stack by writing past 
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the end of an array declared auto in a routine.  Code that does this is said to smash the stack, and 
can cause return from the routine to jump to a random address.  This can produce some of the most 
insidious data-dependent bugs known to mankind (1996).  
In the years that have followed, the details of the buffer overflow have become well known. 
At the heart of the buffer overflow, the stack is compromised, such that control flow can be 
overcome to facilitate the execution of unintended, often malicious code. That is, when a process 
is mapped to virtual memory, the stack is naturally used by programs and the instruction pointer, 
so that stack frames can be pushed and popped onto the stack. The stack frames may include local 
variables, function parameters, and more. The amount written to the buffer can exceed its intended 
target, and that can result in an overflow, overwriting other values on the stack (1996). It had been 
an effective way of placing arbitrary shellcode onto the stack, so that the instruction pointer could 
flow there, thereby executing the payload. Indeed, for a period of time, the stack buffer overflow 
as that simple, absent other mitigations. 
 Following Levy's disclosure, the buffer overflow gained more widespread traction, and it 
was widely used. Microsoft was slow to respond, but remediation efforts began in an earnest in 
2004, with the first release of Data Execution Prevention as an opt-in choice for users in Windows 
XP SP 2. There have been many variations of buffer overflows being exploited for exploitation. 
Related techniques have involved heap-based buffer overflows, integer overflows, and 
vulnerabilities in format string. The central theme is having the instruction pointer being overtaken 
to allow flow of control to be placed under the direction of the attacker. 
 Memory corruption can affect a wide number of operating systems and applications. The 
two primary purposes for doing so are to modify data or to hijack control flow in order to execute 
code. Data that has been modified may indirectly influence control flow, leading to a desired 
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outcome that otherwise would not have been reached. If control flow can be overcome, it is 
possible then to direct execution to shellcode, although whether or not it can be successfully 
executed will depend upon different mitigations. Buffer overflows have also been used to leverage 
information leakage, where the leaked data is the end game. 
Stack Buffer Overflow 
 At the forefront of memory corruption has been the stack buffer overflow, popularized by 
Levy, in the seminal Phrack article. While these are often thought of as the beginnings of the buffer 
overflow, it was first shared more than two decades earlier, although this was known only by few 
until its 1990's rediscovery. In a 1972 Air Force report, the buffer overflow was disclosed, as 
follows:  
By supplying addresses outside the space allocated to the users programs, it is often 
possible to get the monitor to obtain unauthorized data for that user, or at the very least, generate 
a set of conditions in the monitor that causes a system crash (Meer, 2010, 9). 
The report subsequently describes how this technique can be used to “inject” code and then 
“seize control” of the computer. In 1988, Cornell graduate student Robert Tappan Morris created 
the Morris Worm, launching it at MIT. Morris had hoped the worm would be attributed to MIT, 
with which he was unaffiliated, although he later become a tenured professor there. The Morris 
worm created a denial of service attack, and it was the first widespread use of the buffer overflow, 
causing economic disruption and leading to Morris’ conviction. 
Later, in late 1995 Peter “Mudge” Zatko wrote an informal document on writing buffer 
overflows and shellcode (Zatko, 1995; Meer, 2010, 11). After the publication of Levy's work on 
smashing the stack the next year, activity and writings on buffer overflows proliferated in great 
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abundance. 
 With the buffer overflow, a buffer is filled with data that exceeds the buffer’s boundaries, 
causing the program to overwrite adjacent memory (Zatko, 1995; Levy, 1996). The buffer overflow 
is perhaps the most well-known type of security vulnerability. Stack overflows were most relevant 
for lower level languages closer to Assembly, such as C or C++, where programmers deal with 
memory allocations and deallocations, and where there wis raw access to memory with pointers. 
A buffer overflow could have many uses. For instance, the attack could place arbitrary 
shellcode on the stack and then execute it, barring any mitigations, if a return address can be 
overwritten.  Often a stack pivot is performed, allowing for control flow to be subverted, so that it 
returns to another location on the stack. This could then contain shellcode or ROP gadgets. These 
ROP gadgets could help bypass a mitigation, and then direct execution to shellcode. All of this 
could lead to arbitrary computation, benign or malicious. Other possibilities with buffer overflow 
exist, such as overwriting local variables, a function pointer, or an exception handler. 
 Initially, defenses against buffer overflows were weak, but mitigations have been 
developed. These include stack cookies, such as Microsoft’s Stack Guard. Buffer overflows can 
also be mitigated by checking the size of the data prior to writing. A programmer may do this by 
using more secure programming techniques and choosing functions that are not vulnerable, or if 
they use a vulnerable function, to do it in a safe and secure fashion. For instance, strcpy is a 
vulnerable function, and while strncpy is a safer alternative, a programmer could write additional 
error checking to be able to use strcpy in a secure fashion (Ye, et al., 2016). 
Heap corruption 
 The heap is fundamentally different than the stack, and it is controlled by memory 
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management algorithms from the operating system. The heap also contains data regarding heap 
attributes, not limited to its relationship to other memory blocks, linked list pointers, data about its 
state, and other metadata such as vtables. 
 Heap overflow is one type of corruption that can occur, and it can function as the result of 
a buffer overflow. In environments with lower level programming languages, such as C or C++, 
the programmer must explicitly manage memory through API function calls to allocate and 
deallocate memory. Malloc is used to allocate memory in C, returning a pointer to an uninitialized 
region of memory for the allocation.  Heap overflows could overwrite critical areas, such as 
vtables, to achieve arbitrary computation. Heap overflows that are effective and succeed are much 
more complicated and may involve heap coalescing and other advanced heap techniques. 
Heap spraying 
 While not a form of memory corruption or an exploit, heap spraying has been one way by 
which to more easily exploit a vulnerability. In the past it was possible to use heap spraying with 
great effect. Heap spraying involves writing values to the heap at locations that can be found or 
that may be predictable. Mitigations have arisen that have made this a lot more challenging in 
some environments than was previously the case. Heap spraying has been used in browser exploits, 
involving VBScript, Flash, and Javascript. In the past, heap spraying has been used as a way to 
reach a specific target address, by placing NOP or similar instructions on the heap, thereby creating 
in effect, a NOP sled. The NOP or similar instructions would have no effect, until it reached a 
target address or shellcode. 
Use-After-Free 
 A use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability happens once an area of memory has been freed and 
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then is used again after having been freed (Caballero, et al., 2012). Once the memory has been 
freed, it is possible for an attacker to allocate to that previously freed memory location, filling it 
with arbitrary data, such as shellcode, ROP gadgets, or changing functionality by modifying data. 
Use-after-free can lead to several possibilities, such as achieving arbitrary computation or 
modifying data. Recent mitigations such as deferred free and isolated heap in IE have eliminated 
short-lived UAF bugs, although they do not affect long-lived UAF bugs (Bo Qu & Lu, 2014). 
Double-Free 
 The double free is a memory corruption in which an area of memory is freed twice at the 
same allocated memory, a condition that has the potential to result in a buffer overflow attack 
(Caballero, et al., 2012). Once memory is freed twice, the memory's data structures can become 
corrupt. This could lead to the program crashing, or it could lead to a condition in which the next 
two calls to malloc lead to the same pointer (“Doubly freeing,” 2018). This means an attacker 
could try to create a situation in which he is given access to this pointer to memory that has been 
double-freed. If it occurs, it is possible the attacker could subvert control flow or  
Code-Reuse Attacks 
Code-reuse attacks are often used by necessity in exploits, as a means of overcoming 
countermeasures, which serve to harden binaries as well as operating systems, making what was 
once trivial, now a more labor-intensive process. Code-reuse attacks in modern Windows often 
address, at minimum, DEP or ASLR. This chapter will discuss in detail the relevant code-reuse 
attacks that have evolved as well as the countermeasures in place to combat them. These attacks 
have evolved in simplicity from return-to-libc, to JOP, and this chapter will provide a necessary 
background to understand these topics. 
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Return-to-libc 
 ROP derived from an earlier attack, return-to-libc, as a vessel through which to skirt around 
various OS safeguards. Return-to-libc (ret2libc) is a way of make simulated function calls with 
attacker data from the stack being used as function parameters. Through ret2libc and return-
chaining multiple functions and parameters could be placed on the stack and then used, with the 
"stack unwind[ing] upward" (Dai Zovi, 2010, 18). This could be achieved by performing a buffer 
overflow and supplying an address for a function and appropriate parameters. Return-to-libc 
allowed for some arbitrary execution, but was limited in its capabilities, relative to code-reuse 
attacks that would arise later.   
Return-Oriented Programming 
Ret2libc provided the attacker with flexibility to subvert control flow, but Schacham had 
found ret2libc to be based upon "false assumptions" and marred by various "shortcomings," and 
he expanded upon it extensively, resulting in what he called return-oriented programming 
(Schacham, 2007; Kornau, 2010, 10). Schacham points out an important distinction between 
ret2libc and ROP. The former deals with entire functions calls that "perform substantial tasks," and 
they may involve many lines of code, whereas ROP gadgets may be just one to a few lines of code 
(Schacham, 2007, 5). ROP gadgets are not limited just to existing functions, but Assembly 
instructions such as ADD, SUB, XOR, etc., can be used to modify values in registers or memory. 
Each ROP gadget may perform only a small number of trivial actions that independently may mean 
very little, but a chain of ROP gadgets from discontinuous locations in the virtual memory 
collectively can result in arbitrary execution that enables a substantial task to be performed (Dai 
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Zovi, 2010, 28). The RET instruction that each gadget ends in will ensure that execution will return 
to the next location on the stack, thereby allowing for gadgets to be chained together. 
 When creating a ROP chain, an attacker will need to create a plan for what values to load 
where, what values to modify, etc., and the necessary gadgets will be found in the virtual memory. 
If any attacker wishes to call an arbitrary function, he will need to discover the address of such and 
create a ROP chain that will result in that function being executed with the correct parameters. The 
attacker would need to be careful to ensure that registers being used to hold a value are not 
inadvertently clobbered by other instructions in a ROP gadget. This could happen easily, as some 
gadgets may consist of multiple lines of instructions, and some registers may be used repeatedly 
in different instructions. Sometimes flexibility is necessary with ROP chains, and an attacker 
sometimes may be able to find another ROP gadget to compensate from the effects of less than 
desirable actions performed by a previous gadget.  
 Roemer writes that ROP works on the principle that there is a flawed idea that “preventing 
the introduction of malicious code is sufficient to prevent the introduction of malicious 
computation" by taking and using borrowed chunks of code from the process image or modules 
(Roemer, 2010, 2). A module or dynamic-link library (DLL) is a file extension in the PE file format, 
that allows executable code to be imported and used by executables. Whether compromised of 
code from module or the executable itself, ROP gadgets independently are neither benign nor 
malicious. However, they can be used to thwart mitigations such as DEP, ASLR, etc., which may 
lead to malicious computation. 
The algorithm to discover ROP gadgets works by searching the process image and modules 
for the opcode that designates a RET, which is C3, although others are possible, such as C2, C6, 
CA (Kornau, 2010; Schacham, 2007).  C3 is a near return, C2 imm16 is a near return with a stack 
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unwind, CB is a far return, and CA imm16 is a far return with a stack unwind. Once a RET is 
found, the algorithm can disassemble backwards, trying to discover useful instructions. A useful 
ROP gadget is one that does not cause flow of control to escape by not reaching the RET 
(Schacham, 2007). A C3 may be found in the middle of machine code for instructions that had not 
been intended to contain a RET. That C3 would be recognized by the ROP discovery algorithm as 
a RET, even though that was not what had been intended by the compiler. Disassembling 
backwards from that C3 could produce a useful, valid ROP gadget. This would likely include new 
Assembly instructions. Though unintended by the compiler, these instructions would be executed 
if control flow were subverted there. Schacham refers to this as the "geometry" of a language, 
where moving a byte can produce instructions that are valid instructions that are unintended 
(Schacham, 2007). This technique of finding unintended instructions, known as opcode-splitting,  
may vastly increasing the attack surface by producing many more ROP gadgets than would be 
available otherwise. Opcode-splitting frequently leads to viable results in x86, where not just 
words but whole sequences of words can be discovered (Schacham, 2007). 
 Opcode-splitting works due to the nature of Intel x86 architecture. Because the Intel x86 
architecture descends from the 8-bit 8088 processor that was used in the original IBM PC, it must 
support many legacy features. One such legacy feature involves having memory access be 
unaligned, allowing for the 8-bit and 16-bit portions of a 32-bit register to be referenced. The 
length of instructions are also variable. This differs from an architecture like SPARC, where 
instructions are not variable-length, but instead are fixed-width with enforced alignment.  
 With x86 ISA, we also have an inherent flexibility not present in some other architectures, 
where we are free to do as we like with regard to calling conventions, using the stack and calling 
conventions without restrictions. whereas with SPARC there is much less flexibility, as various 
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registers are typically used for calling conventions and function arguments. With x86 we also have 
less registers than other architectures, which some might at first think of as a hindrance, but it is 
more beneficial, because it makes it easier to coordinate data flow from various registers 
throughout various instructions, all of which may come from different ROP gadgets (Roemer, et 
al., 2012). 
 There are several considerations to be aware when constructing ROP exploits. The size of 
the binary and its loaded modules will limit the number of possible gadgets, as there may not be 
enough useful instructions in sufficient quantity to perform desired actions. Alternatively, a 
specific, desired instruction may be present, but there could be actions that occur in successive 
lines that induce side effects to other registers, prior to the RET being reached. Those side effects 
could render some potential gadgets unusable. Other problems could exist, such as losing control 
flow, such as a conditional jump, which would make a gadget unusable. 
 The success of ROP is reliant directly upon the amount of code size available. Certain 
instructions may appear with less frequency, but after one reaches a certain threshold of code size, 
the probability of having a usable number of gadgets available increases greatly. In some cases, 
with sufficiently large amounts of instructions it may be possible to have Turing-complete sets of 
gadgets, though some may be partial (Roemer, et al., 2012). 
ROP: Turing-complete Features 
 ROP has been proven to be Turing-complete in all architectures that have been 
encountered, as will be discussed (Checkoway, et al., 2010). Thus, theoretically ROP is capable of 
producing arbitrary computation in those environments purely by using only ROP gadgets, 
although in practice that may not always be the case, if there is a limited number of gadgets 
available. New defenses against code-reuse attacks could be evaluated from the standpoint of how 
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they may adversely impact Turing-complete features. If a defense can completely block one 
category of Turing-complete features, then from an evaluative standpoint we might say that the 
defense is at least partially effective. If a binary can produce Turing-complete features, then the 
argument has been that it is feasible to construct exploits allowing arbitrary computation, given a 
binary with sufficient gadgets. This section will explore in detail what constitutes Turing-complete 
features. 
Turing-complete attributes can be broken down into the following categories: (1.) memory 
load and store operations; (2.) arithmetic gadgets, which includes addition, subtraction, negation, 
multiplication, and division; (3.) logical gadgets, which includes exclusive or,  and, as well as  or; 
(4.) branching, which includes both conditional and unconditional jumps as well as loops; and (5.) 
system calls. 
Demonstrating ROP to be Turing-complete has been achieved on every architecture, thus 
far, absent any mitigations. Many coarse-grained CFI solutions, such as ROPecker, kBouncer, CFI 
for COTS binaries, EMET, and ROPGuard, etc. have claimed that they can stop ROP attacks and 
that Turing-completeness had been eliminated, owing to the reduced codebase. Yet in spite of these 
claims, Davi & Sadeghi were able to achieve a Turing-complete gadget set on all (Davi, 2014; 
Davi, 2015). Many of these solutions, while they do indeed raise the bar for difficulty, also allow 
for many more execution paths than are necessary, which a dedicated researcher can take 
advantage of (Davi & Sadeghi, 2014, 402). Others have done advanced work with ROP; Roemer, 
et al., have created a simple proof of concept compiler on the SPARC architecture. Using ROP, 
this compiler can implement a "dedicated exploit programming language" (Roemer, et al., 2012, 
28). 
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Memory Load and Store Operations 
Loading a constant is fairly straight forward, often accomplished via a POP, e.g. POP EDX 
/  RET. It could also be accomplished through loading from memory, e.g. MOV EAX, EBX / RET. 
The lods and stos instructions are other possibilities as well. Storing to registers is straightforward 
as well, with instructions like MOV EAX, EDX. Writing values to a place in memory or the stack 
is also possible.  Other less obvious ways of memory load and store operations can be implemented 
via ADD or SUB where an intermediate value is 0 (Homescu, et al., 2012).  
Arithmetic Operations 
Arithmetic operations are simple to perform. One needs to first load a value from memory 
and then perform the desired arithmetic operation, whether it be addition, subtraction, negation, 
multiplication, or division. The result must be stored to memory, if it is not already at the currently 
desired location. Addition can be accomplished via instructions such as ADD EDX, EAX. 
Subtraction can be accomplished via the SUB instruction, e.g. SUB EAX, EBX, or one could also 
emulate it via addition. It is important to be aware of less desirable alternatives for addition or 
subtraction, as ADD and SUB have same meaning as ADC and SBB, once the carry flag is cleared 
(Homescu, et al., 2012). This could be useful with smaller binaries and limited options.  
With negation, one could use NEG EAX, to give the opposite. It is also possible to use two's 
complement and add one.  
Multiplication can be accomplished via a similar process to addition or subtraction, 
although multiplication can be somewhat rare at times. In fact, Roemer et al. found no way to do 
multiplication in libc, though it was possible to emulate it with addition (Roemer, et al., 2012).  
Looping was used to facilitate multiplication or division operations when they may not been 
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otherwise available. Indeed, in the ARM architecture Davi used the ADDS or SUBS instructions 
in a loop to achieve MUL and DIV functionality (Davi, et al., 2010). 
Logical Operations 
Logical gadgets are necessary to achieve Turing-complete status, but not all may be as 
useful for ROP, with the exception of NOT. Exclusive Or is one that can be very useful, and it is 
included among logical operations, represented by the XOR instruction, e.g. XOR EDX, EAX. 
Others include AND, OR, as well as NOT. The use of NOT and AND can help achieve branching, 
depending on one's modus operandi. Finally, shift and rotate instructions are possible as well. 
Though it is interesting to note shift gadgets are not always included in Turing-complete gadget 
sets (Davi, 2015). Clearly though shifting can also be used to help achieve multiplication or 
division, although one is limited. On the whole, Davi found that logical gadgets were not quite as 
commonplace as were arithmetic gadgets (Davi, 2015). 
Branching Operations 
As a whole, branching operations are not the simplest of operations. Unconditional 
branching can be instructions such as XCHG REG, REG. Alternatively, a simple POP ESP; RET 
may sufficient to get desired branching (Roemer, et al., 2012). Davi also suggested LEAVE for 
unconditional branching, which will load ESP with a new address that had been previously loaded 
into. Davi also suggested the possibility of simply adding an offset to ESP, such as ADD ESP, 0Ch 
(Davi, 2015).Alternatively, one could load an address onto the stack or memory; whatever register 
is being used for control flow could then be moved to that location.  
While establishing branching was not difficult, doing the same with conditional branching proved 
to be the most challenging of all the Turing-complete features to achieve using ROP (Roemer, et 
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al., 2012). The conditional jump instructions are not useful for ROP, and many require certain 
flags to be set. To achieve conditional branching, Davi required four instruction sequences: 
negation of a register value, subtraction with carry of that value and itself, anding the value, and 
LEAVE: 
NEG EAX;  
SBB EAX,  
EAX;  
AND EAX,[EBP-4];  
LEAVE 
The result is EAX would be the same as EBP-4 if EAX was zero, and if it was not, then EAX 
would be zero.   
There are other ways to achieve the conditional jump. Conditional jumps could also be 
done with ADC. There would need to be two values in registers, then the ADC, add with carry, 
could be used to give the sum of the operand as well as the carry flag. If the two operands were 
zero, then the result would be either 0 or 1, which can be used to perturb a register, such as ESP 
(Roemer, et al., 2012). Conditional branching could be achieved by using addition or logical 
operations to set or clear a flag; PUSHFD could then be used to put EFLAGS onto the stack (Chen, 
2011). One can extract the flag of interest from the stack through an arithmetic or logical operation. 
Then, one can then use neg on the register containing the extracted value. It will be 0 or -1 (Chen, 
2010). One then could set the offset to perturb as either 0 or whatever the original value was, based 
on flag information (Chen, 2011).  Various other ways can be used to achieve conditional 
branching. Davi found more than a dozen possible ways of doing unconditional branching in 
Kernel32 (Davi, 2015). 
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System and Function Calls  
System calls and function calls are important for exploits, as they allow for different 
functions of the operating system to be performed, such as memory allocation, executing a file, or 
changing memory protections, etc. In Linux, the system call is typically done via a software 
interrupt, such as INT 0x80 or Syscall, for 32-bit and 64-bit Intel respectively, and the EAX 
register to specify the system call (Davi, 2015). In Google Android, rather than using EAX for 
system calls, the system call number would be in R7 (Davi, et al., 2010). On Windows, one 
typically uses wrapper functions, such as the Windows API and the necessary parameters, to gain 
access to system calls. For the attacker, system calls can be more time consuming to perform in 
Windows, than in Linux. It is more straightforward to use syscall, to call on any of the numerous 
system calls available in Linux1. For instance, in Linux the mprotectto function could make a page 
writable and executable, and this would use syscall with 125 in EAX, as well as appropriate 
parameters for EBX, ECX, AND EDX. Additionally, in Linux sys_execve can be used to 
implement a function call from libc.   
Other Useful Operations 
Additional operations can help facilitate the smooth functioning of Turing-complete 
features on the ISA-86, even though they outside their purview. For instance, in dealing with 
function calls, NULL is sometimes required, and so having a NULL-byte gadget would be 
advantageous. One illustrative function is strcpy, which stops coping data after a NULL, yet the 
attacker is at an impasse, as a NULL would typically break a payload. One solution is the AND 
instruction, which can be used to create a NULL, after strcpy had been used (Davi, 2015). 
                                                 
1 See Linux System Call Table at http://docs.cs.up.ac.za/programming/asm/derick_tut/syscalls.html for 190 system 
calls and required register values.  
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The Long-NOP gadget can be particularly useful in allowing a ROP gadget to stay viable. 
Some behavioral heuristics can be set off with seven or more short gadgets, and having a Long-
NOP gadget is a way to do this. A long-NOP gadget could be one that is 20 or more instructions 
that perform actions of no consequence to the attacker. Ideally, the Long-NOP is one that makes 
use of few registers, helping ensure that the registers used for the attack are preserved. The Long-
NOP should be selected to ensure no side effects are caused for registers used by the ROP (Davi 
& Sadeghi, 2014) 
Beyond ROP 
 While return-oriented programming was cutting edge a decade ago, there are presently 
myriad defenses against with others in development. This has necessitated that attackers to 
consider other possibilities. We must think beyond ROP, into the more general concept of code-
reuse attacks. Me may define these as attacks that subvert control flow by manipulating existing 
code to be used in an unintended fashion (Davi, 2015, 9). We may view ROP as a subset of code-
reuse attacks. Code-reuse attacks need not confine itself simply to ROP or ret2libc; the possibilities 
are limited only by the imagination of its creators. And there have been a number of variations, 
some of which this research will discuss. 
 As mitigations increased the difficulty of performing ROP, more advanced code-reuse 
attacks were developed, as introduced by Checkoway & Shacham (2010, 2-3). The idea was the 
same: use gadgets to modify the control flow and allow for execution of gadgets to achieve 
arbitrary computation, chaining them together with some other element of control flow.  
 One alternative subset of code-reuse attacks that emerged was Jump-Oriented 
Programming (JOP). With JOP, instead of using RET instructions to chain together gadgets, an 
indirect call or jump could be used to subvert control flow. Significant, additional complexity is 
  40 
 
also required for JOP. 
 Different paradigms evolved for JOP, but the most useful of which was introduce by 
Bletsch. This paradigm uses a dispatcher gadget in conjunction with a program counter to move 
along control flow (Bletsch, et al., 2011). In a sense, a dispatcher gadget happens automatically on 
the stack with ROP, due to the inherent nature of IA86. With JOP though, since RET is not being 
used, it does not naturally unwind to the next location, and thus a special dispatcher gadget and 
program counter are necessary to emulate the functionality of what happens with the stack. Most 
current ROP mitigations do not work with JOP attacks, so that is a strong reason in favor of using 
JOP. In actual practice, JOP is far more difficult to construct, due to absence of appropriate tools, 
much higher complexity in implementing, and much fewer viable gadgets, relative to ROP. 
Jump-Oriented Programming 
  JOP may make use of many varieties of vulnerabilities, including heap over flow, buffer 
overflow, use-after-free are vulnerabilities (Goktas, et al., 2014). ROP has been en vogue for some 
time since its academic “discovery” in 2007, but JOP has not caught on nearly to the extent. Even 
as of 2015, there have been claims there have been no real world JOP attacks  (Qiao, et al., 2015). 
That is not accurate, but they are very rare; the first real world JOP attacks were known to have 
started in 2010, targeting Adobe PDF. In the literature, Erdődi demonstrated in a JOP attack which 
added a user to Windows (Erdődi, "Attacking x86," 2013).  
With JOP we can identify three distinct varieties of way of performing JOP. The first is the 
"Bring your own pop jump (BYOPJ)" paradigm, as introduced by Checkoway and Shacham. The 
second involves a method of setting up a dispatcher table, as introduced by Bletsch in 2011. Third, 
there is a method that involves control gadgets and “combinational gadgets,” which we consider a 
distinct category in its own right, although it could also be seen as a variation on Bletsch's 
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dispatcher gadget paradigm (Chen, et al., 2011). 
 There is a good reason JOP has not been used much. In the past, JOP simply was not 
necessary, as DEP was not rigidly enforced, and ROP defenses were in their infancy (Davi, 2015). 
ROP is far simpler and easier, and often inadequate defenses are in place to prevent ROP from 
being performed. Why would someone want to spend hours in a manual process to discover JOP 
gadgets, when there is a possibility there may not be sufficient JOP gadgets to mount an attack. 
Clearly, ROP would be the better choice. However, as chapter 1 discussed, there can be times when 
there are strong ROP defenses in place, but inadequate security for JOP. If countermeasures mean 
there is a forced absence of ROP, which is a goal of many CFI implementations, then JOP would 
be viable. 
 Intel’s proposed CET is intended to make JOP impossible, although it may be years off, 
and it would require hardware-based support. It would involve indirect branch tracking and a 
shadow stack. CET would result in forced alignment to some extent, which would force the 
absence of opcode-splitting (“Control-flow Enforcement,” 2017). This by itself would severely 
reduce the attack surface, such that attacks likely would not be probable, purely on that reason. 
Indirect branching would prevent attackers from entering in the middle of functions as well, which 
would require longer gadgets. This would likely induce side effects, which would clobber values 
that need to be preserved in some registers. These two features would have the effect of making 
nearly all JOP gadgets unusable.  
 Barring those restrictions from potential CFI solutions, JOP could present itself as a useful 
code-reuse attack paradigm. As example of JOP's potential value, Chen et al. created a 
sophisticated, kernel-level rootkit constructed out of JOP, using linux-2.6.15 to perform arbitrary 
computation. This enabled them to evade most methods to check kernel integrity as well as the 
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latest ROP detection schemes then present (Chen, et al., 2011). 
Jump-Oriented Programming: Bring Your Own Pop Jump Paradigm 
Checkoway and Shacham introduced a new type of code reuse attack, the first variety of 
JOP attacks, bring your own pop jump (BYOPJ) or ROP without using return instructions. This 
paradigm of JOP required a special sequence to initialize, though inconveniently it is not often 
found naturally in code (Davi, 2015). Checkoway & Schacham used a POP X; JMP *X sequence, 
with X being any register. This sequence shares attributes with RET, in that it both retrieves a value 
at the top of the stack and sets the EIP to said value. In addition, an attacker could use POP X; JMP 
*C(X), where C is a constant. Instead of placing a value of Y into X, the attack would simply then 
do Y-C, to take into account the offset The POP X; JMP *X is not common; in fact, the POP X; 
JMP *X sequence is so rare it is not found even once in libc. Thus, this paradigm is not highly 
realistic for practical use in the wild. However, Checkoway & Shacham speculate it could be in 
large enough binaries, and they point out the  sequence of POP X; JMP *X is needed only once. 
The rest can be JMP *Y with Y serving as a pointer to the POP X; JMP *X sequence. The register 
holding the POP X; JMP *X address need not be static; that is to say, an attacker could be creative 
and shuffle it from register to another, as long as it ends up going to the register containing the 
address of the sequence. Other means can be used to load an address into *X, so only JMP X would 
be necessary (Checkoway & Shacham, 2010). 
Jump-Oriented Programming: Dispatcher Gadget Paradigm 
With JOP, each gadget ends with an indirect jump. However, unlike ROP, JOP gadgets are 
"uni-directional," and they keep going forward without an easy way to bring control back. The 
solution to this impasse was the dispatcher gadgets to both "dispatch and execute" the gadgets, 
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thereby serving to "govern control flow among various jump-oriented gadgets" (Bletsch, et al., 
2011). Bletsch, et al., had found that the BYOPJ paradigm difficult and cumbersome, and thus they 
developed dispatcher gadgets. The logic is much the same as with the BYOPJ paradigm, but 
instead of a rare sequence of POP X / JMP X, the dispatcher gadget is utilized instead. The 
dispatcher gadget a will subvert control flow to "an internal dispatch table that explicitly specifies 
the control flow of the functional gadgets" (Bletsch, et al., 2011). 
The program counter is used in conjunction with the dispatcher gadget; it may be used to 
point to the dispatcher table with be any register. With every invocation, the dispatch table 
advances to the next functional JOP gadget and launches it. Given that the stack is not necessary 
for JOP, the dispatcher can use potentially any memory, even that which is not contiguous, to begin 
the dispatch table, absent any consideration for possible mitigations in place (Bletsch, et al., 2011). 
With the JOP dispatcher, one register can hold the address to the dispatch table.  Instead of the 
stack, we have something that is predictable, such as adding or subtracting. The hacker have 
appropriate gadgets in memory. If a constant such as 4 is used to advance the program counter, 
then the table can be organized as an array, while if a memory deference occurs, it can be done 
more in the manner of a linked list (Bletsch, et al., 2011). 
 The functional gadgets in JOP are designed to go to code pointers that perform the 
desired instructions, or what would be considered the just simply gadgets under ROP, only now 
they end with an indirect jump (Bletsch, et al., 2011). The functional gadgets could be operations 
such as Turing-complete features, loading system calls, etc., or any arbitrary computation. The 
requirements of the functional gadgets are twofold. First, they must jump back to the dispatcher 
table after executing the function. Second, they cannot have side effects that are destructive to 
values within the dispatcher gadget (Erdődi, 2013, "Finding Dispatcher Gadgets"). It may be 
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possible to have a functional gadget that could survive side effects, if needed registers were 
moved to onother registers or places in memory and could then be restored. Such measures may 
be necessary at times, given the paucity of functional gadgets available. 
 Careful thought is required for selection of dispatcher gadgets. The dispatcher gadgets 
should be as short as possible, because each register that is modified in other lines may not be able 
to be used much, as that register would be clobbered endlessly. The more registers that are 
clobbered, the less viable the dispatcher gadget candidate is. The only exception would be an 
intermediate gadget to somehow restore the gadgets. A less commonly used register would be more 
well suited as a dispatcher gadget, to state the obvious. Erdődi points out there are many possible 
ways to change the pointer of dispatcher gadget, such as incrementing or decrementing a register, 
adding or subtracting a value from a register, moving a constant value and a register to a register, 
or moving a dereferenced register to a register (Erdődi, 2013). It is considered suboptimal to have 
a conditional jump within the dispatcher gadget, even though it is feasible the EFLAGS value 
would evaluate to false. Whilst it is certainly unfavorable, it is still potentially viable, though it 
adds greater complexity both to the gadget searching and the JOP construction. 
Jump-Oriented Programming: BLX Attack on ARM 
JOP need not confine itself purely to one architecture. JOP is more limited on  ARM. In his 
dissertation and other work, Davi establishes one way to perform JOP on ARM using a BLX attack. 
Davi's work with ARM included developing a Turing-complete gadget set for a BLX attack. Davi's 
gadget catalogue included the following categories: memory operations (e.g. load and store), data 
processing (e.g. arithmetic and logical operations), control flow (e.g. branching), and system and 
functional calls (Davi, 2015). 
The BLX jump-oriented attack centered around the indirect call instruction BLX, or 
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Branch-Link-Exchange. Only the BLX will allow indirect function calls, accessing addresses of a 
branch that may be held in a register, hence this instruction being pivotal to the attack (Davi, et al., 
2010). Davi faced hurdles because ARM has memory alignment, thereby significantly reducing 
potential gadgets due to lack of opcode splicing (Davi, et al., 2010).  Developing a BLX-based 
JOP attack on ARM may be somewhat similar to developing an attack for the NSA CFI scheme, 
due to the rigid memory alignment, thereby prohibiting opcode splicing and thus creating a paucity 
of instructions. Davi was able to use a heap-overflow vulnerability in conjunction with JOP to 
attack an Android app and thereby send SMS message (Davi, 2015). 
Solutions and Countermeasures 
 As buffer overflow attacks and later ROP became more prevalent, it was necessary to 
employ different countermeasures. Two of the earliest and most well-known were DEP and ASLR, 
although bypasses soon developed against both. Other detection and mitigation strategies employ 
different techniques, tools, and heuristics in order to harden binaries against ROP. Some ROP 
detection programs can identify and block ROP. With heuristics, it is possible to create a signature 
of different attributes, such as what is referred to as length, or the number of memory address that 
appear on the stack, one after the other.  ROP attacks often are comprised of long sequences of 
short gadgets. Thus, length can help find ROP as that attribute would not occur otherwise (Carlini, 
et al., 2014).T he behavior of the binary can also be useful with heuristics in detecting ROP. Other 
strategies such as control flow integrity can provide some degree of protection against code-reuse 
attacks, although this varies greatly among implementations. 
DEP 
 Microsoft attempted to provide mitigation against shellcode attacks with Data Execution 
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Prevention (DEP). This was in response to vulnerabilities that had arisen out of buffer overflows. 
This dealt with memory pages, and it prevented code that was readable and writeable from also 
being executable (“Data Execution Prevention,” 2009). With DEP in place, attempting to execute 
memory protected by DEP will result in an access violation and program termination. With the 
/NX used on a compiler, DEP could be utilized on binaries compiled with Visual Studio. As a 
mitigation, DEP’s utility is limited, as various ways have been devised to bypass it, most 
commonly involving ROP and function calls to VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect. Once DEP has been 
bypassed, then it is possible to have a region of memory that is both readable and writable as well 
as executable, meaning an attacker could write and execute shellcode at the same location. 
ASLR 
 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) was designed to provide a challenge against 
ROP. ASLR randomizes the regions of memory, including the heap, parts of the stack, as well as 
module base addresses. ASLR makes it unknowable where certain items will be in memory. Prior 
to ASLR, these memory addresses would typically be predictable, based on different factors, such 
as operating system, software version number, etc. ASLR was first deployed on Windows Vista 
on, but it has evolved and subsequently been further hardened. There have been a couple problems 
associated with ASLR. Memory disclosures can allow for it to be overcome; once a memory 
disclosure is found, offsets can then be calculated to figure out addresses of desired functions or 
gadgets, thereby negating the effect of ASLR. The second problem was low entropy in terms of 
randomization for ASLR. This meant memory addresses were not predictable, but they could be 
brute-forced. However, this has since been remediated by introducing high entropy ASLR with 
x64 Windows 8 and up. 
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EMET 
 Microsoft’s EMET is a free security toolkit from Microsoft. For several years it was a 
cutting-edge security tool, providing features to attempt to mitigate or stop different exploitation 
strategies, including ROP. It contains several mitigations to provide protections, such as Caller 
check, SimExecFlow check, LoadLibrary check, EAF check, MemProt check, and Stack Pivot 
check. While these and others checks provide strong protection against ROP, they do not stop JOP. 
EMET could best be viewed as a hodgepodge of various tricks and tools to try to limit the efficacy 
of code-reuse attacks and other exploitation techniques. EMET provided strong defenses for 
several years, but it soon became subject to a number of bypasses, most notably by DeMott (2015). 
DeMott found several shortcomings in EMET that allowed a total bypass. As others created 
bypasses, Microsoft continued to update the tool and mitigate against those bypasses. However, it 
became clear that EMET would continuously be an arms race with attackers, with the different 
protections that were to evolve serving as merely the next hacker challenge.  
EMET is not a tool that enforces CFI. Control flow integrity was viewed by some as the 
ultimate solution to ROP. After all, a perfect control flow graph would not allow the unintended 
ROP gadgets to be reached in the first place. In actual practice, achieving this is fraught with 
difficulty, some of which is detailed later in the literature review. Given EMET’s inherent 
limitations, efforts were made to replace EMET with a more resilient tool that would be impervious 
to bypasses. Microsoft worked to develop their own instantiation of control flow integrity, resulting 
in Control Flow Guard (CFG).  
Additionally, Windows 10 also provides similar functionality built into the operating 
system, in the form of Process Mitigation Management Tool and Windows Defender Exploit Guard 
(Bright, 2017; “ProcessMitigations,” 2018; “Windows Defender,” 2018). 
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 While EMET has since been deprecated and is no longer supported as of July 2018, it still 
may be used by those utilizing older operating systems that lack CFG and other defenses.  
Control Flow Integrity Background 
 Control flow integrity (CFI) could be used as a final solution to code-reuse attacks, given 
the perfect yet at present unobtainable implementation. CFI refers to how an operating system may 
implement the natural control flow graph for a program for which it was intended.    
The principle behind CFI is to determine an application’s control flow graph before 
program execution, allowing the control flow graph to be used to require that control flow adheres 
to paths defined in the control flow graph. CFI can be either looser or stricter, i.e. fine-grained or 
coarse-grained. Failure to follow said paths as set forth in the control flow graph generally results 
in application termination. What makes up those paths is defined by different CFI solutions, with 
varying levels of granularity (Davi & Sadeghi, 2014). Precision is important in a control flow 
graph. In a fully-precise static control flow graph, an indirect control flow is permitted only when 
there is a legitimate trace that follows the edge, avoids malicious attempts at control hijacking, and 
does not limit functionality. Often real-world implementations rely upon static analysis to create 
the control flow graph, and the result often is an overly loose, coarse-grained control flow graph 
(Carlini, et al., 2015). A fine-grained defense is a closer attempt to fully-precise control flow graph, 
but it can be overly restrictive, meaning it may block paths that are legitimate.   
 According to Davi & Sadeghi, CFI can be broken into three categories of policies. The first 
deals with rules for indirect branching. Second, there may be heuristics that attempt to capture 
attributes of ROP behavior that may try to undermine CFI. The final category is when the 
inspection occurs (Davi & Sadeghi, 2014, 404). The strength of CFI is in how precise the control 
flow graph is, i.e. the hard limit for precision, as well as how precise run-time checks may be. If it 
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is inadequately precise, then unintended control flow may occur (Payer, et al., 2015). 
 In the control flow graph, there are basic blocks (BBLs) represented as nodes. A BBL is a 
sequence of Assembly instructions and edges, which function to connect two nodes. Control flow 
may occur directly or indirectly, as with return, jump, and call. To facilitate this, CFI often inserts 
labels at the start of BBLs. CFI validates control flow transfers that occur at runtime, to ensure 
indirect branches go to BBLs that have the appropriate label (Davi & Sadeghi, 2014). CFI that is 
looser, in that it allows for fewer labels, may improve performance, but it results in a control flow 
graph that is less precise. On the other hand, as far as practical implementations are concerned, 
CFI that is based on a strict control flow graph could limit legitimate returns, so there is the 
dichotomy of being too strict and causing potential exceptions with greater overhead, and then 
being less strict with lower overhead but leaving more opportunity for exploitation (Goktas, et al., 
2014).  
 When discussing CFI, it is important to be aware of the different protections that can be 
offered to different types of attacks. Forward-edge CFI protects against indirect JMP or CALL 
sites, while backward-edge CFI protects against RET instructions (Spisak, 2017). 
 CFI needs to have a shadow stack in order to have a strong defense (Carlini, et al., 2015). 
The shadow stack is merely one way to help implement some of the policies of CFI, though it is 
one of the strongest ways of doing so. There can be a sharp cost though, as some CFI 
implementations with shadow stacks can have performance overheads, with an average as high as 
21% (Davi & Sadeghi, 2014). This clearly means that CFI without dedicated hardware is not quite 
ready for widespread deployment. Dedicated hardware is not available, although Intel is working 
on the forthcoming CET. 
  One of the main efforts at restricting returns is performed via a shadow stack. The idea is 
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that only legitimate return addresses, i.e. those placed on a shadow stack, can be returned to without 
triggering an application termination. This helps prevent the arbitrary arrangement of code pointers 
ending in ret from achieving a ROP payload. CFI with a shadow stack will typically limit an 
attacker to just system calls that are available within the application (Carlini, et al., 2015). There 
have been several drawbacks to previous efforts at shadow stacks. One is incompleteness, in that 
they protect against code from compilers, but not so from hand-written assembly, potentially 
leaving some third party libraries unprotected. There are also incompatibility issues, where 
complex program may have returns that do not match calls, leading to false positives. These are 
serious issues that need to be addressed, before any implementation should have widespread 
deployment (Qiao, et al., 2015). 
Control Flow Guard and Return Flow Guard 
 Control Flow Guard (CFG) is Microsoft's attempt to prevent control flow to unintended 
locations. It accomplishes this chiefly by storing valid addresses in a bitmap and performing a 
check before every indirect call, in an effort to ensure the target address is valid. CFG offers 
defense against ROP, though it is very coarse-grained. CFG does provide forward-edge CFI, so it 
offers protection against indirect CALL or JMP sites. Microsoft’s Return Flow Guard (RFG) 
provides complimentary support for backward-edge CFI, by providing a software-based shadow 
stack. With RFG, protection is not assured for return addresses, as it is possible to call valid 
functions out of context. It is also possible to corrupt return addresses on the stack. CFG willl 
integrate with the proposed CET hardware enhancement from Intel, further hardening the CFI 
protection offered. Many individuals have bypassed CFG and RFG (Wojtczuk & DeMott, 2015;  
Spisak, 2017), and it is anticipated bypasses will continue to emerge.  
  51 
 
NSA's CFI Implementation 
 The NSA developed a proposal for CFI that would do very well in mitigating both ROP 
and JOP attacks. Their proposed implementation consists of a shadow stack, which is implemented 
at the hardware level (NSA, 2015). The hardware for the shadow stack has not been prototyped, 
and they left some questions as to how it would work up to the industry. For it to be adopted would 
require considerable industry buy-in of the idea. It seems that Intel has taken notice, and they have 
worked to develop a solution that offers similar functionality, CET. The second key part of the 
NSA proposal was the addition of three landing point instructions to Assembly. These are for the 
RET instruction and movement to CALL or JMP sites. That is, the compiler would produce these 
landing point instructions at the start of the function. If a code-reuse attack attempted to enter a 
function at a location other than the entry point, then there would be an exception, causing the 
processor to abort the program. This would prevent opcode-splitting from being used additionally. 
Currently, the opcodes for these landing point instructions would function as NOPs.  The NSA's 
proposed CFI scheme could function with just the landing point instructions, or it could function 
with the landing point instructions and the hardware shadow stack. The work of several researchers 
indicates it is feasible though very unlikely that the landing point instructions could be defeated in 
any meaningful way, in the absence of the shadow stack, though some Turing-complete features 
can be performed. The chances of doing an actual attack with landing point instructions present is 
highly unlikely, and if it were possible to do so, it would take considerable effort and likely would 
be very limited. With the presence of the proposed shadow stick, the chances of this CFI scheme 
being compromised in any meaningful way are highly remote. 
CET 
 Intel and Microsoft have proposed a new technology to deal with CFI. Control-flow 
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Enforcement Technology (CET) is a joint effort to rigidly enforce CFI (Intel, 2017). CET is 
comprised of two elements, a hardware-based shadow stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.  The 
CET shadow stack is used only for control flow operations, such as control flow addresses and 
shadow_stack_load and shadow_stack_store;  no other values are kept there (Intel, 2017). It is held 
in system RAM and protected by the CPU memory management unit (Williams, 2016). With 
Indirect Branch Tracking, we have a new instruction, Endbranch. This is used to mark and keep 
track of control flow targets that are valid. As with the NSA proposal, the opcode is otherwise a 
NOP for legacy systems. Indirect Branch Tracking uses a sate machine, to keep track of calls and 
jumps. If there is a JMP or a CALL, the state will go from IDLE to WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH. 
If the endbranch is not forthcoming, there will be a fault. Thus, the endbranch instruction is able 
to help find control flow violations. For CET to function, the processor needs to offer support for 
it. CET is currently in preview. However, GCC and Microsoft Visual Studio both have begun 
compiler support for CET. It is unknown when Intel will roll out CET. 
 CET is similar in some respects to the efforts from the NSA Information Assurance 
Directorate. Both involve a shadow stack for to implement backward-edge CFI. NSA's CFI scheme 
is more fine-grained, however, with different landing point instructions. CET was influenced by 
the NSA proposal, but it has taken a different approach. Both require hardware support, and as 
such there are not implementations available as yet to researchers, though the NSA made compiled 
ELF binaries publicly available to researchers on their GitHub. 
Other ROP Solutions 
While EMET, CFG, DEP, and ASLR all provide strong yet imperfect defense against ROP, 
there are various other solutions that have been developed. A sampling of some other solutions to 
  53 
 
ROP are provided here. Some of these mitigations, while providing lower overhead and good 
security, can be compromised (Carlini & Wagner, 20014). 
Kbouncer 
 Kbouncer can utilize hardware to examine a variety of indirect branches, to try to determine 
if ROP is being attempted. If a system call is made, kBouncer can examine the history to verify 
the call was valid and not part of a ROP gadget. Whenever a system call is made kBouncer, it will 
utilize Last Branch Record to examine a history of 16 of the last indirect jumps, making sure that 
they all return to only an address that was call-preceded. If kBouncer can detect that 8 of the last 
memory addresses utilized are gadget-like, then it will kill the process. One behavioral heuristic is 
to specifically check that each RET is preceded by a CALL instruction (Carlini, et al., 2014). 
Another common heuristic is examining the histories of gadgets. If enough of what appears to be 
ROP gadgets are used in a set period of intervals, then it could be flagged as ROP. While this is a 
valid signature pattern, an attacker could still overcome it. For instances, the histories kBouncer 
maintains only go so far before they are overwritten, and an attacker could exploit this. A history 
flushing attack could be performed by making a 16 safe indirect jumps sufficient to wipe out 
kBouncer's history (Carlini, et al., 2014). 
ROPecker 
 ROPecker is an extension available to kBouncer. ROPecker can look at different places for 
an attack throughout the execution of a program (Carlini, et al., 2014). ROPecker performs its 
inspections more frequently and in a more meticulous fashion. ROPecker additionally allows for 
only a small number of pages to be executable. Thus, if there is an attempt to execute a page outside 
this range, a page fault will occur. ROPecker will then commence searching for an attack. Like 
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kBouncer, ROPecker also performs efforts at detection whenever a system call is made. If a page 
fault occurs, not only will ROPecker look at the past history via the Last Branch Record, but it will 
also look forward at what it is about to happen. With ROPecker, if 11 or more of what could be 
considered gadgets that are less than six instructions in length occur back to back, then it will 
terminate the process (Carlini, et al, 2014).  
As with most ROP defenses, ROPecker is not impenetrable. One way is to use an evasion 
attack and make use of a termination gadget after 10 or less gadgets; this would ensure that the 
number of gadgets needed to trigger the process being terminated (11) is not reached. An attacker 
would need to be careful choosing a termination gadget, to ensure that any registers that need to 
be preserved are not clobbered.  
G-Free 
 G-Free is another tool that can help combat ROP (Onarlioglu, et al., 2010). 
G-Free achieves its defensive capabilities through recompilation. How it accomplishes this is by 
taking away unintended ret instructions and by also encrypting return addresses. It enhances this 
security by going further and encrypting the return address with a random nonce at the function 
entry point and then ensuring it is there at the function exit (Goktas, et al., 2014; Qiao, et al., 2015). 
If recompilation is occurring, then the result will be that ROP gadgets are then made to be 
challenging to use. Another of the ways in which G-Free can provide defense is through enforcing 
alignment, which is critical in reducing the attack surface (Goktas, et al., 2014). One of the key 
ways in which ROP is able to increase the attack surface is through opcode splicing, as IA-86 does 
not enforce alignment; G-Free would mitigate this. 
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ROPGuard 
 ROPGuard is a tool to detect and prevent ROP, and it won second prize for Microsoft’s 
BlueHat Prize contest. As part of that, some of its functionality was later baked into EMET. 
ROPGuard works to ensure essential Windows API functions must have a call-preceded instruction 
occur first. ROPGuard also checks that the word that precedes the return address is the true start 
of an essential function. This will protect essential functions, but it does not offer the same 
protection for non-critical functions. ROPGuard also provides additional security by examining 
the stack to look for what could be other possible ROP gadgets, and if these are found, the program 
then terminates. ROPGuard makes use of heuristics in order to check and see if a stack pointer 
does not go beyond what is defined as the limits for the stack, thereby mitigating against attacks 
on the heap (Davi & Sadeghi, 2014). 
 ROPGuard offers no protection with respect to indirect jumps or calls, so while it may 
provide defense against ROP, it does not provide defense against JOP. 
Other CFI Solutions 
Microsoft’s Control Flow Guard is the preeminent implementation of CFI, but there have 
been many different CFI solutions that have been developed. Section examines some prominent 
ones that have appeared in the academic literature. 
Cryptographically Enhanced Control Flow 
 Cryptography can be used to enhance CFI. The proposal for Cryptographically Enhanced 
Control Flow still requires a fair amount of work to be effective, but it holds great promise. The 
approach is to utilize message authentication codes (MAC) to provide assurance for vtable 
pointers, return addresses, and function pointers, thereby greatly hardening the control flow 
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(Mashtizadeh, et al., 2014). This provides a number of advantages. First, CCFI requires that in 
order for an adversary to launch a ROP attacker, they must somehow observe a specific MAC that 
it is utilized. Second, CCFI requires that a MAC can only be utilized with the pointer that it is 
associated with. These two facts together can help avoid the need for an open, coarse-grained CFI, 
as that assurance will be provided instead by the MACs. 
 Whenever any objects pertaining to control flow are encountered, the return address is 
placed on the stack alongside MACs generated using the return address and the frame pointer. 
Subsequently, the MAC is verified in the epilogue before it is returned to the caller. This is key in 
helping to avoid a hypothetical attack where the adversary would pop the upper stack frame, in 
order to then move to different return addresses.  
CCFI implements its cryptography by storing a random key in a dedicated register. 
Utilizing a register can help prevent a memory disclosure. In addition, the MAC also includes 
additional metadata to help mitigate against the threat of swapping pointers that could have been 
leaked. CCFI also makes effort to mitigate against other emerging attacks. Thus, RELRO is utilized 
to ensure that the GOT is made read-only, thus getting rid of an older attack that is seeing increased 
use (Mashtizadeh, et al., 2014). 
 CCFI is subject to criticism. Some programs required manual computations for MAC to be 
inserted, which would be impractical for a real-world implementation. Other issues can arise, as 
when void* is used for both arguments of memcpy. Most concerning of all is the high performance 
overhead, which can range from a lower 3-18% to an unacceptably high 38%. It is also possible 
the hashing may be too expensive an operation to perform for any real-world CFI implementation. 
CCFI, while imperfect, is mentioned because of the innovation and the tremendous that hashing 
may add.  
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Lockdown 
Lockdown is another prominent tool that provides a more fine-grained, dynamic approach 
to CFI (Payer, et al., 2015). With Lockdown, import and export definitions are used to approximate 
the jump targets, and target approximation can also occur at time of execution through dynamic 
binary analysis, thereby dynamically changing the control flow graph for the process being 
executed. Furthermore, the current object can only proceed to where it is dictated by the current 
object imports and exports, thereby allowing for only valid functions to be reached (Payer, et al., 
2015). One of the more robust ways in which Lockdown enforces control flow integrity is through 
the shadow stack. Thus, valid addresses from function calls to specific addresses are placed onto 
a shadow stack. If there is an attempt made to reach an address that has not already been placed on 
the shadow stack, then the program will fault. In addition, the shadow stack within Lockdown also 
requires that control can only be given back to the caller or sometimes the previous caller, thereby 
preventing many addresses for ROP gadgets (Payer, et al., 2015). Lockdown is fine-grained in its 
approach to CFI, and it becomes increasingly more fine-grained when there are more modules or 
libraries associated with a process. Thus, the more libraries there are, the more fine-grained the 
CFI (Payer, et al., 2015). Lockdown also augments its defensive capabilities against ROP with 
strong restrictions on intra-module indirect calls. Beyond these powerful capabilities, Lockdown 
can analyze and make sense of symtab and dynsym information from ELF binaries to better restrict 
boundaries for jumps (Payer, et al, 148-150). 
Summary 
Chapter 2 has explored the evolution of code reuse attacks from return-to-libc, to ROP, and 
to JOP. Prominent forms of memory corruption have gently been introduced to the reader. There 
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has been discussion on the different mitigations and countermeasures that have arisen, such as 
DEP, ASLR, EMET, as well as various implementations of CFI, e.g. Microsoft’s CFG. Other 
solutions to ROP and CFI have been examined. Chapter 2 will help provide a broad overview of 
the necessary concepts one must grasp to be fluent in code-reuse attacks.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Chapter 2 provided a broad overview of the literature that comprises the background 
needed for this research. We were able to ascertain the current state of research with respect to 
code-reuse attacks and the various mitigations in place that attempt to curtail their usage. In the 
sections that are to follow, Chapter 3 will present the research methods that will be employed in 
this study. In addition, this chapter will not only discuss how this framework works, but it will \ 
demonstrate why this framework is the inevitable result of a DSR inquiry into this research 
question.  This chapter will discuss how this research satisfies the design science guidelines of 
both Wieringa (2014) and Hevner, et al. (2014). Finally, chapter 3 will define in detail the 
requirements, development, as well as implementation of the framework. 
We are reminded that purpose of this research broadly is to facilitate advanced code-reuse 
attacks. More specifically, this research aims to develop a novel framework can greatly simplify 
the process of constructing JOP exploits, making what was once a manual and potentially labor-
intensive process, into a far simpler and more fruitful activity. 
Hypothesis 
A hypothesis takes a clearly worded stance that predicts the behavior of different variables 
within a system (Creswell, 2018). The hypothesis for this study is that a software tool can be 
created to greatly reduce the effort required to construct a JOP exploit. This hypothesis will guide 
the work that will be done in this study. Without the presence of this framework and its methods, 
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the effort needed to construct JOP exploits would be significantly higher. This is a causal 
explanation, describing how this framework will facilitate a possible occurrence. 
The null hypothesis will be that a software tool cannot be created to greatly reduce the 
effort required to construct a JOP exploit.  
Research Approach 
 This research will make use of design science methodology, and the resulting artifact, the 
JOP ROCKET, will answer the research question. While Hevner, et al., are much more well-known 
with design science, this research will pursue a DSR inquiry by looking at Wieringa, due to the 
highly technical nature of this work. Wieringa’s approach to design science is better suited to this 
study, as it is more apposite to software development, reverse engineering, and exploit 
development. The JOP ROCKET is not intended for information systems or business use, but 
because of its widespread use in design science, this chapter will endeavor wherever possible to 
show how it not only follows Wieringa, but also meets the guidelines set forth by Hevner, et al. 
 The problem, having been identified in chapter 1, is the need for a novel framework that 
helps facilitate the discovery of JOP gadgets and simplify the construction of JOP exploits. The 
motivation is the lack of available tools to provide this needed functionality and the difficulty and 
potentially time-consuming nature of doing so without such a tool. As mentioned previously, 
Roemer spent weeks finding just a couple dozen gadgets that met certain classification criteria for 
Turing-complete features. This was work done by manually looking at disassembly from a Solaris 
libc file, and it was using the far simpler ROP. Without proper tools, a manual undertaking seeking 
JOP would be time-consuming effort. 
This will employ the design science research methodology, and it will result in the creation 
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of an artifact, the JOP ROCKET. According to Wieringa, design science entails performing both 
the investigation and design of artifacts in a specific context. The artifacts in turn are designed to 
address the problem context with an aim of improving it (Wieringa, 2014). DSR is intended to 
develop a practical approach or method to allow the problem to be better understood, allowing for 
the cycle of re-evaluation and improvement of design, to lead to a superior solution that satisfies 
the research problem (Watts, 2009). Validation and evaluation are hallmarks of the DSR cycle, as 
different iterations inevitably lead to a continuously improving artifact and bringing into focus 
different DSR choices. 
This research will adhere Hevner’s DSR guidelines. They assert design science is very 
much concerned with the process of discovery through artifacts that have been created in order to 
address certain problems (Hevner, et al., 2004). Design science, thus, can be fruitful and allow for 
new and useful knowledge to emerge from the creation of an artifact, and that knowledge can pose 
a significant contribution to the collective knowledge of the cyber security discipline. 
Design science problems also demand a careful analysis of stakeholder goals (Wieringa, 
2014). The stakeholders here can be identified as a security researcher engaged in exploit 
development. The security researcher is one who wishes to have the ability to more easily discover 
relevant JOP gadgets, classify them, and exclude those which have minimal value. To do this 
through an automated tool would save a monumental effort that would need to be expended doing 
it manually. Another stakeholder could be defenders; these could consist of individuals who might 
devise or utilize defenses against JOP. The JOP ROCKET could perhaps lead to superior defenses. 
The stakeholder goals will have been carefully considered when devising the requirements for the 
artifact. 
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Hevner’s Desigin Science Guidelines 
 Hevner provides seven guidelines in their seminal piece on design science. These 
guidelines are listed in Table 1, alongside both a description of the guideline and details as to how 
the JOP ROCKET satisfies these guidelines (Hevner, et al., 2004). 
Table 1. Hevner Design Science Guidelines 
Guideline Definition Artifact 
Design Science 
as an Artifact 
Design science should result in 
creation of an artifact in the form of 
model, construct, instantiation, or 
method 
 
JOP ROCKET will adheres t these 
principles. It provides an instantiation 
of a framework and five supporting 
methods. 
Problem 
Relevance 
Design science research is focused 
on developing solutions to 
important business and information 
systems problems 
 
JOP ROCKET will fully address the 
problem of not having an automated 
process to help construct JOP exploits. 
This will eliminate what could be very 
time-consuming, tedious work. 
Design 
Evaluation 
The design artifact must be able to 
withstand scrutiny from rigorous 
evaluation to ensure sufficient 
utility, quality, quality, and 
effectiveness. 
 
The accuracy and validity of its results 
will be tested by making use of several 
existing reverse engineering tools to 
ensure accuracy. The artifact will be 
developed in a protype environment 
and made use of single-case 
mechanism experiment (laboratory 
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simulation), to demonstrate its 
efficacy and utility. 
Research 
Contributions 
The design science research must 
provide verifiable contributions 
with respect to design foundations, 
design artifact, or design 
methodologies. 
 
JOP ROCKET provides contributions 
to design science research, by 
providing a sorely needed tool that is 
highly useful for creating JOP exploits 
or exploring the possibility of doing 
so. Several of the novel methods could 
be adapted and used in other reverse 
engineering tools unrelated to JOP. 
Research Rigor Rigorous methods must be used 
both during the artifact’s 
construction and evaluation. 
JOP ROCKET will be subjected to a 
cycle of testing throughout the entire 
development cycle. A single-case 
mechanism experiment will be used to 
provide validation and evaluation of 
the artifact. 
Design as a 
Search Process 
Available means must be used 
during the search for an effective 
artifact, while also not violating 
laws within the problem 
environment 
JOP ROCKET was developed through 
a highly iterative cycle to help ensure 
the best possible artifact apposite to 
the task was created. Additionally, 
other code-reuse attack tools relating 
to ROP and more general-purpose 
reverse engineering tools were 
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examined closely, to determine what 
was effective and what could be 
improved. 
Communication 
of Research 
Design science should be able to be 
communicated effectively not only 
to a technology-oriented audience, 
but also to one that is managerial. 
JOP ROCKET provides rich, detailed 
information to the intended technical 
audience. It generates files and 
statistics on its findings, to be of use 
to security researchers and technical 
users. A managerial audience can 
understand that it produces desired 
results.  
 
The DSR process inevitably is part of a cycle, with different iterations allowing for the design of 
the artifact build to improve, while the problem can be closely examined and research methods 
can be enhanced as needed. 
Design as an Artifact 
In the first guideline, the design research must yield a viable artifact that results in a 
construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation (Hevner, 2004). Wieringa writes that an 
instantiation of a software solution should be referred to simply as an artifact; both will be used 
interchangeably in this chapter (2014). This research will produce an instantiation of a framework 
that is designed to help facilitate exploit development. The JOP ROCKET will also encompass 
several novel methods.  
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Together the artifact and its methods will solve a problem that has hitherto remained 
unsolved. This is achieved by creating a framework that allows for the discovery of JOP gadgets 
in an innovative fashion. In addition, it expands upon and refines the algorithm for JOP gadget 
discovery. Refinements on the algorithm will allow for considerably more gadgets to be found, 
helping to ensure that potential gadgets are not missed.  
Problem Relevance 
Problem relevance asserts that DSR must yield technology-based solutions to important 
and relevant business problems (Hevner, 2004). The JOP ROCKET will achieve such, by meeting 
the needs of those in the business of exploit development, as well as by providing additional 
motivation for enhanced cyber security to those play a defender role within organizations.   
The primary problem relevance is the lack of supporting tools, as addressed in chapter 1. 
Existing tools that make use of gadget discovery for PE Files only provide very minimal support 
of JOP gadgets, such that they are of minimal utility. The Mona python script (Van Eeckhoutte, 
n.d.) and ROPGadget (Salwan, n.d.). provide scant to barely existent coverage; this is certainly 
understandable as these tools were designed to discover ROP gadgets. The only way to obtain the 
needed information to construct a JOP exploit would require using multiple reverse engineering 
tools, and it would be a time-intensive, manual process. Moreover, it would require a mastery of 
those tools that many would-be users of JOP simply may not possess. Roemer, as described in 
chapter 1, spent three weeks just manually searching for ROP gadgets in a Solaris libc file to find 
gadgets for his Turing-complete features gadget catalog for SPARC, as there were no tools 
available. JOP is a much more complicated process. This research will also provide a classification 
of gadgets, as part of one of the methods, and that includes many Turing-complete features. This 
classification will greatly simplify and enhance the process of constructing the JOP chains. 
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By having a way to find JOP gadgets in an automated fashion, then JOP becomes viable as 
an attack paradigm, which previously was not the case. This can allow JOP to then be used on 
systems that may have strong defenses against ROP, but whose defenses would be inadequate for 
JOP, as discussed in chapter 1. Exposing many systems to the threat of JOP underscores the need 
for better CFI and enhanced cyber security. It motivates defenders to find solutions to JOP, or to 
upgrade to operating systems that can provide defense. 
Design Evaluation 
The third guideline, that of design evaluation, asserts that the triad of efficacy, quality, and 
utility must arise from the design artifact; furthermore, these attributes should be demonstrated via 
well-executed evaluation methods (Hevner, 2004). 
The framework will make abundant usage of validation techniques in the form of a single-
case mechanism experiment. According to Wieringa, single-case mechanism experiments are used 
for implementation and evaluation of a design science artifact. This allows researchers to 
investigate, in a lab or natural setting, the cause and effect of the object of the study within an 
environment containing the intended context. The mechanism describes the interaction among the 
various elements at play, showing the effect the artifact has on the natural phenomena in the real 
world. The response can then be understood through the unique mechanisms intrinsic to the model 
(Wieringa, 2014) . Single-case mechanism experiments can be done in two ways, either by 
investigating an implementation in a natural, real world setting, or by making use of an artifact 
protype in a laboratory environment (Wieringa, 2014). This research will pursue the latter.  
Single-case mechanism experiments are highly effective in the validation of new 
technologies, such as the JOP ROCKET, by performing evaluation of the utility and effectiveness 
of the design. One of the most labor-intensive parts of the design cycle of the artifact will be in 
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demonstrating these attributes. These experiments may respond to questions such as, can the 
framework be used in a way that is useful to the practitioner? We will find this is likely to be the 
case, as it will provide classification of JOP gadgets, using some Turning-complete features as 
well as others that are useful for JOP. This ensures the gadgets were organized in a way that was 
meaningful and useful to the practitioner. We will find that with this framework, the practitioner 
will be able to be very granular and specific about the types of gadgets they are searching for, and 
to get results that are specific to those needs. Additionally, gadgets that likely would be of little 
use will be excluded, thereby saving the security researcher from the need to manually consider 
each gadget for potential use.  
If the artifacts are able to respond fully the research problem and the primary research 
questions, there could be an argument that the JOP ROCKET has met evaluation criteria, if testing 
with a single-case mechanism experiment is able to validate the technology. Each of the artifacts 
have specific aims that will be described in chapter 4, and from a DSR standpoint, if this research 
creates a tool that can satisfy all those goals, while producing the intended results without errors, 
then the evaluation will be successful. As a very complex tool, the fact that it simply works and 
does what it sets out to accomplish some very non-trivial tasks demonstrate it has met evaluation 
criteria 
 Tied closely to evaluation is the accuracy of the gadgets. While we can view this from a 
more high level perspective, in that we need the artifact to meet various goals, if the accuracy is 
off, then it cannot satisfy many of these goals. Widely used reverse engineering tools, such as IDA 
Pro and WinDbg, will ensure accuracy of the gadgets. First, it will ensure the disassembly 
produced is accurate. While this framework makes use of the Capstone disassembly engine, this 
is not altogether straightforward. The JOP ROCKET is a static analysis tool, and is not looking at 
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a process, but is working with code from the text section of the PE file, reading from disk, rather 
than from process memory. If the disassembly begins at the wrong byte, then the disassembly that 
it produces is not accurate. The resulting disassembly will be checked in IDA Pro or WinDbg as 
appropriate, both at the Assembly mnemonic level and also looking at the opcodes.  
 Second, the algorithm to find JOP gadgets will search for the desired indirect jump or call, 
and then it will disassemble backwards to discover opcodes that could then become useful gadgets. 
If the algorithm goes back 8 or 10 bytes to begin disassembly, this will cause opcode-splitting, 
meaning the resulting disassembly could be different, depending on which byte the disassembly 
starts at. Ensuring these results are accurate will be critical, if the JOP ROCKET is to have any 
value.  
 Third, while having accurate disassembly is necessary, having the correct virtual memory 
addresses as well as the correct offsets is equally important. After all, an inaccurate address will 
not allow us to reach the intended gadgets, and thus the gadgets would be of minimal value. Any 
of the aforementioned reverse engineering tools can allow us to perform inspections to see if these 
are correct. 
Research Contribution 
Guideline four states that an artifact needs to contribute to the province of design artifact, 
potentially encompassing artifact design, design methodologies or design foundations (Hevner, 
2004).  This framework will contribute materially to the discipline, satisfying hitherto, unmet 
needs. Because of the capabilities provided by this framework, exploit developers and security 
researchers will all stand to benefit from the JOP ROCKET, as it helps simplify the necessary tasks 
that otherwise would have had to been performed manually or semi-manually. This could be a 
monumentally difficult and highly time-consuming task. It would require specialized knowledge 
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and use of multiple tools, barring entry to many researchers to JOP. The value and importance of 
having this tool for security researchers cannot be overstated.  JOP ROCKET will enrich the area 
of design artifact by providing a well-tested artifact that that provides a solution that has some 
unique, novel methods. Some of the methods used, as will be described more fully in chapter 4, 
independently could constitute worthy research contributions. Some could be taken and adapted 
for more general-purpose reverse engineering tools. In sum, this artifact will utilize existing 
knowledge in ways that are both innovative and novel, allowing for unanswered research problems 
to be solved. 
Research Rigor 
The fifth guideline concerns research rigor, and it asserts that DSR should employ rigorous 
methods not only during the construction of the design artifact, but during the evaluation (Hevner, 
2004).  This rigor has been achieved by iterating through the different stages of design science as 
well as working to ensure that the results it produces are accurate and valid. The work accepts as 
valid the results produced independently by different existing reverse engineering tools; producing 
results that line up with those help to provide rigor. In one sense, the question of research rigor can 
be addressed in an objective fashion by whether or not it achieves its stated aims. If it can do this 
and those results can be verified, then it will have demonstrated research rigor. If the artifact is 
able to provide classification of gadgets to enable security researchers to take a very fine-grained 
approach to gadget discovery, that too will have made a contribution towards research rigor. 
Design as a Search Process 
Guideline six, which deals with design as a search process, states that the search for an 
effective artifact requires making use of all possible means to reach an effective artifact, while 
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satisfying the laws inherent in the problem environment (Hevner, 2004). This framework meets 
these guidelines. This tool will be developed in a prototype environment,  after multiple years of 
studying code-reuse attacks, close examination of the literature, examination of existing reverse 
engineering and exploitation tools, and through iterating through the design science cycle to help 
achieve the most effective tool apposite to the research problem. The design science cycle by its 
very nature is iterative, allowing for multiple cycles of development, validation, and improvement, 
to achieve a superior tool. 
Communication of Research 
The final Hevner guideline, that of communicating research, asserts that DSR must be 
presented not only to a technology-oriented audience, but also one that is managerial (2004). This 
work is communicated effectively to a technical audience through this dissertation, which provides 
abundant technical detail and discussion. Hevner’s DSR guidelines deals with information 
systems, businesses, and the management that oversees those businesses, thereby necessitating that 
part of the research be understandable by them. This is one of the guidelines where this study 
follows Wieringa more. The communication of the results that will be created by this framework 
will be readily understandable to the intended users, consisting of security researchers and exploit 
developers. The JOP ROCKET is not intended to break down the results in layman’s terms for 
management, as it is assumed that largely this work would be beyond their understanding. This 
largely is one of the shortcomings of Hevner, since not all design research will be on a level that 
is accessible to a management audience. However, the fact that the framework will produce results 
in well documented files and provide statistics on the number of gadgets found is a form of 
communication that a managerial audience may appreciate. They may recognize that it is doing 
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what it sets out to do, generating JOP gadgets that can be used to construct a JOP exploit; any more 
in-depth understanding would be unnecesary. 
As has been alluded to, the intent is not to follow Hevner’s design principles, although we 
find that, according to the above, these guidelines largely would have been satisfied. Because of 
the highly technical nature of this framework, it instead follows DSR guidelines set forth by 
Wieringa. His work, while much less widely known, seems more appropriate to creating software.  
Wiering’a DSR model attempts to answer two types of research problems, design problems 
as well as knowledge problems (2014). The first attempts to improve upon something, where utility 
is a goal and knowledge is a side effect. The second attempts to discover knowledge, explaining, 
predicting, and describing, with truth as the ultimate goal and utility as an inevitable side effect. 
The algorithm for finding JOP has already been established, so this research does not endeavor to 
rediscover the wheel, but it instead improves upon and expands previous research. 
Wieringa’s Design Science Guidelines 
Wieringa describes a scientific theory as a conceptual framework that can help frame a 
research problem, allowing for phenomena to be both described and subjected to analysis, such 
that generalizations can be formed, allowing for the structure of the artifact and its context to be 
laid out (2014). These generalizations may help explain some the causes or reasons why the 
phenomena are such. Having formed useful generalizations, these may be in turn used to help 
provide the necessary justification for designs of artifacts that may arise. The framework can be 
viewed, not just as a way of specifying an artifact, but a way of defining methods, asking questions, 
and interpreting the specifications; it can be a way of discussing the architecture, as well as its 
different capabilities and components (Wieringa, 2014).  
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Wieringa writes that with an architectural framework, a system’s various components are 
responsible for its behavior. Thus, we could view the proposed instantiation of the JOP ROCKET 
as an architecture whose various components are responsible for its “system-level phenomena” 
(Wieringa, 2014). As designers, we then can explore the various available options by attempting 
different possibilities and observing the effect they have on system behavior (Wieringa, 2014). 
With respect to the JOP ROCKET, we can abstract different parts of it, different methods, different 
features, different algorithms, and explain the effect those have on the system phenomena. These 
phenomena would include JOP gadgets, the opcodes, the disassembly, and the different 
classifications. As we embark upon this research, the iterative process of design science will enable 
us to observe the effects different methods may have on the results. By closely looking at these 
effects and by making changes to enhance results, we can create the best artifact possible. Some 
DSR activity through the iterative process may lead us to rethink or refine different algorithms, 
variables, or methods, and this too will enhance the artifact. 
Goals are used to help provide a definition to the research problem; these goals have been 
enumerated in chapter 1. Design research can then address a design problem, which necessitates 
an iterative process of designing an artifact in order to satisfy said goals. These design problems 
stem from both the stakeholder’s goal as well as the problem’s context (Wieringa, 2014). The 
artifact is the vehicle through which the stakeholder goals can be satisfied. This can be broken 
down to the form of a template: “Improve <a problem context> by <(re)designing an artifact> that 
satisfies <some requirements> in order to <help stakeholders achieve some goals> ” (Wieringa, 
2014). This template could be applied to any design science problem. In the case of this research, 
we will express the aim of this research as such: This research will improve the need for automated 
tools for JOP discovery by designing a framework that satisfies both its stated technical and major 
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functional requirements, in order to facilitate the development of advanced code-reuse attacks and 
allow users to save significant time and effort. 
According to Wieringa, the three primary phases of a design science engineering cycle 
consist of problem investigation, treatment design, and treatment validation (Wieringa, 2014). The 
problem has been thoroughly investigated in chapter 1. Treatment design consists of those 
requirements that contribute to the goals of the implementation. These have been expressed 
separately within this chapter, as technical requirements and major functional requirements.  
Wieringa’s work on treatment validation will be addressed in chapter 4. 
Objectives 
The next task is in defining the objectives for the framework. These objectives are an 
integral part of the design for this artifact: 
It should identify all gadgets for each indirect call or indirect jump to a particular register. 
These could form the foundation for the functional gadgets. 
It should then use criteria to establish and discover potential dispatcher gadgets. These will 
be few and far in between for ones that are viable, and good ones will be even more scarce.  
It will use criteria to eliminate gadgets that are by likely to be of no practical use. These 
can be identified through analysis and if found may be discarded before the analyst even 
needs to look at them. 
It will classify gadgets into different categories that roughly correspond to features of the Turing 
catalogue as well as additional classifications that are practical in constructing a JOP exploit. Not 
all Turing-complete features will be utilized, as they are beyond the scope of what this tool is 
intended to do. Some, for practical purposes, would be very difficult to do with JOP in real-life, 
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non-toy binaries. These will make extensive use of analysis to reject gadgets that most likely are 
to be of marginal or no practical value, saving the analyst time that otherwise would be wasted. 
This feature will be of tremendous utility to the security researcher, as instead of having to potential 
comb through vast numbers of gadgets, they can look at the ones germane to the task at hand.  
Because JOP in essence has its own stack-like structure, the dispatch table, which serves to order 
control flow, many gadgets by their very nature may need to be discarded outright, so being able 
to be very granular and specific will be immensely useful to the security researcher.  
It will be a primarily static analysis tool, although some DLLs will be briefly loaded into 
memory but not executed, so a handle can be obtained for the module, allowing for its file location 
to be found. This is needed for its text section may be extracted for analysis. The reason for this is 
because one of the overarching goals is to not have this tied down to an existing tool, such as a 
script for WinDbg, Immunity, or IDA Pro, and for it to be its own standalone tool.  
It will ensure that by working at both the opcode and assembly mnemonic level, that all 
potential gadgets are found. With opcode-splitting, we increase the attack surface drastically by 
changing where we begin disassembly, or eventually where the execution would begin in an 
exploit. This is important because there is a paucity of available gadgets in comparison to ROP, so 
we must make sure we enumerate all potential gadgets. Doing this can sometimes result in gadgets 
that would be of very marginal value, simply because of what they do and registers used. Thus, 
having strong criteria to exclude will enhance the utility of this framework. The JOP ROCKET 
will make use of a technique to do this, and in addition, it will provide the user the ability to be 
granular and specific with this, to increase or decrease the number of results.  
The tool will allow the user to decide how many opcodes to go back from the desired 
indirect jump or indirect call. It then will then iterate through and enumerate all the possibilities. 
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Thus, if a user specified to go back 14 bytes, it would go back 14 bytes and then test it with all 
possibilities at an opcode level, until at reached the minimum number of bytes, effectively ensuring 
the whole of the attack surface is covered. This enhanced flexibility, rather than just hardcoded 
defaults, can allow a user to narrow or widen results as needs dictate. 
It will let the user be specific about the number of lines of other instructions that should be 
able to exist between the desired operation (e.g.MOV or ADD to a desired register) and the 
terminating indirect jump or indirect call to the target register. Having more lines in between can 
certainly make some of these gadgets more difficult to use, as they might clobber needed registers, 
but it may be necessary if there are limited gadgets otherwise. Likewise, a user may just want to 
exclude all results that exceed a certain distance. As a practical tool, this framework will provide 
the analyst with the ability to make those judgment calls if need be, but it will provide reasonable 
defaults so that the novice user need not to be concerned with such details. 
Artifacts of Design Science 
DSR has an end product of artifacts that address the research problem. The artifacts created 
should have utility and be effective at achieving an artifact’s purported aims. This design science 
research inquiry is part of an effort to answer the research question, and it will result in the creation 
of different artifacts. These artifacts can be immensely useful to the security researcher that wishes 
to make use of JOP.  
This research will culminate in the creation of two types of artifacts, a collection of methods 
and an instantiation of a framework, the JOP ROCKET. Accurate requirements will be provided 
to help provide assurances that the artifacts created fully address the all aspects of the research 
question. Throughout review of the literature, an instantiation such as outlined below was not seen, 
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nor were the methods as described here, although as mentioned before, some methods are 
significant improvements upon existing algorithms. 
Within the province of design science, we can regard a method as those operations, steps, 
or algorithms involved in performing a task (March & Smith, 1995). The following methods will 
be created during this research:  
A method to discover JOP functional gadgets; 
A method for discovering JOP dispatcher gadgets while applying exclusion criteria; 
A method for printing the disassembly of gadgets found; 
A method for classifying JOP gadgets into, while applying exclusion criteria; 
A method for statically enumerating and obtaining modules in the import table and 
obtaining their JOP gadgets, while applying exclusion criteria. 
A method that utilizes an object-oriented approach for storing executable content, JOP 
gadgets, and other bookkeeping information for the PE image and its modules. 
The most significant contribution, the primary effort, is in creating an instantiation, which 
embodies all the methods and serves as a practical tool that the user can employ to obtain the 
desired information. According to March & Smith, we can regard an instantiation as the final 
culmination of the artifact (1995). Throughout the research, the methods will be developed with 
the notion of how they can be implemented effectively within the instantiation. The methods 
provide the most benefit embodied in an instantiation, where collectively they can provide the 
desired functionality needed to address the research question and provide utility to the security 
researcher. Taken independently, some could be adopted and used for other, unrelated projects. 
Requirements for Instantiation of the Artifact 
The requirements for the instantiation are provided below in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Requirements for Instantiation of the Artifact 
Number Requirement 
1. Must be portable across platforms, such that it is able to be run on all modern 
Windows operating systems. 
2. Must be portable across platforms, such that it is able to be run on Linux and 
MacOS with limited functionality. 
3. Must be able to run with minimal hardware specifications. 
4. Must make use of only publicly available libraries as dependencies. 
5. Must provide a user interface that is intuitive and that has an easily accessible help 
sub-menu. 
6. Must provide output to user in a manner that is logical and convenient. 
7. Must provide the user with a high degree of freedom to customize the types of 
gadgets obtained and how they are generated, by allowing them to change the 
mechanics of how the gadgets are produced. 
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
This research has intentionally limited the scope of the framework instantiation to 32-bit 
Microsoft Windows PE files. The reason for this is simple: developing a tool for another 
architecture or for 64-bit would be non-trivial and would involve rewriting all the labyrinthine 
rules for the numerous subroutines that use strict criteria to exclude gadgets. Testing each of these 
subroutines to ensure accuracy can be a labor-intensive endeavor. Such effort is best left to future 
work.  
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 While 64-bit has become commonplace, a significant number of programs are still 32-bit 
and simply run under SysWoW64, which provides compatibility on a 64-bt system for 32-bit 
applications to be run natively (Kennedy & Satran, “File System,” 2018). 32-bit applications are 
more prevalent and likely will remain so for a while, and so targeting these is more important. One 
limitation of no examining the 64-bit binaries is that we do not gain an understanding of the nature 
of JOP in that environment that could prove useful. Because of the nature of JOP, having more 
available registers in theory could be highly beneficial. However, what that means in actual 
practice will be another matter. Statistically, as this research will demonstrate, indirect jumps and 
indirect calls to certain registers in 32-bit applications are much less plentiful, making some of 
them even potentially difficult to use. Thus, it stands to reason that while there may be more 
registers available to use, in actual practice some may not on average produce many practical JOP 
gadgets. Nor would we gain an appreciation for how the x64 calling convention impacts the 
efficacy of JOP in general and with specific registers. A more in depth study of JOP in 64-bit 
programs could be fruitful. While one could produce anecdotal responses or conjectures to some 
of the above, the JOP ROCKET produced highly detailed statistical information on the numbers 
and types of gadgets produced for the binaries that it analyzes. 
This framework does consider the matter of ASLR, but it does not provide the ability 
exclude modules that utilize ASLR. The artifact provides information on different security 
protections in place for each application and associated modules, such as ASLR, DEP, CFG, and 
GS (Stack Guard). Providing the functionality to exclude them could be done without significant 
effort, but they are included as the user may be aware of a memory disclosure to overcome ASLR 
or other bypasses. The framework also conveniently provides offsets for all modules, in the users 
has the ability to obtain a memory disclosure. It is assumed that the security researcher who uses 
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this tool has a high level of sophistication and familiarity with more basic code-reuse attacks, e.g. 
ROP, and they understand the ramifications of all protections. 
This framework will be limited in the number of modules that it is able to enumerate and 
thus obtain gadgets for. This is perhaps the most significant limitation. This is due to the limitation 
of this being a static analysis tool. This is due to the fact that modules are loaded into a process in 
a variety of ways. First, they may be imported. Some may be done dynamically during runtime, as 
with a Windows API such as LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress, or through a malware technique 
such as traversing the PEB to find desired modules and then desired Windows API functions. 
Some modules will also call upon other DLLs as a dependency.  Other dynamic methods of loading 
libraries can include loading libraries for forwarded as well as delayed API calls. Thus, to be able 
to enumerate all modules, one must make use of a dynamic approach, allowing the process to be 
examined in memory, rather than from disk. As this is a static analysis tool, it does not provide 
that functionality, and as such it will only enumerate those that are statically bound to the import 
table, which is a limitation, since some modules may be missed. When one makes use of general-
purpose reverse engineering tools such as WinDbg, we may take it for granted that some libraries 
are loaded through other means early on. The end result is that some libraries that are loaded 
relatively early on are excluded. There does not seem to be an easy or simple way to statically 
enumerate these via examination of the PE; dynamically loading the PE file as a process would 
need to be a necessity to discover some of these libraries that are not loaded via the import table. 
This research will identify other unique ways to obtain some likely modules that will be loaded 
and that exist outside the IAT, but while this will be pragmatic, it will not be all inclusive. 
Another limitation is that the user needs to establish the proper environment with necessary 
dependencies, namely Python as well as the following Python libraries: Capstone, PEFile, and 
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Pywin32. They will need an environment in which to make use of Python; the recommendation is 
Cygwin, for convenience sake, although any environment would do. Setting up these dependencies 
might take a moderate amount of effort, but it likely would be a trivial undertaking for the intended 
users, who may already have some or all of these set up. By utilizing different existing libraries 
and being a standalone tool, the JOP ROCKET avoids the need to have to integrate with an existing 
reverse engineering tool, such as WinDbg or Immunity, making users reliant that tool. By having 
a standalone framework, the user can quickly and easily make use of the artifact from a command 
line interface to obtain the necessary data. 
There is a limitation with respect to malformed PE files, as those may not be read properly. 
It is possible have code in places other than the standard text section, and in such a case the code 
would not be extracted, and thus it would be excluded from analysis. Indeed, any executable code 
that may lie elsewhere in the PE file would be excluded. It is also possible the code could be self-
modifying in memory, behavior that is typically associated with malware. Were this the case, then 
the gadgets generated may not be valid.  
Another limitation is that this framework does not support long term storage of data that is 
collected on the target PE file and its DLLs. This would be beneficial, but it is a feature left to 
future work. It is anticipated that security researchers will make use of the tool to generate gadgets, 
which will then be written to disk in appropriately named files, so that users can refer to the data 
contained in the files as needed. 
This framework will be created using the Python language to provide optimal portability, 
allowing it potentially to run on Windows, Linux or MacOS. To enable this to occur, the 
framework will make use of different existing Python libraries, namely PEFile, Capstone, and 
Pywin32. There will be one limitation, however. While it is possible in the appropriate Linux or 
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MacOS environment to read and extract gadgets from an executable, on those systems it will only 
be able to extract gadgets from the executable image, not the modules. This is for two reasons. 
First, Pywin32 is not supported on those systems. That library provides access to the Windows 
API in a Python environment. Pywin32 is used on Windows to very briefly load libraries so that a 
handle can be returned to modules, and this handle is used to help ascertain the file locations of all 
DLLs in the import table. Thus, the Windows API is used to help facilitate the discovery of file 
locations for DLLs in the import table, so that their text sections can be extracted and the subjected 
to analysis. Outside of Windows, this will not be possible as the Windows API will not be present, 
and even if it were, the necessary supporting DLLs would be absent in a Linux or MacOS 
environment. Of course, individual modules could be loaded one by one, such as Windows DLLs, 
but that would be very tedious to acquire all of them and individually analyze them. 
Data Collection 
The data that is of consequence here are the gadgets themselves. Data that is obtained by 
the framework will be stored in hundreds of parallel lists that maintain the necessary data, that 
enables the search, the classification of gadgets, the exclusion of impractical gadgets, and finally 
the printing of gadgets. The data stored in the data structures will not be the gadgets themselves, 
but bookkeeping information that can enable the gadgets to be generated immediately on the fly. 
However, for purposes of data collection, we can think of the stored data as the gadgets. 
The JOP ROCKET will utilize methods to obtain the gadgets and perform classification; 
these methods serve as artifacts themselves, and the full implantation details will be discussed in 
chapter 4. Thus, part of the data collection involves classification. Classification occurs 
automatically as the algorithms are run. As a carved out, small chunk of code from the text section 
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is analyzed, different features of that code might result in several different classifications. One 
could be for ADD or one for MOV, etc., all ending in the same indirect jump or call. The gadgets 
stored would be based on the classification, as the search algorithm will only produce the most 
minimal form of the gadget. Thus, if ADD EAX, EBX appeared 3 lines back from the indirect 
jump,  and MOV EBX, EAX appeared 4 lines back, then if the classification was for addition, then 
the gadget would begin at ADD EAX, EBX. Thus, we see the same data can manifest itself in 
different gadgets, serving different purposes. 
Prior to data collection, validity and reliability of data must be assured. The sample of 
binaries to be analyzed will be processed through the framework, and some results will be 
compared with various reverse engineering tools to ensure accuracy and reliability. These tasks 
are discussed more fully under Validity and Reliability. Once those steps have been performed 
successfully, it will be assumed that the data produced is valid and accurate. As such, data 
collection will then concern itself with the collection of gadgets that are generated by the 
framework. These are stored in data structures and are available to be immediately printed. 
Immediately implies that no additional CPU time is required, other than the minimal amount 
needed to print to terminal or save to disk. The latter will be the chief means of delivering the data; 
the former is just a convenience to the analyst.  
The development of the aforementioned algorithms and workflows will be iterated until all 
errors have been corrected and the algorithms have been optimized. Once the design science 
process has completed and the tool has achieved a high level of efficacy and utility, there will be 
a single-case mechanism experiment that will be performed. This will be done to perform 
validation, to ensure that the design science cycle has resulted in a tool rich with utility and 
efficacy. 
  83 
 
Data collection adhering to quantitative methodology will also begin once the DSR cycle 
has been completed. A single-case mechanism experiment will be done on 32 executables. These 
will include a variety of both open source and commercial executables, ranging in size from small 
to large. These executables will be run in the framework, and the data will be subjected to analysis 
and classificaiton. The purpose here will be to demonstrate the utility and efficacy of the tool. It is 
anticipated that a large number of gadgets will be able to be classified into appropriate categories. 
Furthermore, a large number of potentially impractical gadgets will be able to be excluded. There 
will be no data collected on the number of gadgets excluded, as they are silently discarded, as this 
is a tool that is intended to be useful to analysts, not to perform an exhaustive study on the nature 
of JOP in x86. The classification and exclusion of impractical gadgets will be a significant 
contribution in the area of utility and efficacy. This will be discussed in the data analysis section 
and then finally in the validation section. 
Validity and Reliability 
To provide assurances as to the validity and reliability of the gadgets produced, it will be 
necessary to verify the results against those produced by general-purpose reverse engineering 
tools. For instance, for gadgets produced by the framework, then the disassembly produced must 
be verified as accurate, and both the virtual memory address and the offset must also be verified. 
IDA Pro potentially can be used to validate some of the gadgets. However, if opcode splitting 
occurs, then validating through IDA Pro may not be straightforward, because the disassembly will 
be different. In that case, it is necessary to look at the opcodes and to see if those opcodes would 
produce the disassembly offered by the framework. This is not a straightforward process, and it 
would involve having to use other tools. The framework does not produce opcodes to the user. 
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However, during the design of the tool, opcodes can directly viewed for debugging purposes. 
Alternatively, one could use a simple utility or common web site to convert the disassembly 
produced by the framework back into opcodes, thereby allowing for a comparison (Defuse, 2018). 
In the case of opcode-splitting, the usage of IDA Pro can verify only that the address or offsets are 
correct, not the disassembly. To validate the accuracy of the disassembly in view of opcode-
splitting, the most straightforward technique is simply to make use of WinDbg and the command 
u [address], such as u 0x00435352 and then view the disassembly that results from un-assembling 
at that location. It should be identical to that produced by the framework. Another option could be 
to take the opcodes and use a utility, such as the online assembler and disassembler at Defuse, to 
see if those opcodes produce the correct disassembly that the framework reports. That is a more 
laborious process, but it can provide additional confirmation beyond WinDbg. These techniques 
will be employed to ensure the accuracy of all gadgets produced. 
Reliability also concerns the gadgets produced, beyond simply whether or not the 
disassembly and addresses are correct. There should be no instructions on a gadget prior to the 
target operation. Thus, if MOV were the target operation and it was at a distance of two lines from 
the indirect jump, then the gadget should begin on the target operation, as anything before that 
would be extraneous and irrelevant. Reliability can come into play with classification as well. If 
gadgets are to end with an indirect jump to a specific register, then only those that do so must be 
produced. Similarly, if gadgets are to modify only a certain register, then only those must be 
produced. Similarly, if the user is searching for a specific operation, such as ADD or MOV, or 
may be searching for a dispatcher gadget, then the results should include only those that fall under 
those classifications. The framework will provide the capability for the user to be highly specific, 
and the results must match what has been requested by the user. 
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Reliability will ensure that the same results occur when comparisons are made from one 
tool to another. Results will be checked with a minimum of two reverse engineering tools in 
parallel. This provides assurance as to a higher degree of a reliability, as the results can be 
reproducible from one tool, to the next. 
Overview of Framework 
At a high level, this framework will parse the PE file, extract the executable portion, and 
then obtain the necessary JOP gadgets. First, the framework will extract the text section for the 
target PE file in addition to all DLLs contained in the import table. An algorithm will then be run 
to find the opcodes for all instructions for indirect jumps or indirect calls. Once these are found, 
disassembly will be obtained for all possible combinations of opcodes that terminate in an indirect 
jump or indirect call. The resulting Assembly will then be searched with classification being 
performed according to strict criteria, to exclude gadgets that would otherwise be impractical. 
Finally, the end result will be hundreds of parallel arrays populated with necessary data to create 
the appropriate gadgets that the user may be seeking, based on whether it is an indirect call or 
indirect jump, the registers in question, and the operation performed. In addition, the JOP 
ROCKET will feature additional customization the user can perform, to be more granular and 
specific as to what gadgets they wish to search for or print. This could increase or decrease the 
number of gadgets, while at the same time having an effect of lowering or increasing the potential 
quality of said gadgets. As to the matter of quality, we could regard a high quality gadget as one 
where the target operation is close to the indirect jump or call, whereas a low quality gadget is 
once where that distance is high. Thus, the ability for the user to identify specific criteria for the 
functional or dispatcher gadgets they seek will add significant utility to the framework.  
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The framework will be run on the command line. This will allow a user to more quickly 
and easily make use of the artifact, if they will not need to waste time with a mouse or cursor. The 
program is interactive, where the user supplies relatively brief keyboard commands to perform 
operations. For ease of use, these commands are limited generally to one to three characters, and 
a help sub-menu provides a brief explanation on how to use the different commands. The artifact 
allows for a great deal of customization to be possible, so taking command line arguments would 
be impractical, although there is a default command line option that will attempt everything with 
reasonable settings. The user interface has reasonable default settings, so every setting need not be 
set, but they can be adjusted with great flexibility as need be. 
Specification of Major Functional Requirements 
The functional requirements should provide explicit, detailed descriptions to aid in the 
design of the application. Wieringa asserts, “The desirability of a requirement must be motivated 
in terms of stakeholders goals by a so-called contribution argument” (2014). This research has had 
its requirements motivated by these stakeholder goals. Wieringa defines as a requirement a 
property that will be sought by a stakeholder, to be realized in the final implementation of the 
artifact (2014). A functional requirement is one specific type of requirement, which Wieringa 
defines as a requirement for some functions that will be sought from the artifact.  All the primary 
functional areas will be discussed with a detailed description of the proposed functionality. 
Command Line Interface 
For ease of use, this tool will be built with a command line interface. The purpose of this 
will be to provide a versatile user interface for the user, one which does not require the use of a 
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mouse. This will be the primary means through which the user enters commands and can interact 
with and utilize the various algorithms and methods, to allow for effective use of the framework.  
The command line interface needs to be run in an environment with Python support and 
with the previously described dependencies, listed under Technical Specifications, and these 
dependencies must be configured properly. On Windows, the ideal environment is Cygwin, and 
the tool will be optimized for that. However, any environment with the dependencies is adequate.  
User commands will be entered in one of three primary areas. The first will be the primary 
screen, where input can be entered. The second will be a printing sub-menu. This will allow for 
results to be printed to screen and saved to appropriately named files. There is a tremendous 
amount of customization on the printing menu, with over 240 different combinations possible. At 
this stage, all the results will have been stored in one of hundreds of data structures. It will be 
simply a matter of providing the input needed to obtain the desired results. The final area will be 
a sub-menu for searching for dispatcher gadgets. As with the printing sub-menu, this will allow 
for a great deal of customization. Some additional screens will be able to be accessed, and these 
will take some input but will be relatively straightforward. These will include a help sub-menu, 
settings for extracting DLLs, and others. 
User commands will be minimal, typically one to three characters, just enough for a quick 
keystroke. The intent will be to minimize the typing the analyst must do. The commands all will 
in some way have some mnemonic that can be connected to the operation that is being performed. 
This will allow an experienced user to quickly enter these commands without the need to consult 
the help sub-menu. To that end, reasonable default settings for some of the more esoteric settings 
will be set, so that a user will be able to simply select from among various preset options, if they 
do not wish to specific each individually. Because the intend will be for the tool to be very flexible 
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with a high degree of customization available, there will not be a one-size-fits-all setting that will 
be the standard default. Though the user will be able to simply select everything, it is assumed that 
they will wish to customize their output by using some more specific preset options or even 
specifying some options individually. 
The commands are introduced alongside a description in Table 3 and Table 4. These will 
describe the commands the user is able to enter in the main screen as well as the print screen. There 
will be a simple interface to a very robust, powerful set of algorithms and methods. There is a 
stakeholder goal in having a degree of usability, so this is felt to be preferable to something with 
arguments supplied on the command line. With the level of customization that will be present in 
this framework, the command line would be too limiting. Moreover, extracting and performing the 
search does take a period of time, so the user may explore several options for printing after those 
steps have been completed, and it would be highly inefficient for them to have to continuously 
repeat the extraction and search. Once the extraction and search have been completed, it will only 
take seconds to print the results, regardless of the level of customization applied. 
 
Table 3. The main screen user interface commands. 
Command Description 
F This allows for the target PE file to be changed. 
R This specifies the target 32-bit registers, delimited by commas, e.g. EAX, 
EBX. 
T This sets the target control flow, indirect target, e.g. JMP, CALL, or both. 
P This allows for the user to configure the settings to print output according both 
to target registers and target operations. 
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Command Description 
D This grants access to a sub-menu to provide settings for getting dispatcher 
gadget. 
M This enumerates all modules. 
N This changes the number of opcodes to disassemble. This is done through an 
iterative process, so the more that you have, the more gadgets you generate, 
but the higher you go, the longer the resulting gadgets become. 
L This changes the lines to go back when searching for a specific operation, e.g. 
3 or 4 lines. 
S This sets the scope to perform the search and subsequent printing of results. 
The default is set to just the PE file itself, but the scope can be expanded to 
include all modules in the import table. 
G This gets gadgets. Once the settings have been set, the framework will search 
through the extracted text section in order to discover the target gadgets, 
perform classification, and perform exclusion. 
C This clears all the data structures. 
 
Table 4. The print screen user interface commands. 
Command Description 
R Set registers to print. The functional gadget classified by operation will print 
only those that pertain to registers set here. For instance, if EAX was set and 
ADD was selected, then only gadgets that somehow add to EAX/AX would 
be included in results. All registers are possible as well as ALL. 
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Command Description 
J Print all JMP [REG]. This is done according to registers set. 
Ja Print all JMP EAX. This is done according to registers set. 
Jb Print all JMP EBX. This is done according to registers set. 
Jc Print all JMP ECX. This is done according to registers set. 
Jd Print all JMP EDX. This is done according to registers set. 
Jdi Print all JMP EDI. This is done according to registers set. 
Jsi Print all JMP ESI. This is done according to registers set. 
Jbp Print all JMP EBP. This is done according to registers set. 
C Print all CALL [REG]. This is done according to registers set. 
Ca Print all CALL EAX. This is done according to registers set. 
Cb Print all CALL EBX. This is done according to registers set. 
Cc Print all CALL ECX. This is done according to registers set. 
Cd Print all CALL EDX. This is done according to registers set. 
Cdi Print all CALL EDI. This is done according to registers set. 
Csi Print all CALL ESI. This is done according to registers set. 
Cbp Print all CALL EBP. This is done according to registers set. 
Ma Print all arithmetic (ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV). This is done according to 
registers set. 
A Print all ADD. This is done according to registers set. This is done according 
to registers set. 
S Print all SUB. This is done according to registers set. 
M Print all MUL. This is done according to registers set. 
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Command Description 
D Print all DIV. This is done according to registers set. 
Move Print all movement operations. This include all MOV, XCHG, and LEA. This 
is done according to registers set. 
Mov Print all MOV. This is done according to registers set. 
Movv Print all MOV value, where a value is moved into a register. This is done 
according to registers set. 
Movs Print all MOV shuffle, where one register is shuffled to another. This is done 
according to registers set. 
L Print all LEA. This is done according to registers set. 
Xc Print all XCHG. This is done according to registers set. 
St Print all stack operations (POP, PUSH). This is done according to registers 
set. 
Po Print all POP. This is done according to registers set. 
Pu Print all PUSH. This is done according to registers set. 
Id Print all INC and DEC. This is done according to registers set. 
Inc Print all INC. This is done according to registers set. 
Dec Print all DEC. This is done according to registers set. 
Bit Print all bitwise operations. This is done according to registers set. 
Sl Print All Shift Left. No customization is available due to paucity of results 
making it impractical. 
Sr Print All Shift Left. No customization is available due to paucity of results 
making it impractical. 
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Command Description 
Rr Print All Shift Left. No customization is available due to paucity of results 
making it impractical. 
Rl Print All Shift Left. No customization is available due to paucity of results 
making it impractical. 
All Print all options. 
Rec Print only all Turing catalogue operations, the recommended setting for ease 
of use and speed. 
 
Parsing of Input 
The command line will provide tremendous flexibility in terms of the commands that can 
be input into the framework. Many of these commands will be settings that will change the results 
that are printed. For instance, on the main screen there will be an option for which registers to 
include in the search, or “get,” as in the language of the JOP ROCKET. This will specify the 
registers that indirect jumps or calls should go to, as only some may be of interest to the security 
researcher. To provide input for the registers to “get,” the user simply will need to enter the 
command r and then provide the desired registers, delimited by commas. The input will then be 
validated and then stored in a list. Once all other settings will have been finalized, the user then 
will be able to enter the command g for get, thus starting the process of searching for JOP gadgets. 
Similarly, in the printing sub-menu, the user will have an option to enter registers of interest for 
printing. This will work utilizing data that has already been obtained. If the user had sought only 
gadgets that end in JMP EAX or CALL EDX, then the registers entered on the printing sub-menu 
would pertain to the operations performed on just those registers. Thus, if EBX was selected as a 
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register to print, then gadgets such as MOV EBX, 5 / JMP EAX or MOV EBX, EDX / CALL EDX 
would be printed. All of this allows the security researcher to be very granular and specific as to 
exactly what they may be seeking. 
Capture of Text Section 
The framework will provide functionality to capture the text section. The text section is 
traditionally where the executable section is contained. Traditionally, executable code exists in the 
text section. The text section consists of the opcodes that provide the Assembly instructions to be 
executed by the CPU, beginning at the entry point specified by the PE file. It is possible to have 
the executable code be placed outside the text section or in multiple locations. This framework 
will not consider these, as it will only consider traditional, well-formed PE files. In the case of 
malicious programs or those with heavy obfuscation to protect intellectual property, there can be 
a concerted effort to complicate analysis for researchers; these will not be considered.  
The framework will utilize the Pefile library to help extract the executable image’s text 
section. This is the best option for the language used, and this work does not endeavor to recreate 
the wheel here, as these steps are well established. Once it has been extracted, other text sections 
from DLLs will be extracted for analysis. As a static analysis tool, by default it will extract just 
the executable image text section, but the user can select to add all DLLs. This may be useful if 
ASLR is not on a specific DLL or if the researcher has a memory disclosure to allow for an ASLR 
bypass. Then gadgets on those modules would be relevant. If the user decides to search the DLLs, 
then the JOP ROCKET will iterate through and capture the text section for each module. It will 
then perform a search for the specified target registers, storing the results in the appropriate data 
structures for later usage. 
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Search for opcodes 
 This framework will utilize and improve upon existing ROP and JOP algorithms that seek 
to find the opcode for a specific instruction, such as RET. Once found, it will disassemble 
backwards, finding all possible gadgets. Thus, the artifact will search for and enumerate all 
opcodes that produce the target indirect jump or call to a register. In x86 Assembly, there are three 
combinations that produce this. For instance, for CALL EAX, it will search for the opcode for 
CALL EAX, \xff\xd0, the opcode for CALL PTR EAX, \xff\x10, as well as the opcode for CALL 
FAR EAX, \xff\x18. The latter two are much less common, but this framework will endeavor to 
be comprehensive. With jump EAX, we have only one possibility to pursue, JMP EAX, or \xff\xe0. 
There are no indirect jump conditionals that lead to a register; they do not exist. Once the opcodes 
have been discovered, their location will be recorded in a data structure along with other necessary 
data. These will be used subsequently by other algorithms as needed. 
Disassemble and Search 
Once opcodes have been found, they can then be disassembled and then allow for 
searching. This has involved usage of the geometry of innocent flesh on the bone, as opcode-
splitting was referred to as in the seminal journal article introducing ROP (Shacham, 2007). Again, 
this describes the unintended instructions that can be discovered due to the lack of forced alignment 
on x86. This concept can be applied to JOP, where we might find a gadget terminating in CALL 
EAX or JMP EAX. The JOP ROCKET must then discover all possible combinations.  
To do this, it will address this problem in a novel fashion. It will start by generating a chunk 
of opcodes as specified by the Number of Opcodes. It will disassemble this chunk and then subject 
it to analysis. Once disassembly has been created for the chunk of opcodes, it will then be subjected 
to analysis. This will take the form of hundreds of lines of complicated regular expressions to 
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exclude gadgets that would be deemed impractical. Because opcode-splitting can produce a lot of 
unintended gadgets, some end up being highly impractical. Without exclusion criteria, there could 
be a significant number of useless gadgets. Having strict, carefully considered exclusion criteria 
will help to ensure these are not present. 
After that analysis has been completed, the number of opcodes will be decremented, 
creating new chunk of opcodes ending in the terminating functional gadget, e.g. JMP EAX. This 
will be disassembled and added to a data structure for further analysis. This decrementing will 
continue until there are only 5 bytes of opcodes left. This process will be described more in chapter 
4. 
Search for Dispatcher Gadget 
 A dispatcher gadget is absolutely essential, as it is a required first step for JOP. The 
dispatcher gadget is a way to somehow advance or go backwards in the dispatch table in a 
predictable pattern. With ROP, the security researcher does not need to worry about such matters, 
as the nature of RET and the stack already provide want is tantamount to this functionality. When 
the researcher must create their own stack-like structure, the dispatch table, it needs a special 
gadget to direct control flow.  
For this algorithm, the user will specify target registers to look for. For instance, the user 
might try to find a dispatcher gadget that advances a dispatch table whose address is contained in 
EAX. The search criteria would then try to find a gadget that ends in an indirect jump or call to 
EAX. It must also advance it in a predictable fashion; it could be adding or subtracting. The amount 
to be advanced is not as important, as padding can be used, within reason; the predictability is what 
is key.  This advancing operation should ideally occur very close to the indirect jump or call. Each 
line of instruction between the ADD/SUB and the JMP [REG] runs the risk that other registers 
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could be clobbered. These registers then might be made permenantly unusable for functional 
gadgets or other purposes. Thus, the lines between should be kept minimal.  
Practical dispatcher gadgets can be scarce. Therefore, the security researcher has the ability 
to increase or decrease the number of lines between the advancing operation and the indirect jump 
or call. This could be useful if an analyst needs to consider less desirable options if no other options 
exist. Once dispatcher gadgets have been found, then additional exclusion criteria will be applied, 
and those results will be stored in relevant data structures. 
Data Structures 
 There will be hundreds of different data structures in this framework, based on specific 
classification criteria. This is necessary because when the search for gadgets operations is being 
performed, it will automatically search for everything, all gadgets that meet all classification 
criteria, storing the results in data structures, so that they are then ready to be of use immediately. 
There are unique data structures for every operation for which there is classification. For every 
operation there are data structures that hold all gadgets that perform that operation, and there are 
also data structures for operations that modify each register. Thus, for one specific operation, such 
as ADD, there will be different data structures for ADD operations that modify each register, as 
well as one that is a catch-all for all ADD operations. Additionally, each operation that modifies a 
particular register has four unique data structures associated with it, as described in the next 
section, Save to Data Structures. Thus, for just the ADD operation, there will be a total of 32 
different data structures.  
At no time will any disassembly be saved to any data structures. Disassembly will be 
generated as needed, whether for analysis or printing. The data structures only contain three 
numerical values as well as the name of the module. 
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Each data structure will belong to an object, and each object will be a part of a list of 
objects. The object will correspond to an executable image or one of its modules, and for each 
object, there will be distinct data structures maintained. The list of objects will correspond to the 
PE file itself, including the executable and all its modules. 
Save to Data Structures 
 This framework will make extensive use of data structures. Because this will be a static 
analysis tool that does not build off of an existing dynamic analysis tool, such as WinDbg or 
Immunity, all that it has to go off of is a captured text section. Once the relevant opcodes have 
been found, the disassembly has been performed, and the classification and exclusion have been 
performed, then the JOP ROCKET will be read to save the necessary information to data 
structures.  
For this program, some will be stored in lists belonging to an object, while others will be 
stored in lists that do not belong to an object, but primarily the former. Because of the nuances of 
Python, given that it is not a compiled language, this rather than a more complex data structure 
works best. The vast majority of data structures will belong to an object, and each object will 
correspond to the executable image or one of its modules. For each gadget that is found, there will 
be four parallel lists: listOP_Base, listOP_Base_CNT, listOP_Base_NumOps, and 
listOP_Base_Module. ListOP_Base is the location in the text section of the target JMP [REG] or 
CALL [REG]. This is the location where the chunk to be generated will end. ListOp_Base_CNT 
indicates the number of lines of instructions to go back. This is important because gadgets will 
come in many sizes. Having a gadget with a RET four lines before the JMP EAX would be 
impractical; starting after the RET would make it a potentially usable gadget. The JOP ROCKET 
whenever possible will reflect these nuances, so that the gadgets given to the user are clean. 
  98 
 
ListOP_Base_NumOps will specify the number of ops that the binary chunk to be generated should 
be. This goes back to the idea of opcode-splitting, as different combinations of opcodes will 
produce completely different Assembly instructions. Finally, the listOP_Base_Module contains 
information on what module it is, whether it is the image executable itself or one of its DLLs, if 
applicable. The data structures will not store or contain any disassembly, only bookkeeping 
information so that the correct disassembly can be produced very quickly if requested by the user. 
There will be helper functions that save all needed data to the appropriate data structures. 
Provide Disassembly for Printing of Gadgets  
 This framework will provide the disassembly in a novel fashion. It will employ helper 
subroutines, disHereJmp and disHereCall, to generate a binary chunk according to the 
bookkeeping information provided by the data structures. The gadgets then will be generated on 
the fly using this bookkeeping data to carve out and disassemble small chunks from the text section 
of whatever executable or module is needed. Disassembly as before will be performed by the 
Capstone library, which has become an industry standard and is used in over 400 tools. While there 
will be hundreds of data structures created, allowing for the security analyst to be granular and 
specific about what gadgets they may wish to seek, many may be of no interest. They will all have 
been populated, but the user may only be interested in a handful. They can provide input given 
their needs. Once input has been provided, then only those requested gadgets meeting the requested 
specifications will be printed. Given the number of registers and options, there are a couple 
hundred unique combinations available.  
The disassembly will be printed to the screen as well as saved in files. The files will be 
classified according to operation and register. If an existing file of the same name exists, the 
framework will maintain the existing file and created another one, incrementing the version 
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number of the file. While printing to the screen is convenient, sometimes the sheer number of 
gadgets will make this impractical, making files far more convenient. 
Summary 
 The JOP ROCKET will be constructed as part of a DSR inquiry into the research problem. 
The iterative cycle and the results obtained throughout the DSR process will help to continuously 
improve the artifact throughout development. This chapter has described the design of the 
framework and delineated its various components and its architecture. It has described how 
together they can allow for a novel, innovative solution to be found. The chapter has explained 
how this design science research conforms to the guidelines set forth by Hevner, et al., as well as 
Wieringa. The chapter has described how one goal of this research will be to employ classification 
and exclusion criteria to ensure the JOP gadgets are more usable and pragmatic. It has shown how 
the JOP ROCKET will allow for this to occur in an automated manner, via software, rather than 
through an arduous, time-consuming manual process. This chapter has also introduced the use of 
the single-case mechanism experiment as a means of demonstrating the utility and efficacy of this 
framework. Finally, the chapter has addressed how validity and reliability will be assured, and how 
validation will be performed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide a full-featured artifact to assist reverse 
engineers and exploit developers in their ability to construct JOP gadgets, meeting a need for a 
sophisticated toolset. A close examination of the literature had revealed that there were no publicly 
available tools that provided this needed functionality, and this study effectively provides a 
validated solution to the research problem. Because of the greater complexity of JOP relative to 
ROP, creating a tool that can fully satisfy the needs of the exploit developer is much more 
challenging than it would have been to have created one of the similar, already existing tools for 
ROP. After all, it would be trivial to develop a tool that could search through disassembly to find 
all gadgets that terminate in an indirect jump or indirect call. However, such a tool would be 
severely lacking and be of only marginal use to the researcher, who would need much more help 
to relieve some of the tedium inherent in their efforts. A fully developed JOP artifact, one which 
has significant exclusion criteria, one that allows classification of gadgets, one that includes robust 
searching for dispatcher gadgets, is a more labor-intensive project, one that is fraught with myriad 
difficulties that need to be handled delicately. A high level of expertise is needed to carry such a 
project to fruition, and chapter 4 will showcase the results of those efforts. 
The artifact developed in this research fully satisfies those requirements, as well as those 
set forth in the requirements specification. This chapter will discuss the results obtained by from 
the research that was discussed in the previous chapter. The research contributions are discussed 
in chapter 5. 
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Evaluating the Instantiation 
As an instantiation, the JOP ROCKET is an implementation in the Python programming 
language of all the methods, brought together under a cohesive shell. It allows for different 
methods that individually would only contribute to part of the puzzle, to come together and 
collectively bring life to the instantiation. The JOP ROCKET follows what was set forth in the 
requirements specification provided in chapter 4.  
Performance, reliability, functionality, supportability, and usability are necessary 
evaluation criteria (Wieringa, 2013). These attributes are used broadly as a way of determining 
how robust an artifact is. Reliability in software indicates that it should conform to the guidelines 
set forth in the requirement specification. In short, it describes whether the program works as the 
author intends and as the user would expect. Functionality describes all the different features and 
capabilities that a program can provide to its user. Functionality provides for an abundance of 
features to meet the needs of the software. Chapter 3 laid out in detail numerous functions, which 
were achieved in developing the instantiation. Additional functionality was also developed during 
the iterative development of this artifact. Supportability describes how easily the program lends 
itself to users or technical staff being able to troubleshoot issues that arise. The criterion of usability 
describes how easily a human can interact with the system. The ROCKET has a clean, intuitive 
interface with straightforward, simple language describing the features. Finally, performance 
relates well the program works under different loads; i.e. its speed and memory usage. The 
ROCKET does well with performance, although some large binaries with numerous modules 
would require a 64-bit installation of Capstone and Python due to memory constraints in the 32-
bit version. As will be explored in greater detail below, this work does effectively embody all these 
characteristics. 
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When evaluating an instantiation, to try to identify the presence or absence of these 
features, we can look at code inspection, testing, and verification. Code inspection is intended to 
discover and allow for remediation of different defects that may exist in the source code. It can 
involve looking at different parts of the code to try to determine if it meets the set specifications. 
It also can address how robust the software is, looking at performance, usability, functionality, 
supportability and reliability (Wieringa, 2014). This work did not follow a formal process of code 
inspection with multiple individuals involved, but it utilized a more informal approach as adopted 
by the author, as he endeavored to address many of the elements of code inspection. Code testing 
is an important part of the process to ensure that the program works as intended and to ensure 
reduction of software defects. This can encompass many areas, such as how it handles widely 
differing input, whether it achieves stakeholder goals, whether it meets the requirements set forth, 
whether it is usable, and if it can perform its functions in an adequate amount of time (Wieringa, 
2014). Finally, code verification is an important feature as it ensures that the results produced are 
accurate. Verification has been dealt with extensively elsewhere in this dissertation. 
In looking at the five criteria for evaluating an instantiation, i.e. performance, usability, 
reliability, supportability, and functionality, we will endeavor to discuss briefly how this artifact 
measures up.  We can assert that this artifact is relatively fast and efficient, in terms of its 
performance. The typical user will be analyzing one binary at a time, not a vast multitude, and the 
time frame for this is acceptable. When using Mona, a python script that can integrate with 
WinDbg or Immunity, on some occasions in can take in excess of 40 minutes to process a binary; 
others may take much less, and it depends upon system resources as well. Mona has many features, 
so this also depends upon the commands being used. The JOP ROCKET performs different tasks, 
but the time in which it does it is comparable, often taking 10 to 25 minutes to process a binary, 
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depending on its size. This includes the image executable as well as all modules.  Formal metrics 
have not been used to measure the time, as it is felt that it is clearly well within an acceptable 
range, and no additional benefit would be conferred for it to be much faster. Additional work to 
improve speed would likely not amount to significant performance enhancements and would be of 
negligible value.  
Performance can be attributed to a few different areas. First, the tool does not need to 
integrate with other software. Secondly, when it searches for different categories of gadgets, it is 
all done concurrently. That is, there is just one pass made for each running of the search algorithm 
for a specific indirect jump or call. The resulting bookkeeping information for all the gadgets are 
stored in appropriate data structures. A portion of the time could be reduced if printing to the screen 
was removed, as speed of terminal increases the time it takes, sometimes by as much as a few 
minutes, if it is a very large binary. That time could be reduced to seconds with just printing to 
files. Again, these numbers are all felt to be reasonable for the task at hand, so more rigorous 
measuring of time is not pursued. 
The JOP ROCKET provides a high degree of usability. The user interface (UI) is accessible 
directly from the command line, thereby not requiring the use of a mouse, and the tool features a 
minimalist design. Where possible, the shortest possible keystroke combinations were used, 
provided they correspond to some sort of mnemonic. Thus, a frequent user effortlessly could 
memorize various keystrokes, enabling them to perform the desired operations. Much attention 
was placed on how to simplify how a user can interact with the program, accessing the needed 
functionality, while presenting this in a UI that is clean, simple, and intuitive. Such a UI would 
more likely correlate with a pleasant user experience (UE). A poor or broken UI can create a deeply 
unpleasant user experience, and while JOP is a complicated topic, this tool provides an effective 
  104 
 
UI, allowing an interested user to successfully use the tool, even if they do not have a deep 
understanding of all the various options available.  If a tool lacks usability, even if it has a high 
degree of functionality, then it may have little value, so efforts were made to ensure it was highly 
usable. Once the user got the feel for the UI for the JOP ROCKET, then likely they would be able 
to anticipate how certain features would be accessible. Whenever there was a doubt regarding how 
to proceed, the user simply need type h to see possible commands.  Finally, for users who want to 
get all possible results with minimal UI interaction, the software provides them an opportunity to 
obtain reasonable results for everything with just a single command. 
This tool meets the criterion for supportability. Repeatedly throughout the artifact, there 
are dozens and dozens of try catches, so that graceful degradation is handled; that is, the program 
can recover safely from exceptions that otherwise would make the program crash, allowing for the 
user to still get results and not have an interrupted experience. In a few cases, if less than desirable 
behavior occurs, descriptive error messages are provided to the user. For instance, in very rare 
cases when it cannot load a dll from its file location, it will provide output informing the user of 
this error. Additionally, the UI provides documentation in the form of a help interface that is 
implemented with straightforward, concise descriptions of different functionality.   
Functionality is perhaps the most important criteria by which we judge a DSR artifact, and 
this does well to embody everything that is laid out in the software requirements specification. The 
need for some additional functionality also evolved over the course of the design cycle, and these 
would be implemented as their need was ascertained. This was typically happened with various 
helper functions and internal workings of the artifact. For instance, it was noticed that although 
imports from a PE were loaded, there were additional imports that would load once the PE file 
began execution. This is because the Pefile library only loads modules that are statically bound 
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through the Import Address Table (IAT). Thus, creative ways to find some of these missing 
modules were sought out, and this involved some slightly complicated logic that called for new 
helper functions and internal structures to be implemented. Functionality does not just encompass 
features, but it addresses how well these features work together and to what purpose. A feature 
may be ineptly implemented or prone to serious errors; this is the opposite of one that works 
flawlessly. Functionality was a chief consideration in designing the JOP ROCKET, and 
considerable testing was performed to help remove all known defects and to ensure various 
algorithms functioned smoothly without problems. If there was some, rare unusual case, the 
artifact is designed to gracefully handle the error, simply passing an exception. Functionality can 
also be measured by the quality and depth through which the JOP ROCKET meets its functional 
requirements, and it does fully satisfy them.  
Reliability of software is critical, as software must be able to run given optimistic 
conditions, as well as those that are less so. To ensure reliability, a large number of test cases were 
done with the JOP ROCKET, as a frequent part of the iterative design cycle. This allowed for 
anomalies to be found, their causes discovered and then remediated. When it was not possible to 
completely rule these out, they were gracefully handled with try catches. The test cases used fell 
within the normal range, inclusive of both small and large PE files, with and without many DLLs. 
Because the artifact is an interpreted Python script, we need not worry about software defects, such 
as memory corruption bugs, that could be exploited, so from a reliability standpoint, such issues 
need not be addressed. Additionally, occasional regression tests would be carried out to see if any 
minor bug fixes or refinements may have introduced new defects, and when these had been 
identified, they have been remediated. Input validation has also been employed to ensure that 
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inaccurate user input doesn’t break the software. In some parts of the software, this has taken the 
form of whitelisting acceptable input, with all other input being discarded. 
Evaluating the Methods 
This artifact is the realization not only of an instantiation, but also of several methods. As 
such distinct criteria comes into play concerning the evaluation of methods. With methods, we can 
look to consistency, completeness, and appropriateness as evaluation criteria. Completeness looks 
at how complete the results produced are, and it looks to the completeness of the software 
specification in terms of describing functionality. The specification must fully and completely 
address all aspects regarding the algorithms, with nothing left unstated. Consistency is in reference 
to the specifications not having any “internal contradictions” (Zowghi, etal., 2002). Correctness is 
viewed as the presence of both consistency and completeness; satisfying the stakeholder goals can 
also be described as correctness (Zowghi, et al., 2002). Those are the criteria, and they can be 
demonstrated in a number of ways, such as laboratory research, case studies, surveys, etc. This 
research will look to Hevner’s evaluation criteria for a design science artifact, i.e. efficacy, quality, 
and utility.  This will in part be demonstrated via validation techniques from Wieringa’s single-
case mechanism experiment.  
Evaluation of the artifact’s instantiation and its methods will be performed jointly, as in 
this artifact they are inseparable. To try to separate them for purposes of evaluation and validation 
would be overly artificial, and it would introduce unnecessary redundancy. 
Artifact 1: A Method to Discover JOP Functional Gadgets 
As the literature indicates, previous methods to discover JOP gadgets already exist. As 
chapter 2 discusses, there have been different paradigms for finding JOP, and the JOP ROCKET 
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exclusively uses the JOP dispatcher gadget paradigm. This dissertation presents an original 
approach to an existing algorithm. It is an enhanced variation on the algorithm for finding JOP. 
With this approach, it searches for a combination of opcodes for a specific indirect jump or indirect 
call. For instance, for CALL EAX, it would search for the opcodes for CALL EAX (FFD0), CALL 
PTR EAX(FF10, and CALL FAR EAX (FF18); these are shown in Figure 3. It would then search 
through the whole of the text section. Each time it found one of these combinations of opcodes, it 
would carve out a chunk of a bytes to be analyzed. The default is 20 bytes, although this could be 
changed to any arbitrary amount.  For the opcodes carved out, it would search the resulting 
disassembly, perform classification, and save necessary bookkeeping information. The tool then 
would decrement the number of opcodes being searched, and the it would carve out those bytes, 
create disassembly, and then perform classification. This method would continue as long as there 
was at least six bytes of opcodes. After a point, there could sometimes be insufficient opcodes to 
generate meaningful disassembly, and this was chosen as a safe value.  
This method is an original reworking of a simpler JOP algorithm (Bletsch, et al., 2011).  
The method presented in this artifact is more robust, and the inner workings of the method differ. 
It is assured that discovery will occur for each possible permutation that could be formed with 
chunks of binary that end in a desired indirect call or indirect jump. Because the attack surface 
with JOP is very small relative to ROP, it is critical every conceivable gadget be located and 
catalogued. The specific exclusion criteria and the usage of regular expressions is original as well.  
Although this algorithm could include some redundancy, it ensured that no viable gadgets 
were missed. While there is value in ensuring all practical gadgets are located, sometimes the 
output generated would be highly impractical and of no value to an analyst, and accordingly 
exclusion criteria prevented such gadgets from being saved. For instance, SBB  BYTE PTR [EAX-
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0X5E5B10C4], AL would be of no use to an exploit developer. To deal with these, the tool makes 
use of a series of extensive regular expressions to exclude unwanted results that were felt to be 
nonsensical or far removed from the possibility of being useful. There is not functionality for the 
user to change this in the UI, although they could modify the source code as needed, to add to or 
detract from the exclusion criteria. Once desired gadgets were found, they were saved to 
appropriate data structures that indicated the location in the array of text where the indirect jump 
or indirect call was, the number of lines to go back, the number of opcodes to disassemble, and the 
name of the module, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 2. Function get_Op_JMP_EAX 
 
Figure 3. Hexadecimal opcodes for various JMPs.  
Another value that is important in this algorithm is the LinesGoBackFindOp. This is a 
global variable that is utilized as part of the searching mechanism, and the UI allows the user to 
easily change this as needed.  LinesGoBackFindOp allows the analyst to specify the depth to search 
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for gadgets. The depth refers to how many lines exist from the indirect call or jump to the target 
operation. The further back a line is from the indirect jump or call, the greater the chance that other 
instructions might be disruptive to registers that contain values that need to be preserved. Thus, by 
either enlarging or reducing the LinesGoBackFindOp variable, the analyst can cast a broad net or 
do the opposite. 
   
 
 Figure 4. A diagram of method addListBaseAdd 
 
Figure 5. The source code for method addListBaseAdd 
Once the desired gadget is found, bookkeeping information is stored in specific data 
structures, as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. There are three primary data structures as well as a 
less important forth once; each is populated with information once a functional JOP gadget has 
been discovered. The first three contain numerical values. The first is the location of the indirect 
jump or call. The second is the number of lines to go back; this is in reference to the number of 
lines between the target indirect jump or call and the target operation. The third is the numOps, 
which is the number of opcodes needed to produce the desired disassembly. NumOps is important 
because in x86, line enforced alignment does not exist, and therefore execution may begin in the 
middle what would have been an intended instruction. There is a global value for numOps, so the 
user can easily change this through the UI and affect the numOps in all the functions, while 
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allowing a user to also modify the source code at the function level if need be. However, the 
algorithm will discover all possible combinations of opcodes from the set amount of numOps, 
down to 6. The printed results also list the number of opcodes associated with a gadget. Finally, 
the forth parameter is the module name; this indicates the module that the gadget stemmed from. 
 
Figure 6. The "carve out" portion of function disHereJmp 
Now that we have a better understanding of some of what goes on in this method, we can 
provide a broad overview of how the method is implemented. The algorithm consists of two 
functions, a primary function and a helper function. The primary function, as show in Figure 2,  
first searches through the entirety of the extracted text section, for the opcodes that correspond to 
a target indirect jump or call. Once it finds an instance of one, it sends it to a helper function that 
carves out a chunk of disassembly based on the number of opcodes, as shown in Figure 6. This 
will then search for all the specific operations, of which there are dozens, and if found, it will 
record the proper bookkeeping information. It will then decrement the number of opcodes, without 
falling below 6, and iterate through a loop, generating all possible combinations of opcodes below 
the NumOpsDis, and allowing the resulting disassembly to be searched for specific operations. 
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 Figure 7. A diagram depicts the function get_OP_JMP_EAX 
The method improved iteratively as it was subjected to a series of validation efforts. 
Frequently nuanced reworkings would emerge as desirable, and over a period of time these resulted 
in a profoundly improved version of the method.  
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Artifact 2: A Method to Discover JOP Dispatcher Gadgets 
This artifact is also a reworking of a previously extant algorithm to make it more robust 
and useful. A dispatcher gadget is necessary as a critical first step in JOP. With ROP, we would 
use the stack typically which integrates with RET instruction, which will return from the function 
call and then execute the next operation or go to the next address on the stack. However, with JOP, 
the luxury of using RET is not available; instead, a functional gadget would jump to the location 
of the dispatcher gadget. The dispatcher gadget would then advance forward or backwards by a 
predictable amount a location in the target dispatch table, which would be where the dispatcher 
gadget would jump to, allowing us to reach the address for the next functional gadget. One very 
convenient dispatcher gadget would be ADD EAX, 8 / JMP EAX, where EAX would contain the 
location of the dispatch table. The dispatch table would then be populated with virtual memory 
addresses for functional gadgets, as well as filler, as there often may be wide gaps in between the 
addresses. Filler could consist of NOPs or functional NOPs. A functional NOP is one that 
effectively does nothing of importance, preserving registers as they were and not affecting control 
flow; an example would be MOV EDI, EDI, which Microsoft uses for runtime hot patching.   
 
 Figure 8. Excerpt from function get_Dispatcher_G 
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Figure 9. Excerpt from findDG_EAX function depicting the "carve out" portion 
The JOP ROCKET’s method for finding dispatcher gadgets contains original 
contributions, and it improves upon the existing algorithm. First, it utilizes an the method of 
grabbing a chunk of binary to search and then iterating through all possible permutations, as partly 
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9; this is the same technique as used in the artifact to discover JOP 
function gadgets.  The method to discover a dispatcher gadget differs from the rest of the tool, in 
that the search for these is not done concurrently with all other searches. Instead, this algorithm 
works off of previously obtained results. This helps provide the analyst with much more flexibility, 
and the dispatcher gadget finding method takes additional parameters to allow for this.  
Rather than being overly permissive about possible dispatcher gadget candidates, the 
algorithm has strict criteria for what is acceptable. For instance, with ADD or ADC, there is a 
requirement that it must add only a register or a numerical value, as seen in Figure 10.  While 
others could possibly result in valid dispatcher gadget candidates, this helps reduce unacceptable 
results, which could make results too unwieldy to wade through. 
The algorithm provides classification of dispatcher gadgets, which is an original 
contribution. First, it identifies all common, viable dispatcher gadgets. From this, it then 
determines which of these would be best. An example of a best dispatcher gadget would be one 
that adds only a small numerical value to the register that it will subsequently jump to. The best 
dispatcher gadgets are scarce. Finally, it includes an Other Dispatcher Gadget category, which 
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identifies some other gadgets that would be feasible but would require more careful, special 
planning and set up and maintain.  
 
 Figure 10. Excerpt from findDG_EAX function depicting regular expressions to find the primary 
category of dispatcher gadgets 
The Other category includes criteria for finding dispatcher gadgets, and this constitutes a 
more significant, original contribution. Because the number of dispatcher gadgets produced can at 
times be very slim or even non-existent, it is important to consider other less practical possibilities. 
We can look to Appendix A to see the few dispatcher gadgets found, which average to 0, for many 
of the registers, demonstrating the urgency to look at alternative sources for dispatcher gadgets. 
Firstly, the method considers multiplication in the form of MUL and IMUL. It the multiplication 
was a very small number, in some cases this would lend itself to a plausible dispatcher gadget 
candidate. For instance, if an analyst were to start writing to the heap, and then multiplied it by 2 
or even 3, potentially a few to several addresses then could be hit, given the right set up.  At some 
point, the numbers would increase too much, and there would be no way to go forward. However, 
if one were to find another functional gadget that subtracted a large, appropriate value from the 
register containing the location of the dispatch table, then the dispatcher gadget could then return 
  115 
 
again to an area of the heap under the attacker’s control. Of course, doing all this would require a 
special set up and very careful planning, but it is feasible. Unfortunately, gadgets that do 
multiplication are rare, so MUL and IMUL will be are rare, but they are considered in the code 
because no stone should be left unturned. It is anticipated that being able to use them in this fashion 
as a dispatcher gadget for a real-world application would be rare. 
 
Figure 11. Excerpt from findDG_EAX function depicting regular expressions to find the “other” category of 
dispatcher gadgets 
What is more practical and could be found in the wild, are gadgets that do multiplication 
or division through bitwise operations, namely shift left or shift right. Thus, the algorithm searches 
for shift left and shift right by values or 1 or 2, as it is felt that anything higher is simply too 
impractical, as can be illustrated in Figure 11. With shifting bitwise operations, the same logic can 
apply. Traditionally, multiplication and division have not been considered as useful for dispatcher 
gadgets, for obvious reasons. However, as previously explained,  it is feasible that the attacker 
could advance forward or backward a very limited number of times and then get a functional 
gadget to subtract or add a large value from register containing the address of the dispatch table. 
This also means shifting operations could be feasible if the attacker can gain control over a very 
large area of the heap, because within the heap the dispatch table could be laid out with significant 
distances between the addresses for functional gadgets. Because dispatcher gadgets are necessary 
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for JOP to work, and due to the scarcity of these gadgets, being able to expand what is acceptable 
for dispatcher gadgets candidates could potentially make some binaries now potentially viable. 
These are binaries that otherwise may have been impractical due to paucity or absence of 
dispatcher gadgets. With JOP the urgency of consider all possible gadgets is no more true than 
with dispatcher gadgets. 
The dispatcher gadget algorithm allows for needed flexibility for the analyst. Specifically, 
the howDeep variable indicates the distances between the indirect call or jump and the desired 
dispatcher opertion (e.g. add, sub, shift, etc.). Ideally, the howDeep should be within one or two 
lines, because the greater the distance, the higher the chances that other registers could be made 
un-usable or only usable on a limited basis. However, if no viable candidates can be found with 
howDeep within 1 or 2 lines, that amount can be increased easily in the UI. After all, it is possible 
gadgets may be found that would work in spite of a larger howDeep value. The default for this 
parameter allows for only two lines of instructions, so as to not inundate the analyst with results 
that mostly would be impractical. 
In summary, this artifact is an original contribution due to its unique method of searching 
to discover dispatcher gadgets. It is an original contribution also because of its expansion to include 
other dispatcher operations, other than what had previously been used. It is an original contribution 
because of its use of regular expressions to exclude unsuitable gadgets as well as to classify 
dispatcher gadgets into distinct categories. Finally, it is an original contribution because of how 
granular the analyst can be  when searching for dispatcher gadgets, to either expand or narrow the 
scope of what is acceptable. 
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Artifact 3: A Method for Printing Disassembly for JOP Gadgets 
This dissertation presents an entirely new method, not based on previous work, for the 
printing of disassembly for JOP gadgets. Such a method could be extended to artifacts that make 
use of other code-reuse attacks, such as ROP. The JOP discovery algorithms described above result 
in pertinent bookkeeping information being saved to appropriately named data structures. There 
are approximately 600 data structures that save bookkeeping information for each object that exists 
in the list of objects. Each object holds all the information for one PE file, whether it is an 
executable or one of its modules. The extracted text section for the executable image and each 
module is also stored within each object. As described in previous sections, the contents of each 
of these data structures consists primarily of just a few values used to carve out correctly sized 
chunks of binary that are then disassembled. At no point are any opcodes or disassembly saved for 
any gadget. This is useful for many reasons, as it allows enhanced ability to search, manipulate 
data, and it does not waste memory storing many lines of gadgets, disassembly, or other printed 
information. No other software that prints out disassembly for code-reuse gadgets using similar 
methods is known to exist.. 
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 Figure 12. Excerpt from function printlistOP_CALL_EDI 
Each specific operation has its own printing function, as can be illustrated in Figure 12. Each 
operation has its own printing function because of the hundreds of different data structures used 
for the many possibilities. This is easier and simpler to read and maintain than a few with much 
more convoluted logic. 
Each printing operation displays the disassembly both to screen as well as to disk. To utilize 
a function, such as printing SUB, the register would be passed as a parameter. Thus, it could 
retrieve all functional gadgets that perform SUB a specific register, such as EAX or EBX, or 
alternatively it could simply retrieve all SUB operations. This parameter will allow the appropriate 
data structures to be accessed to then print the desired output. Once the bookkeeping values were 
obtained from the appropriate data structures, they are then provided to a helper function, as shown 
in Figure 13, which then uses those values to obtain the necessary disassembly and then return it 
as a string, to be printed to terminal and disk. 
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 Figure 13. Excerpt from function disHereClean 
Each operation is printed to an appropriately named file, with the output provided in a more 
aesthetically pleasing manner; sample output can be found in Appendix B. Segregating the specific 
operations to small text files named for the the operation in question is intended to make it easier 
for an analyst to find the gadgets they need, as they would not be required to wade through one 
large or even massive file. Representative, truncated output is included in Appendix B, for printed 
results from dispatcher gadgets and functional gadgets. Each line of output has both the virtual 
memory address location as well as the offset. In many cases, the offset will be more relevant, due 
to ASLR and other factors that will allow for the virtual address memory to be unpredictable. Each 
line in the output has both values, so the user can quickly obtain the needed offset, and not need to 
spend 10 seconds calculating it. For experienced users, calculating an offset is a nominal effort, 
but for more novice users, it could be another unnecessary source of confusion. 
Other printing functions are simpler, if less data structures are involved, but all very similar 
in that they obtain the necessary values from data structures, provide these values to an original 
helper function, and then get strings of the disassembly returned. 
The speed of printing output is fast. Depending on the size of the binary and its modules, 
it could range from 5 to 20 seconds for a binary with a smaller number of results, to a few minutes, 
for those with significant output. At the upper end, much of that time is in printing to terminal. 
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Figure 14. Print sub-menu options 
The user is able to go to a printing menu, as seen in Figure 14, to select exactly what they 
wish to print, as there are numerous options with many variations. The user can easily enter input 
in an intuitive UI, utilizing brief keystrokes. With a few more keystrokes, they can obtain the 
highly customized results that they want. Again, emphasis here is on allowing the user to be very 
granular and specific about what they need, rather than providing a one-size-fits-all option for 
output. Thus, although all data has been obtained for all possibilities, they may wish to only print 
output for certain operations or that jump or call a certain register. With output, sometimes less is 
more, as time is not wasted on irrelevant data. Finally, the user can print a .csv file that shows the 
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number gadgets generated for each of the various operations. This can allow an analyst at a glance 
the opportunity to decide if a binary is likely to be useful for JOP and worthy of further 
investigation. 
Artifact 4: A Method for Classifying JOP Gadgets into Categories Based on Turing 
Catalogue Features, 
 Many studies on code-reuse attacks have demonstrated Turing-complete catalogue 
features for ROP on various architectures. In fact, ROP has been demonstrated as a feasible in 
some form on all architectures, even voting machines (Shacham, 2007). This tendency to 
demonstrate Turning-complete features has lent itself to JOP as well. This research does not 
attempt to exhaustively enumerate the presence of all Turing-complete features. There is no 
interest for this research to enumerate gadgets that facilitate branching, nor are there any attempts 
within the artifact made to enumerate these, as they are not relevant for the types of attacks being 
envisioned. They certainly would be feasible, but they introduce a level of complexity that is 
simply unnecessary for this type of work. Their use on real-world applications, given the relative 
scarcity of JOP gadgets, would be highly minimal.  
Finding or not finding Turning-complete features does not achieve any goals for this 
research; there is no vested interest to demonstrate these features exist. However, for the analyst, 
being able to rapidly access some of these as well as other classifications, in an organized, easy to 
use fashion, will simplify their work. For example, if an analyst is interested in adding or 
subtracting, they can quickly obtain the functionality that is relevant to them. They might be 
interested in adding to a certain register for an indirect jump or call to a certain register. 
  122 
 
While many other tools have used methods to enumerate Turing features, it is believed this is the 
first that is done so with respect to JOP while using Python and regular expressions for 
classification and exclusion.   
As previously described, the artifact searches for a specific indirect jump or call. To do 
this, it first searches for the appropriate opcodes. Once it finds these opcodes, it then sends the 
appropriate bookkeeping data to a helper function. This will carve out a binary chunk of opcodes 
and then produce the relevant disassembly. For instance, 20 bytes of opcodes might produce 4 to 
8 lines of disassembly. This disassembly would end in the target indirect jump or call. Once this 
disassembly has been obtained in the helper function, it exists in the form of a list. The helper 
function then iteratively combs through each line in the list. For both the disHereCall and 
disHereJmp functions, there are approximately 800 lines of code, much of it regular expressions, 
to facilitate searching the disassembly. Figure 15 depicts a search in the disHereJmp function for 
adding to any register and adding to EAX.  
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Figure 15. Excerpt from function disHereJmp pertaining to the operation of adding to EAX 
For each operation, there are many regular expression filters to select target operations, and 
additionally regular expressions are used heavily to discard results that would be regarded as 
impractical. Because the tool engages in opcode-splitting, it can produce some unintended gadgets 
that are simply irrelevant, such as SBB BYTE PTR [EAX-0X5E5B10C4],AL. Seeing similarly 
outlandish results would have little value to the analyst, only wasting their time to wade through 
such irrelevant results. With regular expressions, patterns for impractical gadgets can be 
determined and excluded. These specific criteria vary widely from gadget to gadget. Each run 
through this helper function iteratively subjects the list of lines of disassembly through all the 
regular expressions. Once an appropriate instruction is discovered that corresponds to a desired 
operation, all the relevant bookkeeping information is then saved to appropriate data structures, as 
explained elsewhere. In all, there are approximately 600 data structures to save bookkeeping data 
for all classifications.  
In summary, this research includes an original method for classification of JOP gadgets. 
Some of the classification categories are based on Turing-complete features, while others are 
simply operations likely to be of interest for constructing a JOP exploit. 
Faceted Classification 
This research engages in faceted classification for software reuse by organizing knowledge 
into very specific categories (Prieto-Diaz, 1990). Not only does faceted classification classify the 
knowledge, in the form of gadgets, but it makes them available for near instantaneous retrieval 
after the classification has been completed. This research does this in part by making limited use 
of Turing-complete features, but it extends it further by adding additional, more granular 
classifications.  Some of these sub-categories, such as for JOP dispatcher gadgets, have a grouping 
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that presents only the very best gadgets. These additional categories, outside the purview of 
Turing-complete, make classifications based on registers used and other relevant functionality.  
Faceted classification helps to make sense of the number of gadgets that may be generated.  
One of the hallmarks of systems with faceted classification is that a user is able to very easily 
navigate and search through vast amounts of data that match up with the different orderings as 
provided by the facets. With adequate familiarity, users can intuitively circumnavigate the 
established categories and subcategories to retrieve the desired data.  
With faceted classification, under the facets, we then have what are described as items 
(Zendler, et al., 2001). For dispatcher gadgets, we have 21 items. There are seven items belonging 
to Dispatcher Gadgets, seven for Best Dispatcher Gadgets, and seven for Other Dispatcher 
Gadgets, and each of these represents seven registers. The included registers are EAX, EBX, ECX, 
EDX, ESI, EDI, and EBP. There are facets as well for each operation performed by functional 
gadgets, such as ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, etc., and each of these contains 8 items, each selected 
specifically due to modification of EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESI, EDI, or EBP. There is also a final 
item that includes all the above. A user may aggregate queries from many different facets to obtain 
the desired data that may be useful for their unique needs for analysis. 
With faceted classification, having a baseline is important, as this is the standard by which 
future efficacy of the experimented can clearly be demonstrated (Zendler, et al., 2001). There 
should be repeated measurements that can help ensure that the baseline is consistent. In terms of 
establishing a baseline, for this research we could look at it from two perspectives. First, we could 
look at the total number of indirect jumps and calls that are made. Secondly, we can look at the 
“all” item under each facet to get a baseline of the total number of gadgets found. From that, we 
can see how these break down into individual items based on register. Some gadgets that may form 
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a part of the baseline may not appear under items for specific registers due to exclusion criteria. 
Additionally, we could look at the baseline, from the perspective of all possible gadgets that would 
be found by a naïve implementation of a search for a particular operation, and then we could look 
at the results from a more sophisticated, mature implementation. This tool does not have maintain 
naïve implementations of different searches, as it would require significant extra work. Such data 
is irrelevant to security researchers, who simply want to be able to construct JOP exploits as easily 
as possible. 
This research supports the idea that efficacy and utility can stem from the effective use of 
faceted classification with JOP. Appendix B provides exhaustive results from 32 binaries that were 
analyzed and classified by the JOP ROCKET. The total number of gadgets found under each item, 
are provided, for each of the binaries analyzed. Results are provided for just an image of the 
executable itself and collectively as the image and its associated modules.   
 
Table 5.  Faceted classification for gadgets that perform various operations 
Dispatcher 
Gadget 
Best 
Dispatcher 
Gadget 
Other 
Dispatcher 
Gadget 
ADD 
gadget 
SUB gadget MUL 
gadget 
DIV gadget 
EAX EAX EAX EAX EAX EAX EAX 
EBX EBX EBX EBX EBX EBX  
ECX ECX ECX ECX ECX ECX  
EDX EDX EDX EDX EDX EDX EDX 
EDI EDI EDI EDI EDI EDI  
ESI ESI ESI ESI ESI ESI  
EBP EBP EBP EBP EBP EBP  
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ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
Table 6. Faceted classification for gadgets that perform various operations 
POP gadget PUSH 
gadget 
INC gadget DEC 
gadget 
MOV ALL 
gadget 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
gadget 
MOV 
VALUE 
gadget 
EAX EAX EAX EAX EAX EAX EAX 
EBX EBX EBX EBX EBX EBX EBX 
ECX ECX ECX ECX ECX ECX ECX 
EDX EDX EDX EDX EDX EDX EDX 
EDI EDI EDI EDI EDI EDI EDI 
ESI ESI ESI ESI ESI ESI ESI 
EBP EBP EBP EBP EBP EBP EBP 
ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
Table 7. Faceted classification for gadgets that perform various operations 
LEA gadget XCHG 
gadget 
SHIFT 
LEFT 
gadget 
SHIFT 
RIGHT 
gadget 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
gadget 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
gadget 
EAX EAX     
EBX EBX     
ECX ECX     
EDX EDX     
EDI EDI     
ESI ESI     
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EBP EBP     
ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
Table 8. Faceted classification for all gadgets that jump to specific registers 
JUMP EAX JUMP EBX JUMP ECX JUMP EDX JUMP EDI JUMP ESI JUMP EBP 
ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
Table 9. Faceted classification for all gadgets that call specific registers 
CALL EAX CALL EBX CALL ECX CALL EDX CALL EDI CALL ESI CALL EBP 
ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
Artifact 5: A Method for Statically Enumerating and obtaining modules in the import table 
and obtaining their JOP gadgets, while applying exclusion criteria. 
Design science is highly iterative, and this dissertation research has developed and refined 
a method to statically enumerate all modules that will be loaded initially by a PE, including those 
not in the Import Address Table (IAT), and to allow for their JOP gadgets to be obtained. As a 
static analysis tool, it is difficult by its very nature to obtain all the modules that will be loaded by 
a PE file. To do this is typically a task best left for dynamic analysis tools, as all modules will 
already be loaded at the time of a search. With the JOP ROCKET, a static tool, the goal was to not 
only identify modules that likely were to be active once the binary became a process, but to also 
discover their respective file locations. This would allow the text section to be extracted from each 
of these and then searched for JOP gadgets.  
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A DLL can be loaded through implicit linking as an import from the IAT, and this is the 
most common way DLLs are loaded. The Pefile library provides functionality to easily enumerate 
these, but this would not include a number of modules loaded through other means. For instance, 
some of these other modules would be present upon a binary being loaded in WinDbg, yet they 
would not be present in the IAT. Additional ways to load DLLs include forwarded and delayed 
imports. These are not able to be obtained through the functionality built into the Pefile library. A 
forwarded library involves having the call to another function or library delegated to a different 
library (Winitor, 2010). A forwarded library will look like a typical exported function, but in the 
ordinal export table, it will indicate that it is forwarded. The end effect is a forwarded DLL will 
not actually be loaded until or if it is called (Chen, 2006). A delay loaded library is similar and is 
not loaded until they are actually called upon; these are not loaded as they are rarely needed 
(Alexander, 2017). 
Explicit linking is more dynamic in nature. This can concern techniques such as using 
LoadLibraryEx and GetProcAddress to dynamically load it; such dynamically linked libraries 
would not appear in the IAT. Additional malware techniques are possible for dynamic loading of 
DLLs, such as utilizing the PEB and the PE file format to obtain the address for and load a specific 
library and desired API functions (Stroschien, 2018). As a static analysis tool, this work does not 
concern itself with enumerating modules loaded in a dynamic fashion. How some of this is done, 
particularly with the former, can be highly obfuscated at times and often occurs in malware, which 
is outside the purview of this work. The latter would be difficult and complex to discover purely 
through a static analysis tool, such as this. It would be possible with a more sophisticated, dynamic 
tool. 
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There were several problems with getting the desired functionality to work for this tool. 
First, Pefile would list only those DLLs inside the IAT, failing to enumerate others that would be 
loaded very soon after a process was loaded. Second, there needed to be a way to obtain the file 
locations for DLLs, so they could be loaded and have their text sections extracted. This 
functionality was not provided by Pefile. Third, after finding a way to obtain the file locations for 
modules, some location proved to be incorrect, with many returning the the Python module. This 
was used for the artifact, since it is the language the JOP ROCKET is written in, but it is unrelated 
to the target binary. Through the iterative DSR process, all of these problems were successfully 
remediated.  
To find the file location of the modules, so that their text section could be loaded, Windows 
APIs were used to find the location of the DLL. First, LoadLibraryEx was used to load the DLL, 
and then GetModuleHandleW was used to return a handle to the DLL. This handle was then used 
with GetModuleFileNameW to obtain the module file location. When it would fail to return a 
handle and would return null, then it would then return a handle for Python, the language of the 
artifact. This was how Python was improperly enumerated with its JOP gadgets extracted. In those 
cases, the JOP ROCKET searched in the directory of the target binary as well as in System32 or 
SysWow64, based on whether or not it was a 32 or 64 bit binary, as seen in Figure 16. Additionally, 
the application’s directory would be searched as well. More often than not, if it could not be found 
through Windows APIs, it was able to be found this way. Occasionally, some modules could not 
be found through the above means, and rather than risk getting improper results by having 
something such as Python be inadvertently returned as a handle and thus loaded, these were simply 
excluded. The user was provided with a notification the module was excluded from searching. 
This was rare, and it stems from the limitation of working with a purely static analysis 
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environment, while trying to do information that would typically be obtained in a dynamic 
environment. 
 
Figure 16. Excerpt from extractDLLNew function, illustrating its ability find DLL file locations when handle 
module base is null 
As a means of addressing some of these delayed imports, the artifact then extracted the 
imports of other imports. As discussed previously, more libraries than what was in the IAT would 
frequently be loaded immediately or soon thereafter, once a process was loaded. Once the imports 
of the imports were obtained, these would then be added to a list of modules to be extracted and 
searched. This initially gave the greater coverage, but it also included some DLLs that were not 
likely to be loaded in the target binary. When tested in a dynamic environment, such as WinDbg, 
it would be found that some of these modules would not appear. However, a commonality was 
observed to help explain this. Numerous DLLs located in SysWow64/downlevel and 
System32/downlevel that began with API-MS were among these that would be found through this 
method, but they would not typically appear as a loaded binary. Results from downlevel were thus 
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excluded, with the recognition that a static analysis tool has limitations, but that it is better to 
exclude these than to present gadgets from unavailable DLLs to the analyst. In addition, many of 
those DLLs were extremely small and likely to yield minimal if any gadgets.  
Initially, prior to excluding downlevel modules, the number of modules could rapidly 
increase, producing a very inappropriately high number of modules. Many of these came from api-
ms-win modules located in downlevel. On one testing machine, there were 111 of these api-ms-
win modules in the SysWOW64/downlevel directory. Excluding these results produced results that 
were much more in line with reality, as they modules did not appear when examined in WinDbg  
 
Figure 17. Excerpt from function noApi_MS, that drops APIs that will be represented by ucrtbase.dll 
A final anomaly noted was that although various downlevel modules might be named in 
the IAT, all beginning with api-ms-win, such as api-ms-win-core-debug-l1-1-0.dll, the handle for 
these returned would always be ucrtbase.dll. Looking to WinDbg, it would be confirmed that it 
was the ucrtbase.dll that was loaded instead of these tiny, numerous downlevel modules. It is 
important to note also that ucrtbase.dll itself is located in the downlevel directory. This ucrtcase.dll 
is nearly the file size of the 111 api-ms-win DLLs, with a difference of only about 200 KB between 
ucrtcase.dll and all the api-ms-win DLLs. Without examining the content of each, it is likely safe 
to conclude the entirety of these 111 are in ucrtbase.dll, and that the 200 KB difference is simply 
related to bytes for the structure of the PE file across the various DLLs. Thus, given that Windows 
returns a handle for ucrtbase.dll when these DLLs are in the IAT, extracting ucrtbase.dll instead 
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of downlevel api-ms-win modules is the appropriate course of action and would be what was done 
once the process was loaded. And again, indeed, this behavior mirrors what is seen in dynamic 
analysis tools such as WinDbg. The JOP ROCKET has included logic so that if a handle is returned 
for a different module, such as ucrtbase.dll, it will be accepted; this provides coverage for other 
similar actions that may occur. DLLs that compromise part of ucrtbase.dll are excluded, as shown 
in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 18. Excerpt from function obtainAndExtractDlls, which drops extraneous modules 
By using the above technique to provide expanded coverage to discover other modules 
outside the IAT, some DLLS would be listed multiple times in the list. Accordingly, there is logic 
to truncate the list, so that there would only be one instance of a module in the list, as illustrated 
in Figure 18. 
The above logic for static enumeration of modules is not perfect, but it provides for 
improved and more accurate coverage, than what had been initially created in earlier forms of the 
artifact, with missing modules or improper results, such as Python being loaded when the handle 
returned was null. By remediating these issues through the iterative process, the JOP ROCKET is 
now able to find additional modules and to ensure accuracy of file locations, allowing them to be 
extracted and scanned for JOP gadgets. Logic was implemented to exclude modules whose correct 
file location could not be found. This method of providing expanded coverage to statically find 
additional DLLs outside of the IAT, while ensuring correct file locations are being returned, serves 
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as an original contribution. This method could be adapted to other reverse engineering tools, for 
many diverse purposes. 
The JOP ROCKET provides the user with the opportunity to search the binary in three 
ways. They can search for just the executable itself, the executable and only the modules contained 
in the IAT, or the executable, the modules in the IAT, as well as expanded coverage of DLLs. This 
final option is made possible by the original contribution that is this method, allowing for users to 
get more realistic results. Without the presence of this method, users would frequently miss out on 
modules that would be present when the binary loads, as some of these modules would not be in 
the IAT. With the relative scarcity of JOP gadgets, it is critical that these modules be enumerated, 
as this method has allowed, so that there JOP gadgets may be included among the results. 
Artifact 6: An Instantiation of the Artifact 
Perhaps the most important of the artifacts for this research is the instantiation itself, the 
JOP ROCKET. It is the consummate realization of all ideals for the perfect JOP tool, and it 
accomplishes this by adhering to the functional requirements specification. The instantiation is the 
culmination of the DSR inquiry into the research problem, and it effectively brings to life all the 
various methods, in the form of a tool that is accessible and usable, providing the desired 
functionality to the user. The evolution of the artifact has been iteratively developed, while 
following well-established design science principles set forth by Hevner, et al., as well as those 
that were provided by Wieringa. 
This instantiation was constructed to be portable, allowing for it to be used across multiple 
platforms. Because the JOP ROCKET is written in Python, all that is necessary is an installation 
of Python, access to the command line, as well as all dependencies. The primary dependencies are 
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the Pefile and Capstone libraries, which are available across a variety of platforms. Sometimes it 
can be complicated to install these in certain environments, but it is not a great level of difficulty. 
Thus, the JOP ROCKET can be used to some degree on platforms other than Windows. The only 
limitation, as previously explained in chapter 3, is that outside of Windows, the executable’s 
modules cannot be scanned, only the image executable. This is due to the use of Windows API’s 
in the artifact, which would be absent elsewhere, and because the DLLs would not be available in 
their proper locations. A user of course can still scan individual DLLs, if they are running analysis 
outside of Windows. 
Verification of Disassembly 
Verification of disassembly is paramount, as it is one of the key features of for the JOP 
ROCKET, as it is the disassembly that is used for the JOP gadgets. From this, we can look at it 
from two perspectives. First, there must be assurances that the addresses and offsets provided for 
each line of gadgets is accurate. Occasionally during development, there were issues that crept up 
with the address or offset not being properly aligned. Once it was noticed this was occurring, 
corrections were made. Next, the principal concern was that the disassembly was correct, 
regardless of address. This was especially true with opcode-splitting. After all, one could not 
simply go and check in IDA Pro by attempting to look at the line prefix for the intended address, 
as IDA Pro only displays disassembly for intended instructions, though it is possible to change 
this. For greater simplicity and reproducibility of results by others, to verify that the addresses and 
offsets were correct, both IDA Pro and WinDbg were made use of.  
To ensure that the correct disassembly was produced, there were two primary approaches. 
First, we could go to the location in IDA Pro and look at the opcodes to see if they aligned with 
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what was in the Defuse Online x86 /x64 Assembler and Disassembler (Defuse, n.d.), as shown in 
Figure 19 and Figure 20. Thus, it could be determined if the opcodes matched up, and one could 
use the Defuse tool to see if the correct lines of opcodes produced the disassembly. Alternatively, 
one could simply take the offset and the base address of the module in question, and enter u 
[address] in WinDbg. That would indicate if the disassembly produced by the JOP ROCKET and 
WinDbg were a match, as shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22.  
 
Figure 19. IDA Pro confirms that these are unintended instructions.  
 
Figure 20. Defuse Assembler and Disassembler confirms that those opcodes do produce the unintended 
instructions provided by the JOP ROCKET. 
 
Figure 21. The JOP ROCKET provides output for a gadget. The gadget is created using unintended 
instructions. 
 
Figure 22. By using the u command in WinDbg, we can see what Assembly instructions would be executed if 
we began execution at the address provided. 
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Throughout the development process, there were numerous changes to various functions, 
structures, or helper functions that had an adverse effect on the disassembly, introducing different 
complications that caused inaccurate disassembly. Once these were identified, they were 
remediated. The JOP ROCKET in its current form is well tested and produces only accurate 
disassembly for the gadgets, as shown in Figure 21. The verification methods leave no shadow of 
a doubt as to the accuracy of the gadgets produced by ROCKET. 
Validation 
Validation is a necessity before a new technology can mature sufficiently to be able to be 
of use in the market. New technologies such as the JOP ROCKET must be subjected to testing 
with appropriate simulations that replicate similar conditions that would be used in a real-world 
context (Wieringa, 2013). An empirical method for validation can be performed here with a single-
case mechanism experiment. With validation, we endeavor to simulate its use in a context similar 
to what will be used, to see if it satisfies the needs of stakeholders. 
Conceptual validation is the first stage of validation, where calculations and examples are 
worked through to try to access the validity (Wieringa, 2013). Then comes the modelling stage, 
where experiments are done with artifact. As the JOP ROCKET was being developed, significant 
informal testing was performed. Finally, we get to real-world field testing. Here the JOP ROCKET 
is used as intended on actual binaries. 
For validation, we primarily focus on the single-case mechanism experiment as presented 
by Wieringa (2013; 2014). Much of what we can do also can be demonstrated via the work with 
Hevner, et al., and owing to their prominence, we discuss that later in chapter 4. For purposes of 
validating software, other similar methods can be used to achieve the same ends. Zelkowitz and 
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Wallace (1998) cover much of the same area in what they call a simulation or dynamic analysis, 
while Glass et al. (2001) cover the same province with what they refer to as field experiment, 
laboratory experiment – software, or simulation. While these other methods are appropriate to use 
for validation, what Wieringa describes as the single-case mechanism experiment provides 
significant potential overlap and is mutually consistent with the aforementioned validation 
methods. 
A validation model consisting of a model of the artifact and a model of the context if fully 
validated should generalize to the implemented target as well as the intended real-world context  
(Wieringa, 2013). As the single-case mechanism utilizes contexts going from idealized to more 
realistic conditions, the artifact becomes more robust. 
Single-Case Mechanism Experiment 
Under both Wieringa and Hevner, et al., validation of new design science artifacts is 
critical. Validation is provided using a single-case mechanism experiment, where a simulated use 
of the JOP ROCKET is performed. The results it obtains are then evaluated for the applicability. 
They show that the JOP ROCKET produces the desired results and output via a controlled 
experiment. As this is very valuable information to have for a researcher wishing to do a JOP 
exploit, it would strongly imply that the tool would be of immense value to such researchers. 
Absent this tool, there would be no automated way to generate all the gadgets divided into 
appropriate classifications. Thus, the idea of asking users or potential users if they find value in 
the tool would be redundant, since without the tool, there would be no other options except for 
laborious, tedious manual discovery of gadgets. Here we have performed validation of the methods 
as well as the instantiation of the framework, and the results speak for themselves. 
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This single-case mechanism experiment is often used as a means to perform validation, 
according to Wieringa, and that has been the case here. With implementation evaluation, a tool 
may be tested for purposes of being able to analyze the tool’s architecture. Algorithms may also 
be tested with a real or simulated context (Wieringa, 2014). The research context is important for 
the single-case mechanism experiment. We can view as part of the knowledge goals, within 
specific target binaries, the need to determine what are the JOP dispatcher gadgets and the 
functional gadgets. More broadly, the results of the single-case mechanism experiment may 
provide insights into the prevalence or infrequency of certain categories of gadgets.  
A single-case mechanism experiment is used with the knowledge goal of validating new 
technology, along with the improvement goal of developing a new or better form of technology.  
With this research, the improvement goal has been to develop new methods to facilitate the 
discovery of JOP gadgets, or where some methods already exist, to iteratively develop better, more 
accurate, more relevant versions of those methods. In validation research, a knowledge question 
might concern whether or not the effects of the artifact prototype interacting with a simulation of 
the context can satisfy the requirements laid out. The results obtained from the single-case 
mechanism experiment clearly demonstrate this has been achieved with the JOP ROCKET. 
JOP Dataset 
The artifact was intended to allow exploit developers to analyze a target PE file, with the 
intent to discover all useful JOP gadgets. As part of the validation effort, to demonstrate the 
efficacy and utility of the artifact, it is necessary to test the tool on PE files. The PEs selected cover 
a broad range, from small to large executables, each with a few to numerous modules. In all, 32 
PE files were subjected to analysis. A broad range were examined, to try to mimic natural working 
conditions. These included Windows system binaries, such as Notepad, as well as large and small 
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binaries that were both commercial and open source. In the design of this artifact, the choice was 
made for it to target 32-bit applications, and accordingly the 64-bit PE32+ files are excluded.  
The research here does not seek to draw conclusions on specific categories of binaries, e.g. large 
or small commercial binaries, binaries made using certain compilers, binaries that employ have 
object-oriented C++, etc. The dataset exists simply to demonstrate the instantiation and its methods 
work as intended and can contribute some practical utility to the intended user. Different research 
efforts that employ quantitative research methods could perhaps make more relevant discoveries 
on the nature of JOP in the 32-bit Windows environment, but that is outside our scope. 
The number of viable JOP gadgets vis-à-vis ROP gadgets is much smaller, and for some 
smaller or even large binaries, the attack surface may not be large enough to realistically mount an 
attack. It is important to include these binaries in the dataset. Some binaries, due to their size, have 
an attack surface that is simply too narrow to realistically accommodate an attack, as there may 
not be enough strong gadgets in plentiful numbers. Because of the relatively small attack surface 
that may be the case with JOP, the JOP ROCKET has gone to extreme lengths to make sure all 
possible gadgets can be found, even those that while less than desirable, were still feasible. 
Additionally, on the same note, the artifact has gone to great lengths to provide order and 
classification, removing junk gadgets (some completely unrealistic, derived from opcode-
splitting), so that the good ones can be found, rather than they suffer the fate of a needle lost in a 
haystack. After all, if there 8000 gadgets for jump to EAX and only a small number may be viable 
for a specific purpose, it does no favors to the analyst, when there is no simple way to make sense 
of the deluge of gadget and locate what is sought. Clearly, that would be suboptimal, and so this 
artifact has eased that burden. 
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The JOP ROCKET can be used in essentially three modes when searching for gadgets: the 
PE file itself, the PE file and the imports contained in the IAT, and the PE file and expanded 
imports. Having more modules than simply the executable itself potentially could greatly expand 
available gadgets, or make available gadgets that may lack protections. It is important to consider 
that many of these DLLs, as well as perhaps the PE file itself, may have protections in place, such 
as DEP, ASLR, SAFESEH, or CFG, which may make them unsuitable, unless a bypass exists. A 
bypass could include memory disclosures, to overcome ASLR, and then other protections 
potentially could be overcome. This research does not consider these possibilities. Like many other 
tools, it can indicate if a particular PE or module has any of these protections. The research is 
undertaken from the perspective that even if all the protections were in place, potentially they 
could be overcome by a dedicated attacker, given the right set of circumstances. In more practical 
terms though, the presence of some of these protections may mean some attacks may not be viable 
or the level or difficulty would be too high. Clearly, it would be impossible to tell if an attack 
would be feasible from a static analysis tool such as this. 
The artifact can generate a .csv with a breakdown of all the numbers of different gadgets, 
which serves as a useful as a way of easily examining the results of the single-case mechanism 
experiment. The results obtained from the dataset are representative of what may be commonplace 
with typical PEs. Looking at the dataset for a binary may provide an indication whether or not JOP 
may be potentially viable. Ultimately the only way to know for certain as to examine representative 
gadgets.  Looking at the .csv may allow an analyst to make an informed conjecture as to whether 
or not a binary is likely to be feasible for JOP.  
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Validation Model 
In validation research, the Objects of Study (OoS) is the validation model. This consists of 
the artifact prototype as well as a model of the context (Wieringa, 2013). In this wok, the artifact 
prototype is the Python instantiation of the framework as well as the different methods. The context 
used is a real-world context. Actual binaries that an exploit developer might target serves as the 
real-world context. A simulated context would be toy binaries constructed solely for the purpose 
of validation. With OoS, there is a need that the validation model satisfies the population predicate, 
and in this research the validation efforts employ real-world contexts (Wieringa, 2013).  
In order for a validation model to be valid, it should support inferences that are analogic, 
descriptive, as well as abductive. The validity of these inferences are then assessed during the 
empirical cycle. For descriptive inference, we must define the descriptive inference (Wieringa, 
2013). 
Validation requires that data preparation be addressed; there should be an answer as to 
whether or not data prepared data represent the same phenomena as unprepared data (Wieringa, 
2013). With the JOP ROCKET, we find that unprepared data would indeed represent the same 
phenomena. However, it would be in a form where manual methods would need to find these, 
whereas the JOP ROCKET provides the prepared data in an automated fashion, as files containing 
gadget and as a .csv file that provides a summary of all the different JOP gadgets found, broken 
down into specific classifications. We also must show if interpretations formed, e.g. classification 
of gadgets, may be regarded as facts. Indeed, the JOP gadgets found and their classifications are 
performed in a highly objective fashion, where there is no room for opinion.  
Repeatability is also a necessity with validation. Other scientists also need to be able to 
utilize this work to reproduce the validation (Wieringa, 2013). An analyst making use of this 
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framework with the same binaries and the same options, would obtain the same results. Another, 
independently formed tool would likely find the same results. Many of the results obtained have 
been repeated numerous times throughout the testing cycle to ensure accuracy and as the artifact 
has been improved, so there is no question as to repeatability. 
Validation models additionally must support abductive inferences. This addresses whether 
the data given can support the explanations provided. It should also address treatment control. That 
is, it must show if the setup of the experiment or even the experiments themselves influence the 
validation model  (Wieringa, 2013). With respect to abductive inferences, with the JOP ROCKET, 
the inferences drawn have been minimal and only used to better inform the design of the artifact. 
There is little that needs to be done with respect to treatment control and concern with the 
experiments influencing the validation model, because the results obtained can objectively and 
decisively be determined as accurate and correct, and there appears to be no undue influence on 
validation. 
Sampling 
The sampling is representative of many types and has been carefully selected, with only 
relevant, modern PEs are selected. These are tested on a current, updated, Windows 10 PC outside 
of virtualization. The results would be accurate on any operating system. The artifact is to be used 
on a large representative sampling of PEs using all available options (all registers selected, all 
dispatcher gadget registers found, printing all operations, and obtaining statistics in .csv format on 
all the data obtained). This is performed with all the default settings, which are deemed reasonable. 
Modification of defaults would produce different results, but the further we go from the defaults, 
the less likely they are to be truly representative of the binary. The resulting binaries are then 
searched for anomalies and errors in reliability. 
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Context 
In this validation, we have the instantiation and its methods as the artifacts, and the 
treatment is subjected it to a realistic context—namely, actual, real PEs that feasibly would be used 
in the wild. The treatment can be viewed as inserting an artifact into a context (Wieringa, 2013). 
The treatment with this experiment is the request to identify relevant JOP gadgets in target binaries. 
We could also view the treatment from the perspective of a security researcher investigating target 
binaries (context) through the use of ROCKET. The measurement is the identification of these 
gadgets and the precision and accuracy with which it is done, in the form of correct addresses and 
offsets. 
Throughout design, a variety of select real world PEs were repeatedly analyzed, some 
having been run through various algorithms hundreds of times, as the instantiation and different 
methods evolved and were continuously refined. Constructing a toy app would be tedious and 
unnecessary. However, in some cases, certain classifications of gadgets were rare, and in the 
development, these were treated with a simulated context, as finding a real-world context would 
be challenging, particularly with respect to testing the many variations of acceptable gadgets, not 
to mention implementing exclusion criteria. The simulated context consisted of real-world chunks 
of disassembly that were then subjected to testing in a separate, small Python program with limited 
functionality, whose only purpose was to test that the regular expressions worked exactly as 
intended. This was often a highly iterative process, with many changes being made, until 
refinements were made just right..  
It should be stressed that the limited use of validation throughout the development process 
with a simulated context was not intended to be repeatable by other researchers. Once the tool had 
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matured and was refined, this testing was no longer necessary, and a real-world context, i.e. actual 
PE files, was then used.  
Execution of the Validation 
Sample construction was routine. A large, representative sampling, meeting the 
aforementioned loose criteria, was selected for final validation. Months of iterative validation had 
gone on previously, both using real-world as well as simulated contexts, in order to arrive at this 
point. A text file was used as input containing the file location for a target binary. This was run on 
the command line with the command python prog.py input.txt. By default, all binaries supplied via 
file is subjected to the most complete analysis possible, with all options selected, generating all 
output.   
Unexpected Events 
Once the treatment was applied and the execution began, some unexpected events 
occurred. A couple DLLs were included twice, and this had been overlooked. The source of the 
error was found and rectified. This was part of the algorithms to expand coverage of DLLs beyond 
what was in the IAT. There had been a reduction algorithm that removed repeated DLLs, but some 
logic had not been considered, allowing for some DLLs to persist. 
Prior to successful execution, some bugs from the latest revisions that had not been caught 
were discovered. Throughout the iterative process, more and more features and functionality have 
been continuously added, and some last-minute additions to help streamline the validation had 
results in a couple minor bugs. These bugs stemmed from changes to facilitate streamlining the 
validation efforts, and they did not pertain to core functions. Once these were corrected, execution 
ran smoothly. 
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For a few binaries that were to be tested, memory ran out. It is believed this is due to using 
a 32-bit version of Capstone and Python, thus limiting available RAM. These were very large 
binaries, each with more than 24 modules, some fairly large. Better memory management may 
also alleviate this, but it is also possible they may reach the limits of what can be done with 32-bit. 
It is believed that moving to a 64-bit version of Python and Capstone would eliminate this issue. 
This would involve changes to the environment, changes that are not straightforward. As the JOP 
ROCKET is being developed outside of a VM, this has been deferred to a later date. 
Treatment Validation 
Treatment validation can be achieved through a number of means, and this is an important 
requirement that needs to be met under Wieringa’s theories on design science. Treatment 
validation must determine if the context and artifact can produce the desired effects. With this 
research, the question has been answered as to whether or not using the JOP ROCKET with actual 
binaries in a simulated environment can create the necessary gadgets; this clearly has been 
achieved. Additionally, treatment validation should address whether these effects can then satisfy 
the requirements that were previously delineated in chapter 3, and indeed that has been the case. 
Data Analysis  
Having ran the tool against some 32 binaries, we can now engage in data analysis, by 
looking at the key areas described by Wieringa for data analysis. Some representative data is 
included in Appendix B, which will be useful to review while examining the data analysis.   
While a much larger dataset could allow us to make more statistically sound generalizations about 
the nature of JOP in modern 32-bit binaries, that is not the point of the research, as the overarching 
goal here is to create a tool to facilitate pragmatic work with JOP for exploitation, not to perform 
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an exhaustive, quantitative study on JOP. Given these constraints, we make only tentative, very 
general speculations on the dataset. 
Descriptions 
Execution times would take up to 20 minutes or more for some binaries. This period of 
time involved searching through many modules for gadgets, as well as searching  imports in the 
IAT. In some previous testing, some options were more limited, e.g. searching only for indirect 
calls or jumps, or for only certain registers, and this resulted in less time.  
The figures obtained from the framework were in line with expectations. Indirect jumps or 
calls to certain registers were much more plentiful, whilst others were much less so. Those that 
tended to be more or less plentiful tended to be so across multiple binaries that were tested. 
Additionally, the application of faceted classification to the data resulted in some categories being 
significantly more plentiful than others, and this as well is true across multiple binaries. Some 
categories tend to have few or even no gadgets associated with them, due to general scarcity. 
Looking at the dataset, it is speculated that across a number of binaries, many categories may exist 
only in limited numbers. Additionally, it is to be noted that some modules have far fewer gadgets 
than others. 
JMP EAX is far and above the most plentiful of the indirect jumps, with an average of 
413.9 gadgets per binary, while JMP EDX has the next highest at 77.9. JMP EBX as the least 
plentiful of indirect jumps has an average of 1 gadget per binary, while indirect jumps to other 
registers on average are in the single digits to low tens. Indirect calls, on average, are more 
plentiful, with CALL EAX on average having 5276.9 and CALL EDX the next highest at 4684.5. 
CALL EBX is still abundant at 1665.8, and CALL EDI and CALL ESI are as well, at 2112.2 and 
2277.3 respectively. CALL ECX and CALL EBP are the least plentiful at 272.3 and 86.2. While 
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some of the figures are relatively high, there can be wide variance across different binaries, where 
one binary might have gadgets for a particular indirect call in the thousands, and another might 
have them in the low hundreds. Some gadgets on average also tend to have very low numbers of 
any indirect calls or jumps, while some outliers may have vastly more, with over tens of thousands 
of gadgets.  
Some operational gadgets are much more common, while others are much less so. Ones 
that are plentiful include ADD, SUB, MOV, LEA, PUSH, POP. Ones that are much less frequent 
but exist in sufficient quantities to be useful include INC, DEC, XCHG, shift left, and shift right. 
Ones that are much more limited or even rare include MUL, DIV, rotate left, and rotate right. For 
those operations identified as rare, there simply may be no viable gadgets in those facets, although 
the functionality could be emulated in other ways, e.g. shifting left or shifting right. 
Some dispatcher gadgets pertaining to certain registers were limited or rare. These are the 
key gadgets to make JOP possible. In no case were any of the DG Best category found; these are 
dispatcher gadgets that would be guaranteed to work with minimal effort and an ideal setup. The 
DG Other subcategory also had limited numbers. Some dispatcher gadgets to certain registers had 
little to no representation in smaller binaries. 
Often there seems to be a relatively small number of functional gadgets, compared to ROP. 
This coupled with the limited number of JOP dispatcher gadgets means the attack surface for JOP 
is much more limited than it is for ROP. 
In terms of the artifact itself, all algorithms and methods performed as intended. The JOP 
ROCKET has been tested through repeated iterations of the design cycle; all programmatic 
behavior appeared was as had been anticipated. Numerous instances of unwanted or unintended 
behavior existed and were encountered often throughout the design cycle, but were all identified 
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and corrected. These unexpected phenomena, e.g. software bugs, stem from unanticipated 
mechanisms in the implementation (Wieringa, 2013). The only anomaly that occurred during the 
single-case mechanism experiment was with a RAM memory error from Python that occurred with 
a small number of very large binaries that were tested, and a reasonable explanation was provided. 
Explanations 
As described in descriptions, there exists a wide variance in the average number of gadgets 
for certain indirect jumps or calls, and Appendix B provides the full details, showing the total 
number of gadgets found for each of the categories. With some binaries represented in Appendix 
B, some may be close to the average for a particular indirect jump or call, and others may be only 
a fraction of the average, while a few outliers may instead of having have 5 to 10 times as many 
gadgets as the average. Again, it must be reiterated that the testing done was just to demonstrate 
efficacy and utility, so the dataset is not statistically large enough to make broad generalizations 
that withstand scrutiny. A more comprehensive study would be needed to form accurate 
generalizations, with respect to the nature of indirect jumps and calls across a broad spectrum. 
However, we might speculate simply that there can be large variance, and that the size of 
the binary can be tied to it, but that other factors may come into play. With these samples, the 
binaries with the largest number of gadgets have been large commercial applications that were not 
Microsoft products. Some of the results could be related to programming choices, languages or 
compilers used, or whether object-oriented was employed, etc. Beyond simply size, there is 
insufficient data to support further informed speculation. The fact that some modules have far 
fewer gadgets than others can be tied to the size of the binary, as an increased size tends to correlate 
with a higher number of gadgets, whilst the opposite remains true as well. A large number of 
modules of greater size can increase the number of available gadgets as well, so this could 
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contribute to the overall potential attack surface for a binary.  Nonetheless, at least for this dataset, 
there are some gadgets that are on average existing in much larger or smaller numbers than the 
average. 
The fact that some classifications of gadgets are more plentiful can be attributed to two 
areas. First, some registers are used much more frequently, such as EAX, while others less so. 
Some Assembly instructions are also more commonly used, such as ADD, MOV, and SUB. Thus, 
some functional gadgets for certain operations produce more plentiful results because they are 
used more frequently. There is also a tendency for some unintended instructions associated with 
certain registers or certain operations to be more likely to result in meaningful instructions. We 
can distinguish this from far more impractical specimens that would have little use in any 
conceivable attack scenarios. This research does not have data to draw conclusions on whether 
certain specific operational gadgets tend to be more plentiful purely on account of opcode-splitting, 
but past work would lend support to this idea (Bletsch, 2011) 
Some categories of gadgets have fewer numbers, and there are some categories of gadgets 
that jump or call to certain registers much less than to others. This may seem on the surface to 
preclude the use of certain registers, if a particular operation does not have appropriate gadgets 
that modify a certain register. However, it bears pointing out that by utilizing one category of 
functional gadgets, the move shuffle, it is possible to change a value from register that is more 
commonplace, to one where there are no available gadets. The register holding the value sought 
by the attacker can switched back and forth from multiple registers, as many as times as needed. 
Some functional gadgets with careful planning can perform more than one key operation. Thus, a 
move shuffle or adding a specific value to certain register could both occur in the same JOP gadget. 
This allows for greater flexibility, but requires more careful planning.  
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The number of available gadgets for a binary can be increased by scanning modules. 
Although this would seem readily apparent, we state this nonetheless. As more modules are 
analyzed, they will tend to produce more gadgets, thereby enlarging the attack surface. Thus, using 
the option to scan all modules in the IAT will tend to increase the attack surface, while selecting 
the option to include the IAT as well as expanded coverage will tend to increase it even further. 
Some gadgets may not be accessible, however, if ASLR is in place and there is no memory 
disclosure or other means to overcome it.  
The fact that the category for Other DG had only limited numbers in some registers can be 
explained in part because of the tendency for those shifting operations to be used more frequently 
with EAX, and the fact that unintended combinations of opcodes involving some registers do not 
tend to produce examples of Other DG gadgets. Thus, it seems the Other DG will typically only 
be found in some registers if these instructions are intended, reducing the attack surface.  
While there were not other programmatic errors encountered during the single-case 
mechanism experiment, this is because they were previously addressed. These errors can come 
from a variety of causes, such as carelessness, inadequate understanding of what we are doing, or 
there may be unknown mechanisms that may interfere with our capacity to comprehend what we 
programmed (Wieringa, 2013). Sometimes correction of errors was a time-consuming endeavor, 
but careful measures were taken to ensure that the algorithms in place worked step by step as 
intended. The anomaly with the MemoryError mentioned in discussion is due to available RAM 
being exhausted for certain very large binaries with more than 24 modules. In this testing 
environment, 32-bit Python and 32-bit Capstone are used. There is a hard limit of available RAM 
for 32-bit, limited to 4 GB, of which 2 GB is reserved for kernel usage. This error only occurred 
with some binaries that were very large and had an abnormally high number of gadgets.  It is clear 
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that due to the size of the binaries and their modules, that memory was apparently exhausted. It 
does seem unusual that the binaries would consume that much memory, but there could be other 
nuances of memory management at play, for either Capstone or Python. It is likely that a 64-bit 
implementation of both Python and Capstone would resolve these. 
The dataset is a testament to the utility of the framework, as the faceted classification has 
produced a wide array of different gadgets, organized by function and by affected registers. The 
high degree of understandability and learnability for users stems from the fact that the JOP 
ROCKET provides a robust menu and help system. The help system should be adequate for those 
familiar with code-reuse attacks, i.e. ROP. ROCKET trades on familiar ideas and similar territory. 
For those who are not familiar, the tool and its usage likely would be beyond their understanding, 
without previous exposure to code-reuse attacks. We can view knowledge of ROP as a necessary 
prerequisite, and it is unlikely someone would attempt to utilize this without that knowledge. 
Analogic Generalization 
Using analogy to generalize as a form of analytic induction is a valid technique that can 
allow statements to be made from a single case to extend to other similar cases (Yin, 2003). Thus, 
we can assume that similar contexts as well as similar artifacts would tend to produce very similar 
results. Those results from a single-case mechanism experiments could speak for many others 
contexts. 
A single-case mechanism experiment is often run in a laboratory environment. This 
experiment was not run in a production environment with exploit developers using it for real-world 
tasks in the development of actual exploits. Instead, a laboratory environment simulated that 
context; this permitted various modern PE files to be subjected to analysis. All these PE files 
feasibly could have been used as targets, as these are much the same binaries that an attacker might 
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exploit, given a vulnerability. Thus, we can generalize that the efficacy and utility demonstrated 
in this experiment would extend to the real-world usage as well. Accordingly, all the 
generalizations derived from a laboratory simulation of the context likely would extend to real-
world usage of the framework (Wieringa, 2014). It is not likely that any situations or conditions 
anticipated in the real world would cause any change whatsoever, as the binaries would remain 
identical and thus produce the same dataset. Here we can also employ sample-based reasoning to 
note that what was observed with the artifact prototype and the simulated context can be extended 
and generalized to the real world, thereby establishing external validity (Wieringa, 2013).  
Answers to Knowledge Questions 
This work was intended to provide contributions towards the knowledge goals regarding 
the best way in which to devise an instantiation along with appropriate methods to address the 
research problem. The fact that the artifact works as intended serves as evidence that this goal was 
satisfied. The answers to these questions are then the methods and instantiation themselves, as 
these are the appropriate ways to realize the goal of constructing this artifact. 
As supplemental research questions, this dissertation was intended to also some additional 
research questions. These concerned (a.) the frequency of certain categories of gadgets, (b.) how 
frequently gadgets could be eliminated as impractical, and (c.) the average breakdown of indirect 
jumps or calls to specific registers. To reiterate, these were not knowledge questions that guided 
this research, but they were felt to be an interesting by-product that would be useful to security 
researchers. 
The below diagrams illustrate the response to the first question. The second question does 
not have evidence in support of a response, as this data was not collected. Owing to the sheer 
volume of data structures, methods, and the size of the code itself, additional methods to collect 
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this data would consume too much space. Additionally, it would add unnecessary complexity to 
the logic and disrupt the flow of the results. Anecdotally, during testing, it did appear that a 
reasonable number of gadgets were discarded. It is likely that a majority of those discarded were 
unintended results. The third supplemental knowledge question (c.) can also be addressed by a 
graph in Figure 23. This does show that indeed certain registers used in indirect jumps or calls to 
registers tend to be much higher than others. 
 
 
Figure 23. Average number of indirect jumps and indirect calls for the 32 binaries analyzed. 
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 Figure 24. Selected averages for total number of operational gadgets for the 32 binaries analyzed. 
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Figure 25. The total number of indirect jumps and indirect calls for the 32 binaries analyzed 
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Implications for the Context 
This work provides a contribution to the improvement goal. Some of these methods had 
already existed in a more rudimentary form, but they lacked refinement and usage in a well-
developed tool. Additionally, this work serves as a contribution to the practice of exploit 
development, by providing said tool to address the previously described unmet needs. 
Discussion of Results 
One of the ways in which a design science artifact can demonstrate its efficacy and utility 
is by validation through a single-case mechanism experiment.  These results show that the artifact 
meets those two criteria. It produces an abundance of useful gadgets carefully classified into 
relevant categories and sub-categories. The JOP ROCKET improves upon as well as introduces 
new methods as artifacts, and their implementation has been successful as seen by the meticulously 
ordered data that can be generated by the tool. 
The results could be enlarged or narrowed by changing search criteria, such as the number 
of opcodes to disassemble as well as the depth, or the to put it another way, the number of lines 
between the target operation and the indirect jump or call. For the discovery of JOP dispatcher 
gadget, additional search criteria could be modified, to further enlarge the results, though 
increasing the depth here would produce inferior or unusable dispatcher gadgets. For obtained 
gadgets in the dataset, the default settings had been employed. These settings were reasonable, but 
could possibly exclude useful gadgets.  
Single-case mechanism experiments are often useful for the testing of a prototype of an 
artifact, allowing for not only the new technology to be validated, but for the evaluation of the 
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implementation. The results of this single-case mechanism experiment with this research does 
satisfy all the stated objectives. 
The Iterative Approach 
 Hevner, et al., emphasize that design science is to be a highly iterative process, with a cycle 
of evaluation allowing for the artifact to improve continuously and better address the research 
question at hand. To simply build an artifact and declare that one is done with it, while not 
subjecting it to multiple iterations of validation, is to fail at design science. Thus, a flurry of activity 
occurred as different stages of the design cycle iterated repeatedly, to yield an artifact that 
embodies correctness, consistency, and completeness.  
As initial algorithms were created and implemented for the JOP ROCKET, the results 
produced were carefully analyzed for accuracy, reliability, and appropriateness. At the most basic 
level, the question of whether they were right and accurate was asked. Then other considerations 
came into play, such as how to save and utilize the large dataset generated for each binary analyzed. 
Initially, an object-oriented approach was started, but that was soon jettisoned for a naïve approach 
that favored simpler data structures. Because of the ambitious nature of this project, it became 
necessary to expand these simple data structures significantly, as their numbers grew into the 
hundreds.  Later, it came apparent that an object-oriented approach was indeed required due to the 
complexity of the program with respect to how it used and manipulated data, and significant 
reworking of the existing code occurred to facilitate this transformation. Thus, design science and 
its iterative approach has significantly enhanced the JOP ROCKET, allowing for features to mature 
and new features to be developed, resulting in a much stronger artifact.  
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Hevner’s Design Science Guidelines 
 While this work was completed by following the design science principles of Wieringa, an 
artifact completed in that fashion would lend itself to evaluation under Hevner’s design science 
guidelines. We briefly review how it has satisfied Hevner’s guidelines. The first two of Hevner’s 
guidelines, Design as an Artifact and Problem Relevance, have been previously in abundant detai; 
having completed the design of the artifact does not change these.  We will look more closely at 
the latter five guidelines, Design Evaluation, Research Contributions, Research Rigor, Design as 
a Search Process, and Communication of Research, in the sections that follow. 
Design Evaluation 
Hevner’s guidelines provide that the triad of utility, quality, and efficacy of the artifact 
must be shown with rigor and the use of evaluative methods. This has been rigorously 
demonstrated via single-case mechanism experiment. The single-case mechanism experiment has 
shown that the gadgets are accurate, that they produce the appropriate offsets, that the UI is clean 
and intuitive, and that the results are organized in a fashion that is useful and meaningful to the 
analyst. According to Wieringa, single-case mechanism experiments are used to implement and 
evaluate a design science artifact, permitting the researcher to explore the tool in a look at the 
cause and effect of the object of the study in an environment with its intended context. Finally, the 
single-case mechanism experiment also helps validate the design science artifact, serving to 
demonstrate its utility and efficacy. This has been done by showing the numbers of gadgets that 
can be classified into appropriate groupings. 
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Research Contributions 
Design science, according to Hevner, should provide strong contributions in the area of the 
design artifact.  This has done so via providing a verifiable contribution in the form of design 
artifact. The framework itself, as has been discussed in detail, is innovative and provides several 
novel methods that can enrich the field of exploit development. This is seen through the five 
artifacts that are methods as well as the primary focal point, the instantiation of the framework 
itself. These amount to a significant contribution, answering a need that has been unmet. What’s 
more is they can be used to help facilitate additional research by others in the area of JOP and 
exploit development. 
Research Rigor 
According to Hevner, design science must employ rigorous methods during both the 
construction and evaluation of the artifact. During the highly iterative development of this tool, 
hundreds of tests were done to ensure the numerous different algorithms, helper functions, etc., 
worked as intended and to discover where changes needed to be made. This was no small task as 
the tool grew to be over 14,000 lines of Python code, but rigor was a focal point. Much rigor could 
have been eliminated if the author had taken the easy way and decided simply to integrate the JOP 
ROCKET with an existing tool, like WinDbg or Immunity; numerous problems and programming 
challenges would have been instantly eliminated. A reduced feature set and a more naïve approach 
to JOP also would have lowered rigor and allowed for the artifact to be created more quickly . 
However, rigor has been a point of pride with this dissertation research, and it would not be traded 
away for convenience or ease, particularly as this work should be of a very high quality to satisfy 
Ph.D. requirements. Additionally, this rigor has been demonstrated through validation efforts, and 
rgor can be shown through the validity of the results the JOP ROCKET has produced. The simple 
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fact that it does what it purports to do and does so accurately is a testament to the necessary rigor 
that the artifact has undergone. Accomplishing these benchmarks is no trivial task, given the level 
of complexity inherent in this artifact, but that level of complexity is commensurate with what is 
needed to fully address JOP. 
Design as a Search Process 
Hevner asserts that that the search for an artifact must employ all possible means to reach 
a successful outcome, whilst satisfying guidelines in the problem realm. This process has been 
actively engaged, as various other models were studied that were used to facilitate the discovery 
of code-reuse attacks. These include the Mona Python script, which must integrate with WinDbg 
or Immunity, or the ROPgadget python script by Jonathan Salwan, which can be run 
independently. Other more generic reverse engineering tools were examined as well. This included 
looking at the tools themselves as well as examining source code, where available. These were 
helpful to some extent, but this work went in a completely different direction and involved subject 
matter that was outside their scope. Mona and ROPgadget have very minimal JOP coverage, but 
they are not developed and appear to be more a placeholder for future work. 
Communication of Research 
Communication of research is essential, as it must be presented to both a technical as well 
as a management-oriented audience. This tool is highly specialized, and the relevance is quite 
clearly communicated to the intended audience. In fact, it is presented in a way to make the content 
as easily digestible as possible.  As has been described, the fact that this tool is able to generate 
well-organized groupings of gadgets to facilitate attacks should be clearly understandable by 
management audiences. They need only understand that it produces the necessary gadgets that 
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potentially could be used for a JOP exploit. Additionally, as one of the means of fulfilling this 
requirement of Hevner, publication or conference presentations will be pursued as an avenue to 
communicate some of these findings to other researchers.  
Summary 
This chapter serves to detail the results obtained by this research. It confirms that the 
artifacts have been created as described in the methodology section, by following rigorous design 
science guidelines. It has been shown that this work has met the DSR guidelines established by 
Hevner, et al., and it has conformed to Wierigina’s principles of design science. This chapter has 
shown in great detail how it meets the guidelines or principles described by both Wierigina and 
Hevner, et al. This research has culminated in the creation of six artifacts, including five new or 
substantially reworked methods, alongside the crown jewel, the instantiation itself. This chapter 
has explored each of these artifacts in detail, explaining what they do and the significance of their 
contributions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
At the heart of this research, the JOP ROCKET was developed as a versatile tool that can 
confer strong benefits to security researchers wishing to do JOP exploits. Outside of doing JOP 
just as a proof of concept, JOP can be a way to overcome heuristics that may look for certain ROP 
behavioral patterns in a Windows 7 environment. Robust anti-ROP heuristics and defenses would 
be unable to detect JOP, as that is outside their scope. Thus, these mitigations that might have been 
too powerful for ROP to overcome, then could be defeated through JOP, making a potentially 
secure system, now suddenly vulnerable to attacks that utilize JOP.  
This work has focused on Windows 7, as it lacks Microsoft’s CFG, and so JOP can be done 
freely without restrictions. However, this work could be extended to Windows 8.0, which also 
lacks CFG, and it is important to be aware that while even Windows 10 has CFG, there are 
vulnerabilities with CFG discovered, from time to time, which can allow attacks to be executed on 
that system, and patching to remediate these can sometimes be delayed. The best defense would 
be new computers with hardware support for Intel’s CET, but that could be years until it is out, 
although Microsoft and GCC have already provided compiler support. While the theoretical CET 
may offer protection, it too may be vulnerable to attacks, and some security researchers have 
already pointed out inherent weaknesses (“Close, But No Cigar,” n.d.). CET would have similar 
forward-edge defenses against indirect calls and jumps, by simply whitelisting a series of 
acceptable targets. That would severely reduce the attack surface, but it would still permit JOP, 
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and other potential, to be discovered vulnerabilities, potentially could make more JOP attacks 
possible. 
This work focuses on Windows as it is the dominant operating system and more relevant. 
While this work has focused on a Windows environment, there is nothing to stop it from being 
modified to include Linux or other operating systems, which may lack support for JOP defenses. 
In fact, much of the existing code and logic in the JOP ROCKET, after extracting executable 
content, would be identical. The code was not adapted only because scope for this dissertation 
research was limited.  If the JOP ROCKET were to be adapted to Linux, it could increase its 
relevancy and increase the total number of machines vulnerable to JOP. While Linux does provide 
some limited, third party CFI solutions, such as Reuse Attack Protector (RAP) and Clang/LLVM, 
these are limited in scope, and neither are widely deployed.  
This chapter will provide a brief review of a few of the principal contributions that have 
been made. Lessons learned from throughout the process are explained, and some of the limitations 
inherent in the application are discussed. Recommendations are made, and finally this chapter 
concludes with a discussion listing possible directions for future work. 
Contributions 
This research provides contributions in the form of an instantiation of a novel framework 
and five distinct artifacts consisting of new or improved methods. These have already been 
discussed at length in the previous chapter, so just a broad review of some of the more significant 
contributions will be provided. 
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Faceted Classification for JOP Gadgets 
This work provides a faceted classification for JOP functional gadgets. While Turing 
complete features have often been used to demonstrate that different architectures can perform full 
arbitrary computation, this research entails classification into new sub categories. The point here 
is not to demonstrate that JOP is fully Turing-complete, but to use what is most relevant and to 
extended it further for other practical uses. Thus, there is classification of gadgets based also on 
the affected register or, as with the dispatcher gadgets, which gadgets might be perceived as best. 
The method by which the classification is performed itself, with filtering via regular expressions, 
is a novel addition. 
Robust, Powerful Framework that can work across platforms 
The most important contribution is the instantiation itself. To reiterate this tool addresses 
a gaping hole that exists, where a versatile, resilient tool could allow an analyst to easily discover 
JOP gadgets. In so doing, it provides a tremendous amount of granularity, allowing the user to be 
flexible in how they customize searching, either enlarging or narrowing results. The instantiation 
utilizes much exclusion filtering, so that the results obtained have been thoroughly sanitized to 
eliminate useless or impractical gadgets.  
This powerful framework exists in Python and is not reliant on other existing tools, and 
this means it is highly portable across platforms. Thus, it can be used not only on multiple versions 
of Windows, but on other architectures as well, although there are limitations on a non-Windows 
OS. 
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Novel and Improved Methods 
This work provided several novel or improved methods. In the case of improved methods, 
the improvements are significant enough for them to be considered as design science artifacts. 
Some of these methods are useful as part of algorithms that help provide necessary functionality 
for the framework, and some could be feasibly be taken and used outside this work in other reverse 
engineering tools.  
One significant contribution is the method to discover dispatcher gadgets. This is the most 
important element to forming JOP attacks, as without this central piece, it is not possible for the 
JOP attack to occur. While the criteria needed for a JOP dispatcher gadget is not new, with a naïve 
implementation, it could turn up significant, impractical results. Additionally, this research 
proposes an entirely new method to form a dispatcher gadget. This is done by using shift left or 
shift right by 1 or 2, achieving multiplication or division. With careful planning and a significant 
area of the heap available, and the ability to find an intermediate operation to perform necessary 
subtraction or addition to go backwards or forwards, then an exploit developer could make use of 
this less than ideal set up. This could present options to make JOP feasible on some binaries, where 
there would otherwise be none. 
This research has provided a new way to discover JOP functional gadgets, reworking an 
existing method to provide greater depth and coverage. Not only that, but it provides the user with 
the ability to be specific and granular in terms of what they seek. It also supports strong exclusion 
criteria to reduce gadgets that would not be likely to be of any value.  
This work also presents a novel method for saving and recording information used to print 
or reproduce the disassembly for JOP gadgets. This could be extended further and used with other 
tools that produce any type of code-reuse attack gadgets. This work presents a multitude of data 
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structures, which maintains bookkeeping information for the different classifications of gadgets. 
These data structures maintain only a few values, so that no opcodes or no disassembly needs to 
be stored. Once the information for the gadgets have been saved, it can be manipulated or printed 
in seconds. This keeps storage requirements minimal. The artifact also includes a print menu with 
numerous options, allowing for flexibility. 
Finally, this work presents an interesting variation on the method to statically enumerate 
modules. While it is simple to use the Pefile library to discover the DLLs contained in the IAT, 
there can be some shortcomings, as not all modules that will eventually be loaded when the PE 
loads, will be present in the IAT. This could have made a static analysis tool such as the JOP 
ROCKET not as relevant if it could not detect some of the modules outside the IAT. This work 
provides additional logic to address finding file locations for modules when the Windows API fails 
to return a handle, ensuring that nearly all DLLs can be loaded. This work utilizes Windows API’s 
to load and obtain a handle for the module in question, which then can be used to obtain a file 
location and then extract the module’s text section, to be analyzed for JOP gadgets.  
Big Picture 
In more practical terms we can view the contributions as a way of facilitating the 
construction of JOP exploits. This is a type of code-reuse attack rarely used in the wild. A large 
part of its difficulty is tied to the lack of dedicated tools, forcing the user to do it manually. By way 
of an analogue, we could view this almost like trying to manually edit a PE file with just the raw 
bytes, rather than using a template on a hex editor. A hex editor, such as 010, can allow a user to 
parse and view the binary data of a computer file, presenting the data in a way that humans can 
understand. Such a tool can map out clearly defined structures with members and values, enabling 
the user to quickly find the desired values. Without using a template in a hex editor, the user would 
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simply see raw binary data and not have a way to make sense of it. The hex editor provides order 
and clarity to what would otherwise be difficult to decipher, and the JOP ROCKET does much the 
same with the JOP gadgets it generates. The JOP ROCKET could be viewed as a way of applying 
a template to raw binary data, to extract something useful. The JOP gadgets would still be present 
in the binary blob that is an application, but without a proper tool, we just would not have a way 
to view them in a way that is meaningful for the intended purpose.  
Ultimately, the JOP ROCKET may spur the use of JOP more in exploits, both in the wild 
or in the academic literature, or we may see increased hobbyist usage, such as with Capture the 
Flag (CTF) completions. The JOP ROCKET could do well to enhance the relevance of JOP, with 
more people wanting to attempt to use it. This could lead to heightened awareness of the need for 
strong CFI, while showcasing the shortcomings of operating systems that lack CFI, such as 
Windows 7 and various other Linux operating systems.  
Lessons Learned 
From a programming standpoint, there were numerous lessons learned throughout this 
research, and it would be tedious to recount them all, so we will touch on a few that standout as 
more significant. 
One lesson was learned was the need to stick with original plans if there is a good reason 
for them in the first place. During development, there was some back and forth on the usage of 
object-oriented programming (OOP). Originally, the intent had been for the framework to be 
object-oriented in its approach, and for each module to be its own object, each with its own sets of 
gadgets. The author had familiarity with OOP from using it in both C++ and Java, but not with 
Python. With the JOP ROCKET, there was a need to figure out how to do some potentially 
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challenging work in a language not well designed for low-level code. This was complicated by the 
fact that Python as a language had some limitations on how OOP is implemented, so it was decided 
to largely abandon OOP, using it in a only a very limited sense. As such, some workarounds were 
used to get some of the desired functionality. The development of this artifact was highly iterative 
over a period of time, with the focus being on evolving the algorithms and data structures. During 
much of this time, most of the work was done on just the executable image itself. Later, as the 
artifact matured and modules were included, it became clear there was a necessity for the approach 
to be OOP, if the artifact were to work as had been envisioned. 
To provide one example of why this was the case, we can look at the printing of operations 
based on faceted classification. This task was simple, when there was just the executable image to 
process, but when there were also modules, it then became necessary to produce a separate output 
for each module. This could quickly produce a staggering number of files. The reason for that was, 
at that given time, all the various data structures were used to generate the needed gadgets and 
disassembly on the fly, after they had been found through searching algorithims. With this tool, 
everything is very modular, and so it would print out all of one operation at a time and move onto 
the next operation to be printed.  
The values in the data structure are used to carve out parts of the text section, which is also 
stored in a data structure. Thus, we can see if there was only one data structure that could be 
possible for each operation and gadget type and only one list, comprised of the text section, then 
the program would need to loop through each of the DLLs. This was highly inefficient, resulting 
in an unwanted deluge of many files. There was no storage mechanism in place to hold data for 
more than one module, and appending modules to the same data structure would not work. 
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The only conceivable solution was to go back to the original plan for having objects for 
each module and all the myriad data structures that would be associated with it, including the text 
section for each module. This would seem like a simple solution, but at this point the code was 
over 10,000 lines, and this meant rewriting larges portions of it to fully utilize OOP. This also 
required additional, careful testing, to ensure all the many functions and helper functions worked 
as intended. At the end, after OOP was fully implemented, the JOP ROCKET worked exactly as 
intended. Now we could have one file for an operation with all modules contained in it; this was a 
tremendous improvement.  
Having a fully realized OOP approach came late into the maturation of the JOP ROCKET, 
but once it did come, it did enable other minor improvements to more rapidly be implemented, and 
it allowed for removing some less efficient code. The lesson learned here would have been to more 
rigidly stick to the original functional requirements.   
We will touch on final lesson learned. In hindsight, waiting to implement the UI until late 
in the development of the tool was not the best choice. During much of the development, efforts 
centered on getting algorithms and methods to work with no attention being given to UI. Once 
many the appropriate functions and data structures were working well together, then energy was 
expended on creating a UI. That is not to say the UI was a secondary consideration, as there had 
been a clear idea of what was sought. It was left to be developed later because of the size of the 
datasets and the operations being tested. Informal tests were not instantaneous, and they could take 
a few minutes or more, so avoiding repetitive interaction with the UI was done to expedite 
development. This also permitted focused testing on specific functions and their interactions with 
different data structures as needed. When it came time to create the UI though, there were some 
bugs to be worked out; these could have been avoided, if the UI had been built and tested 
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concurrently. Allowing the program to have a UI also provided clarity from the standpoint of how 
the JOP ROCKET would look and feel for users. Once a UI was created, it helped give new insights 
to different issues, some not previous considered,  that come into play with how the user might 
interact with the UI. 
Limitations 
Throughout the project various obstacles were encountered. These limitations must be 
properly understood when looking at the results.  
Time bore an influence on this research, as time was somewhat limited and there was a 
desire to not unnecessarily prolong this research and to complete it quickly.  
Some ideas were and thoughts were explored at great length, and some work and thoughts 
were ultimately scrapped due to time constraints. Time was a factor with regard to scope, as 
initially the intent had been to provide a hodgepodge of different code-reuse attack tools. Design 
and evaluation efforts for the JOP artifact took so long, that this was impossible, unless graduation 
would be delayed a year. Thus, it was decided to narrow the scope to work exclusively with a JOP 
tool. Often with Ph.D. dissertation work, the goal is to be very narrow in scope, so this research is 
in line with what is typical, and its contributions are significant. Of course, a tool could have had 
greater utility if scope were broader and encompassed other areas, but doing so can greatly increase 
the number of man hours if down properly.  
One limitation, by design, is that the JOP ROCKET only processes 32-bit binaries. This 
was a decision made early on. Extending this to both 64-bit and 32-bit would add unreasonable 
complexity during development. Moreover, because there is a significant amount of regular 
expressions used, a lot of those would need to be rewritten to accommodate 64-bit. A 32-bit 
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limitation seemed reasonable as many binaries are 32-bit, and that is far and above the most 
prevalent architecture for ROP.  
The author had curiosity about prevalence of other indirect jumps or indirect calls to the 
new 64-bit registers, including r8 through r15, but there were very few found in some preliminary 
tests. This was disappointing, as it had been hoped that unintended instructions possibly might 
result in a large number of indirect jumps or calls to some of the new registers. This might give 
JOP more flexibility and allow it to work better. After the completion of a significant portion of 
the development for the JOP ROCKET, some time was spent attempting to create an alternate 64-
bit version. However, it soon became clear that adapting it to 64-bit would not be straightforward, 
as even after some initial changes and small tests were made, there appeared to be serious issues 
at play. These have yet to be worked through. Thus, it was concluded that it would be a much more 
time-consuming endeavor to convert to 64-bit than had been anticipated.  
It Is not presently known how JOP would work with 64-bit binaries. It is felt, however, that 
even with the absence of increased attack surface on the new 64-bit registers, it was at least possible 
that JOP might enjoy an increased attack surface in 64-bit. The x64 calling convention could also 
introduce limitations that could affect the practicality of some registers. Without a tool to examine 
it closely, only speculation would be possible. 
Another minor limitation is that this work does not address binaries that are packed, heavily 
obfuscated, or self-modifying. This work only addresses standard, well-formed PEs. Some 
binaries, often malware, may exhibit some of the aforementioned characteristics to make analysis 
more difficult. As this tool is intentionally restricted to static analysis, we cannot dynamically 
access the memory of a PE that deobfuscates itself or has modified its memory, as we can only do 
analysis on the text section as it exists on disk. Secondly, some of the imports might not be apparent 
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until dynamic analysis can occur, due to dynamic loading of modules via LoadLibrarayEx and 
GetProcAddress, as well as other malware techniques, such as traversing the PE file format by 
using the PEB.  Unfortunately, a static analysis tool such as this could not provide functionality to 
discover these, not without very significant efforts. 
The limitations described above bring up the topic of dynamic analysis versus static 
analysis, and this certainly is one of the most significant limitations present, for several reasons. 
The type of work being done by this tool is better served by dynamic analysis, rather than static 
analysis. This was not pursued because a dynamic analysis approach, while technically better, 
would r with an require integration with an existing debugger, such as WinDbg or Immunity, and 
there was a strong desire to avoid doing so. There was a desire to make this as much a standalone 
tool as possible, and this certainly created a good deal more work and effort that could have been 
avoided, if we had taken the simpler, easier choice of integrating with an existing tool. But, again, 
it was felt that for doctoral research, integrating with an existing tool would be too easy. Thus, 
with reluctance, we accepted the limitations inherent with static analysis.  
One limitation lies in the fact that, although this tool provides the functionality to search 
for functional gadgets that perform a specific operation, e.g. adding a value to the register EAX, it 
is possible that the contents of EAX could be clobbered or destroyed in the next line of instruction. 
This tool employs no logic to search for this behavior and then provide exclusion on the basis of 
it. Additionally, if that clobbering were to occur, it is also possible the desired value in EAX could 
have been moved to another register and then moved back to EAX, and logic could address this as 
well. This would increase the complexity a great deal given the way that the artifact is designed 
and operates. If there were more time available, likely this would have been implemented. 
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There is a limitation with respect to different platforms. Because the required dependencies 
are just Python as well as the Pefile and Capstone libraries, this artifact can be used across 
platforms other than Windows. As has been described more fully elsewhere in the dissertation, if 
the JOP ROCKET is used outside of Windows, it will be unable to scan any of the DLLs, unless 
loaded and scanned separately.  
Perhaps the elephant in the room is that JOP is still limited in terms of practical application. 
The JOP ROCKET cannot change that or somehow generate gadgets that do not exist. The simple 
fact is often there is a dearth of JOP gadgets available, relative to ROP. This is in part why this 
artifact has been so meticulous in its approach to provide all available assistance to the analyst, 
such as discovering all possible gadgets, the use of faceted classification, and the exclusion of 
impractical gadgets. The fact remains thought that despite these efforts, some binaries may not 
have enough of the right gadgets for JOP to be feasible, or other protections in place such as DEP 
or ASLR may make some needed gadgets unusable. There may not be obvious ways to overcome 
these hurdles with certain binaries. One might just have to accept that with respect to certain 
applications, JOP may not be practical. 
Recommendations 
The primary recommendation is that if individuals or enterprises by necessity or choice use 
an operating system, such as Windows 7, that does not have protection against code-reuse attacks, 
then they should make use of available tools. EMET reached end of life in July 2018, but it still 
may be downloaded and used, offering some protection. Of course, much of its protections are 
built into Windows 10, but we can regard that as a relatively secure operating system. EMET does 
not, however, extend protection against JOP. If a user wishes to use an older operating system with 
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valuable assets, then they should consider an implementation of control flow integrity, depending 
on the value of the target. The leading implementation of CFI available is Microsoft’s CFG, but 
that is not available below Windows 8.1. Various other CFI solutions are available, some discussed 
in the literature in chapter 2, some of which could offer some limited protection against JOP. Still, 
many of these solutions have unacceptably high performance costs or are in some ways overly 
limited or impractical. Thus, it may not be feasible or worthwhile to employ such limited CFI 
solutions. 
The only possible recommendation then can be that if an organization or individual must 
use a Windows operating system unprotected by CFG, then they should greatly limit what is 
available on that machine to only what is necessary. The least amount of privileges should be used. 
Network isolation and segmentation should be employed, so that if the machine were compromised 
using a code-reuse attack, then the attacker would be limited in their ability to do lateral movement 
on the network. All other relevant precautions should take place. In short, the user should accept 
that it is reasonable that such a machine could be unsafe, and they should act accordingly. 
Recommendations for attackers are to attempt to utilize the JOP ROCKET. Some binaries, 
as discussed, many not lend themselves as easily to JOP. That is not a limitation of the ROCKET, 
but of JOP itself. The only want to get good at a new attack methodology is to try to utilize it and 
understand it through study and practical experience. One should also understand that if ROP is 
an option, because of lack of mitigations or because mitigations can be overcome, then it is going 
to be the better choice.  
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Future Work 
This research presents many opportunities for expansion and additional work to be 
performed. The JOP ROCKET is powerful and versatile at the tasks it was designed to perform, 
but if we were to go broader and look at code-reuse attacks, we might find other ways in which to 
expand functionality and improve what is there.  
The most obvious choice is to add functionality for 64-bit binaries. As it is, it is not known 
how much easier or harder JOP would be with 64-bit, if there would even be any appreciable 
difference in the level of difficulty. One hope is that with 64-bit the attack surface would be larger. 
Even if this not the case, providing an artifact with the capability of finding gadgets with 64-bit 
binaries would open many applications to potential exploitation with JOP.  
This tool has been designed to work with JOP in the Windows environment. The tool could 
be expanded to any other architecture where JOP exists. Doing this could involve significant new 
work if the instruction set differs greatly. In one architecture, JOP is done in a very different 
fashion, so this would involve little reuse of existing code. Adapting this to work with x86 Linux, 
however, would likely not involve significant effort. 
The framework could expand to cover other advanced code-reuse attacks, beyond simply 
JOP. One area that would be far more promising than JOP for modern binaries is Counterfeit 
Object-oriented Programming (Schuster, et al.,2015). This would enable a user to even overcome 
CFI. Implementing this in a tool would be far more challenging than JOP, and likely it would need 
to integrate with an existing tool, such as IDA Pro, as doing it as a standalone tool would not be 
possible, even with supporting libraries. There also would be the question as to whether it would 
be even feasible to automate parts of the process for constructing an exploit that utilizes Counterfeit 
Object-oriented Programming.  
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Future work on the framework could include data persistence. This would avoid needing 
to perform analysis each time there was an input file. This could be performed by saving the 
contents of all data structures to a binary file. This binary file, properly delimited, could then be 
parsed with its contents loaded into the data structures, thereby not requiring rescanning of the 
binary or its modules. It is felt this would be a simple feature to implement, given the design of 
the artifact. 
On a related topic to implementation of the instantiation, we will discuss the prospect of a 
GUI. It is often felt that a power user can be more adept at using merely just a keyboard and 
keystroke shortcuts, to more quickly utilize a program. The GUI, rather than making work with 
software easier, can slow down users, as they are forced to interact with the mouse, when it might 
be more efficient to not do so. Even still, not all users will be power users, and for them a GUI 
would be a more apposite choice for more novice users. A GUI can also provide convenient 
functionality for drag and drop, which would be an excellent feature. Thus, if a user set reasonable 
default settings, and they could drag and drop files. That arguably could be faster and more 
efficient. Thus, there is a reasonable case for a GUI. 
Future work could be done to add additional categories to the faceted classification. 
Additional sub-categories for those that are presently exiting could allow the user to be more 
granular still. To be very fine-grained, perhaps a user could even specify specific values or a range 
of specific values that would be sought. While in theory that may sound useful, it could also be 
unintentionally limiting, as the attack surface of JOP is far more restrictive than ROP, and it might 
be better to rethink some attack strategies, rather than to limit a search unnecessarily to only a 
certain range. Along these lines, future work could be given to thinking of alternative ways to 
emulate some desired functionality, which may or may not be scarce. For instance, in this 
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dissertation research, we considered using left shift and right shift as part of a unique strategy to 
expand viable dispatcher gadgets. Similar efforts could be applied elsewhere. 
Finally, future work could involve rebuilding the artifact in C++. This language is much 
better suited for low-level programming. Additionally, OOP is far less restrictive in C++ than with 
Python. Python is useful for rapid development, but a compiled program that provides this 
functionality, including an optional GUI, would make the artifact stronger. It would also eliminate 
the need to have an environment with certain dependencies. There would be various programming 
challenges associated with rebuilding the artifact in C++. Better and more efficient data structures 
could be used than what is available with Python. Some present data structures are inefficient 
owing to Pythonic limitations. Given the proposed changes, it is not believed that it would in any 
way improve the results that would be found. It would just result in an application that would 
otherwise be more pleasing. 
Conclusions 
This work constitutes a significant contribution to the discipline.  The JOP ROCKET 
enables the user to construct an exploit using a form of advanced code-reuse attacks rarely 
encountered in the wild. This research adds to the overall body of knowledge as it pertains to code-
reuse attacks and exploit development. JOP was an area where there was limited knowledge and 
limited academic publications, but there were not publicly available, well-developed tools 
appropriate for JOP. Through this research, we have identified an important gap that exists with 
lack of tooling available for JOP, and we have met that need.  
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One unstated goal has been to help make JOP more practical accessible to non-specialists. 
It is hoped that other researchers can continue research in this vein, by developing other relevant, 
fully-featured tools to help facilitate not just JOP, but other less used code-reuse attacks. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief survey of the various contributions made by the JOP 
ROCKET. Lessons learned have been discussed, as have opportunities for improvement that have 
arisen throughout this research. Possibilities for future work were explored, as with a framework 
such as the JOP ROCKET, there are numerous ways it could be improved or expanded. It was 
discussed that some other advanced code-reuse attacks could be incorporated into the framework. 
This could include the addition of an automated way to facilitate Counterfeit Object-oriented 
Programming. Other possible future work included the additional coverage for 64-bit binaries, 
expansion to other architectures or operating systems, adding additional categories or 
subcategories to the faceted classification, and as the addition of a GUI. Next, recommendations 
were made to users from both a defensive as well as an offensive standpoint. Finally, this chapter 
concluded by reaffirming the contributions made by the JOP ROCKET. 
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APPENDIX A: FREQUENCY OF JOP GADGETS FOUND IN SELECT BINARIES 
Binaries Tested 
Table 10 depicts the binaries that were scanned for purposes of this research to enumerate the number of gadgets according to 
classification.  
 
Table 10. Select binaries scanned for JOP GADGETS 
Acronym Software File Location 
  
ACR Adobe Acrobat Reader C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Reader 11.0\Reader\AcroRd32.exe  
BRL BrLauncher.exe C:\Program Files (x86)\Brother\BrLauncher\BrLauncher.exe 
WDB WinDbg C:\Program Files (x86)\Debugging Tools for Windows\windbg.exe 
FLX Filezilla C:\Program Files (x86)\FileZilla FTP Client\filezilla.exe 
HXD HxD C:\Program Files (x86)\HxD\HxD.exe 
ICO IcoFX 2 C:\Program Files (x86)\IcoFX 2\IcoFX2.exe 
IDA IDA Free C:\Program Files (x86)\IDA Free\idag.exe 
IMM Immunity Debugger C:\Program Files (x86)\Immunity Inc\Immunity Debugger\ImmunityDebugger.exe 
IEX Internet Explorer C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe 
DEV Microsoft Visual Studio 14 C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio 14.0\Common7\IDE\devenv.exe 
NOT Notepad++ C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\notepad++.exe 
SOFF Open Office 4 C:\Program Files (x86)\OpenOffice 4\program\soffice.exe 
POW Power MP3 WMA Converter WMA 
Converter 
C:\Program Files (x86)\Power MP3 WMA Converter\PowerConverter.exe 
QUE Question Writer HTML5 C:\Program Files (x86)\Question Writer HTML5\QuestionWriter.exe 
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Acronym Software File Location 
  
PEB PEBrowse Pro PEBrowse Pro 86 C:\Program Files (x86)\SmidgeonSoft\PEBrowsePro\PEBrowsePro.exe 
STA Steam C:\Program Files (x86)\Steam\Steam.exe 
SNA TechSmith Snaggit C:\Program Files (x86)\TechSmith\Snagit 12\Snagit32.exe 
SNE TechSmith Snaggit Editor C:\Program Files (x86)\TechSmith\Snagit 12\SnagitEditor.exe 
VMW VMware Workstation C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Workstation\vmware.exe 
VUD VUDUToGo 
VUDUToGo\VUDUTToGo 
C:\Program Files (x86)\VUDUToGo\VUDUToGo.exe 
WM Windows Media Player C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Media Player\wmplayer.exe 
WIN WinRARin WinRAR\WinRAR. C:\Program Files (x86)\WinRAR\WinRAR.exe 
MSP Microsoft Paint C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe 
EXP Explorer C:\Windows\SysWOW64\explorer.exe 
CER Cert Util C:\Windows\SysWOW64\certutil.exe 
TAS Task Manager C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Taskmgr.exe 
MAG Magnify C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Magnify.exe 
REG Regedit C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe 
CMD Cmd C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe 
NOT Notepad C:\Windows\SysWOW64\notepad.exe 
RES Respondus C:\Program Files (x86)\RespondusCampus40\Respond.exe 
JOP Gadgets for Scanned Applications – Image Only 
 Table 11 and Table 12 depict the number of gadgets obtained from each of the binaries that was scanned; the results are spread across 
two tables. The average number of gadgets from all binaries scanned is provided.  Standard default settings were used. Had the settings been 
modified, the numbers produced likely would increase or decrease. 
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Table 11. JOP Gadgets for 31 applications (image only) – Part 1. 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOF
F 
POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
JMP EAX 413.9 0 111 7560 291 18 635 12 18 25 0 100 2 245 331 1053 
JMP EBX 7.466667 0 6 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 
JMP ECX 10.36667 0 7 24 3 0 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 32 4 
JMP EDX 77.9 0 0 412 7 0 113 0 0 0 0 25 7 8 10 912 
JMP EDI 6.866667 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6 0 0 0 
JMP ESI 9.466667 6 0 9 0 0 7 0 0 6 0 6 2 18 11 2 
JMP EBP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CALL EAX 5276.9 1524 2081 25690 984 120 1139 0 97 9607 0 2786 0 1039 6845 42757 
CALL EBX 1665.8 0 4730 1033 65 40 239 0 173 4224 0 535 0 51 444 14863 
CALL ECX 272.3333 571 377 263 31 52 123 0 0 1275 0 1427 0 20 562 1378 
CALL EDX 4684.5 977 467 3183 11 83 459 0 8 41 0 2698 4 10 298 58547 
CALL EDI 2112.267 0 4536 862 45 139 301 46 257 3847 0 1057 0 5 483 20777 
CALL ESI 2277.367 23 9654 1147 20 220 227 7 323 8681 34 1074 14 15 737 10060 
CALL EBP 86.23333 0 0 539 28 0 185 0 0 0 0 28 2 1 276 45 
DG EAX 92.33333 0 217 412 272 5 152 0 23 29 0 37 0 217 134 264 
DG EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOF
F 
POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
DG BEST 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EAX 
0.533333 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
DG Other 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD all 2379.633 217 4103 6053 517 89 824 15 189 3018 0 1448 13 418 1442 18249 
ADD EAX 1183.8 154 1729 3328 376 42 528 13 103 1014 0 857 7 348 764 8013 
ADD EBX 128.3333 2 131 1209 38 11 63 0 12 149 0 64 0 9 88 785 
ADD ECX 198.1333 56 1445 201 31 4 50 0 9 203 0 119 5 8 108 1379 
ADD EDX 497.2667 0 465 63 26 4 12 0 51 1217 0 261 0 29 202 4786 
ADD EDI 122.1333 1 95 66 9 0 15 2 4 206 0 50 0 5 85 1176 
ADD ESI 83.6 0 57 36 9 9 7 0 7 148 0 23 0 2 59 805 
ADD EBP 20.03333 4 79 28 4 0 0 0 0 33 0 23 0 3 27 145 
SUB all 486.5333 78 1261 1281 20 28 258 3 32 342 0 231 2 14 326 4425 
SUB EAX 279.1667 9 621 692 9 17 226 2 27 220 0 137 2 5 218 2421 
SUB EBX 81.53333 61 463 274 0 6 27 1 4 69 0 42 0 2 45 598 
SUB ECX 33.7 19 17 57 9 1 26 0 1 53 0 25 0 7 11 303 
SUB EDX 47.3 0 77 24 2 0 4 0 2 43 0 35 0 2 64 519 
SUB EDI 13.56667 0 13 4 2 0 0 0 2 11 0 18 0 0 40 122 
SUB ESI 15.8 50 8 0 0 4 4 0 0 10 0 22 0 0 27 129 
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Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOF
F 
POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
SUB EBP 1.833333 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 1 11 
MUL all 15.76667 0 4 5 12 0 35 0 4 0 0 25 1 5 17 67 
MUL EAX 2.833333 0 2 2 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 9 17 
MUL EBX 0.133333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
MUL ECX 0.666667 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
MUL EDX 4.566667 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 16 
MUL EDI 0.133333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL ESI 0.133333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EBP 0.933333 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
DIV all 36.6 8 32 31 3 2 3 0 0 7 0 19 7 0 34 296 
DIV EAX 36.6 8 32 31 3 2 3 0 0 7 0 19 7 0 34 296 
DIV EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EDX 36.6 8 32 31 3 2 3 0 0 7 0 19 7 0 34 296 
DIV EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV all 9042.433 2737 3516 14379 160 273 2252 25 178 4331 7 6970 5 477 3144 93558 
MOV EAX 2586.033 780 1041 4801 54 114 145 0 34 958 0 2203 0 207 2244 28555 
MOV EBX 119.6333 4 146 193 16 23 47 0 11 245 0 74 5 12 51 972 
MOV ECX 3278.167 965 1464 3097 4 20 8 23 7 2318 1 2288 0 219 540 32024 
MOV EDX 2292.467 986 173 279 31 35 53 0 9 85 0 2086 0 10 77 27234 
MOV EDI 152.4333 0 232 39 22 31 98 0 58 166 0 69 0 13 35 1524 
MOV ESI 235.9333 0 299 47 3 25 113 2 24 451 0 100 0 6 90 2217 
MOV EBP 10.6 2 18 23 10 10 16 0 0 10 0 22 0 0 8 48 
MOV 
SHUFFLE all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOF
F 
POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EAX 
13.16667 0 7 134 15 31 4 0 3 10 0 4 0 4 6 45 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBX 
59.1 0 93 89 11 20 26 0 7 79 0 25 0 8 11 470 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
ECX 
2534.367 36 1119 2741 0 0 0 23 0 2106 0 608 0 0 414 24638 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EDX 
8.166667 0 0 10 19 11 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 79 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EDI 
88.4 0 164 14 7 28 12 0 7 120 0 54 0 3 14 901 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
ESI 
130.2333 0 80 34 3 24 8 0 18 174 0 49 0 6 19 1509 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBP 
4.466667 2 0 9 5 10 16 0 0 2 0 20 0 0 5 0 
MOV 
VALUE all 
283.7333 11 292 2658 30 9 17 0 18 237 1 65 5 219 122 1847 
MOV 
VALUE EAX 
166 11 174 2485 16 5 5 0 9 88 0 15 0 15 61 767 
MOV 
VALUE EBX 
21.56667 0 8 27 0 0 0 0 1 58 0 22 5 1 20 168 
MOV 
VALUE ECX 
25.16667 0 64 12 1 2 1 0 6 33 1 7 0 195 6 223 
MOV 
VALUE EDX 
7.066667 0 7 30 0 1 2 0 0 22 0 3 0 1 9 43 
MOV 
VALUE EDI 
13.46667 0 1 24 8 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 4 2 157 
MOV 
VALUE ESI 
15.8 0 13 12 0 1 8 0 2 6 0 5 0 0 8 155 
MOV 
VALUE EBP 
5.4 0 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 0 0 2 44 
  
 
196 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOF
F 
POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
LEA all 2039.533 10 9313 2817 46 15 121 0 60 588 1 733 0 53 756 19056 
LEA EAX 675.1 4 2410 57 40 12 48 0 51 389 1 364 0 53 499 5898 
LEA EBX 10.5 0 11 22 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 6 0 0 0 79 
LEA ECX 961.4 0 6799 124 0 0 30 0 8 148 0 260 0 0 167 9419 
LEA EDX 280.1333 3 74 78 6 3 41 0 0 27 0 86 0 0 42 3387 
LEA EDI 16.46667 0 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 0 0 28 190 
LEA ESI 10.33333 0 11 11 0 0 2 0 1 13 0 0 0 0 15 77 
LEA EBP 1.1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 0 
PUSH all 17677.07 1818 18457 997 619 587 269 8 1134 40861 30 13540 14 672 15531 166423 
PUSH EAX 4085.867 470 5885 147 342 72 12 0 166 4172 4 1926 0 423 2104 42170 
PUSH EBX 1002.5 8 1242 56 45 22 23 0 48 956 0 850 0 21 1246 8506 
PUSH ECX 1848.967 489 545 3 5 36 3 0 11 280 0 1183 0 4 1001 22182 
PUSH EDX 1333.333 523 278 38 4 70 17 0 1 126 0 842 0 2 509 16072 
PUSH EDI 1189.5 7 613 7 12 177 0 0 131 1063 0 998 1 31 1386 11338 
PUSH ESI 1057.367 0 498 11 30 14 0 0 77 980 0 2269 9 3 2981 9840 
PUSH EBP 194.9 86 28 155 24 11 58 0 2 48 0 488 0 1 571 1369 
POP all 1219.467 129 499 17164 70 15 765 28 57 2069 3 330 7 54 283 6273 
POP EAX 67 18 43 156 16 1 3 0 1 501 0 15 0 6 20 388 
POP EBX 160.5 0 12 4111 8 3 110 0 0 174 0 10 0 4 1 221 
POP ECX 43.6 0 4 5 0 2 0 12 14 55 3 141 0 3 1 177 
POP EDX 37.03333 0 2 2 12 1 0 12 14 100 0 40 0 10 1 189 
POP EDI 141.2667 0 0 3327 3 2 34 0 0 43 0 9 0 3 96 495 
POP ESI 181.5333 87 83 3588 8 3 38 0 5 24 0 12 0 5 18 943 
POP EBP 282.1 0 120 5748 10 2 540 0 4 23 0 14 0 5 51 838 
INC all 1014.267 183 1453 6531 173 58 422 0 32 849 3 651 4 105 958 7143 
INC EAX 167.3667 11 93 1671 52 12 52 0 3 106 1 113 0 25 302 1002 
INC EBX 27.5 0 32 44 7 7 28 0 3 59 0 18 0 17 37 181 
INC ECX 23.63333 29 20 20 23 6 1 0 0 36 0 57 3 1 103 92 
  
 
197 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOF
F 
POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
INC EDX 87.7 15 20 111 7 0 12 0 0 30 0 105 0 0 13 752 
INC EDI 64.7 0 52 400 1 1 4 0 4 94 0 36 0 9 78 364 
INC ESI 85.33333 0 217 20 8 6 5 0 2 244 0 76 0 5 208 679 
INC EBP 361.8667 105 963 2517 48 22 54 0 15 188 2 171 0 37 63 2742 
DEC all 657.2667 270 1573 1035 155 39 86 0 13 343 0 356 6 130 290 5940 
DEC EAX 116.1333 29 331 154 6 1 5 0 0 84 0 43 0 0 94 986 
DEC EBX 14.6 0 43 6 6 2 3 0 0 11 0 6 0 20 8 100 
DEC ECX 22.83333 8 271 15 26 0 2 0 0 9 0 4 0 9 8 126 
DEC EDX 22.3 23 106 2 0 4 1 0 0 20 0 14 2 3 6 151 
DEC EDI 32.43333 5 77 3 3 0 3 0 0 13 0 13 2 1 3 272 
DEC ESI 53.53333 0 37 5 2 3 0 0 0 104 0 41 0 1 14 592 
DEC EBP 209.0333 168 504 139 97 16 18 0 1 45 0 132 0 82 31 2078 
XCHG all 202.4333 25 88 136 11 21 14 0 5 219 0 87 11 6 82 2290 
XCHG EAX 126.3333 25 36 95 9 20 5 0 4 90 0 30 5 4 38 1295 
XCHG EBX 12.83333 0 2 13 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 4 2 166 
XCHG ECX 5.666667 5 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 8 0 0 18 58 
XCHG EDX 46.76667 0 8 25 0 2 1 0 0 5 0 2 5 0 6 546 
XCHG EDI 18.63333 0 15 12 0 0 6 0 0 41 0 2 0 2 0 287 
XCHG ESI 12.5 0 3 11 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 19 0 0 0 196 
XCHG EBP 12.83333 17 2 16 2 0 4 0 2 10 0 5 0 0 5 129 
SHIFT LEFT 126.6333 3 1034 37 0 3 3 0 36 375 5 117 6 0 113 696 
SHIFT 
RIGHT 
51.23333 3 163 131 0 0 0 2 0 45 0 36 6 4 16 437 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
37.93333 10 89 66 14 2 0 0 1 66 0 20 0 2 65 332 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
16.43333 0 13 15 1 0 5 0 6 40 0 11 0 6 42 148 
 
  
  
 
198 
Table 12.  JOP Gadgets for 31 applications (image only) – Part 2 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
JMP EAX 413.9 907 0 0 10 25 3 181 42 144 3 10 0 183 35 473 332 
JMP EBX 7.466667 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 192 11 
JMP ECX 10.36667 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 147 41 
JMP EDX 77.9 661 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 174 20 
JMP EDI 6.866667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 168 15 
JMP ESI 9.466667 4 0 6 0 6 3 17 0 1 0 0 3 6 6 165 9 
JMP EBP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CALL 
EAX 
5276.9 54623 0 41 0 1283 0 8 0 7 0 3 0 4896 1505 1272 36913 
CALL 
EBX 
1665.8 16180 2 44 5 2806 14 195 19 76 0 2 0 1310 2338 586 2143 
CALL 
ECX 
272.3333 937 1 6 0 57 0 10 15 0 0 9 0 776 61 219 732 
CALL 
EDX 
4684.5 69574 0 0 0 51 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3601 363 159 11471 
CALL 
EDI 
2112.267 20088 14 24 1 1752 96 376 73 143 0 2 0 2272 5716 456 1324 
CALL 
ESI 
2277.367 9955 736 242 1 5206 5465 2594 1161 3084 1139 14 70 1694 4324 400 2025 
CALL 
EBP 
86.23333 45 0 0 0 1233 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 194 1279 
DG EAX 92.33333 487 0 4 0 20 0 11 0 5 0 1 0 87 40 353 1192 
DG EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
DG BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EAX 
0.533333 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
DG Other 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD all 2379.633 20627 165 39 13 2656 1102 1625 399 760 257 11 55 1933 1655 3497 5947 
ADD 
EAX 
1183.8 8757 164 21 11 1192 1091 1582 367 736 256 10 55 854 636 2506 3256 
ADD 
EBX 
128.3333 760 0 2 0 183 4 16 11 4 0 0 0 98 125 86 110 
ADD 
ECX 
198.1333 1873 0 6 0 170 3 7 1 8 1 1 0 110 96 50 1571 
ADD 
EDX 
497.2667 5484 0 0 0 652 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 514 455 691 284 
ADD EDI 122.1333 1349 1 3 2 187 4 7 19 4 0 0 0 127 177 70 185 
ADD ESI 83.6 960 0 0 0 112 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 96 102 70 99 
ADD EBP 20.03333 159 0 1 0 36 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 26 14 43 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
SUB all 486.5333 5008 9 11 1 355 25 27 3 32 10 0 0 350 389 75 530 
SUB EAX 279.1667 2874 9 8 1 227 25 18 2 32 10 0 0 265 246 52 433 
SUB EBX 81.53333 682 0 1 0 89 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 33 36 7 43 
SUB ECX 33.7 398 0 0 0 22 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 7 33 17 25 
SUB EDX 47.3 485 0 3 0 43 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 48 63 1 40 
SUB EDI 13.56667 140 0 1 0 12 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 36 0 13 
SUB ESI 15.8 139 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 28 0 30 
SUB EBP 1.833333 19 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 0 
MUL all 15.76667 78 0 0 0 77 0 1 41 0 0 0 0 18 16 67 13 
MUL 
EAX 
2.833333 20 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
MUL 
EBX 
0.133333 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
MUL 
ECX 
0.666667 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 0 
MUL 
EDX 
4.566667 16 0 0 0 47 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 0 
MUL EDI 0.133333 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL ESI 0.133333 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
EBP 
0.933333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 19 0 
DIV all 36.6 288 0 0 0 28 0 63 2 0 0 0 6 201 62 6 30 
DIV EAX 36.6 288 0 0 0 28 0 63 2 0 0 0 6 201 62 6 30 
DIV EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EDX 36.6 288 0 0 0 28 0 63 2 0 0 0 6 201 62 6 30 
DIV EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV all 9042.433 108322 717 37 0 2063 5167 1801 993 3013 1221 23 20 1058
2 
4263 1039 61431 
  
 
201 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
MOV 
EAX 
2586.033 30965 0 0 0 744 1 28 3 5 0 0 0 3041 1135 523 15402 
MOV 
EBX 
119.6333 1202 4 5 0 119 2 5 0 1 0 0 0 156 226 70 105 
MOV 
ECX 
3278.167 38139 662 0 0 385 4922 1696 894 2954 1092 21 18 3240 1239 105 23902 
MOV 
EDX 
2292.467 32771 0 1 0 101 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 3621 1080 138 21363 
MOV EDI 152.4333 1709 1 4 0 110 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 143 241 65 178 
MOV ESI 235.9333 2540 50 0 0 129 233 49 88 47 129 2 2 218 189 25 129 
MOV 
EBP 
10.6 53 0 2 0 70 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 11 5 2 16 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EAX 
13.16667 47 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 5 59 14 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EBX 
59.1 592 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 154 48 44 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E ECX 
2534.367 30289 632 0 0 315 4832 1673 864 2854 1092 16 18 1226 527 8 267 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EDX 
8.166667 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 28 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EDI 
88.4 985 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 151 14 94 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E ESI 
130.2333 1684 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 103 21 85 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EBP 
4.466667 0 0 2 0 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 11 
  
 
202 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
MOV 
VALUE 
all 
283.7333 2040 8 7 0 171 2 48 6 10 0 0 0 253 233 203 196 
MOV 
VALUE 
EAX 
166 979 0 0 0 56 1 25 0 4 0 0 0 84 68 112 128 
MOV 
VALUE 
EBX 
21.56667 191 4 5 0 41 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 40 42 8 4 
MOV 
VALUE 
ECX 
25.16667 137 4 0 0 13 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 32 6 
MOV 
VALUE 
EDX 
7.066667 42 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 22 5 15 3 
MOV 
VALUE 
EDI 
13.46667 123 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 49 17 8 
MOV 
VALUE 
ESI 
15.8 164 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 38 2 3 
MOV 
VALUE 
EBP 
5.4 48 0 0 0 11 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 9 3 0 5 
LEA all 2039.533 22766 10 16 0 861 20 86 0 27 0 0 0 1322 2114 395 2048 
LEA EAX 675.1 7288 0 6 0 697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 371 1883 182 981 
LEA EBX 10.5 109 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 12 1 1 
LEA ECX 961.4 10975 10 10 0 123 20 86 0 27 0 0 0 466 149 21 573 
LEA EDX 280.1333 4091 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 344 20 189 457 
LEA EDI 16.46667 204 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 31 1 13 
LEA ESI 10.33333 95 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 19 0 10 
LEA EBP 1.1 2 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 
PUSH all 17677.07 195840 12 618 3 24893 140 135 47 131 41 3 3 2316
0 
22976 1350 29801 
PUSH 
EAX 
4085.867 49791 9 91 0 3501 40 37 0 18 0 0 0 6098 4416 682 6409 
  
 
203 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
PUSH 
EBX 
1002.5 10712 0 63 0 2226 1 12 0 4 37 0 0 1672 2273 52 1206 
PUSH 
ECX 
1848.967 25408 1 19 0 855 8 2 4 3 0 0 0 2623 772 32 3368 
PUSH 
EDX 
1333.333 18847 0 0 0 90 5 3 23 8 0 0 3 2312 194 33 2748 
PUSH 
EDI 
1189.5 12800 0 90 0 4020 2 5 0 12 3 1 0 1791 1162 35 1675 
PUSH 
ESI 
1057.367 10541 0 26 0 1430 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 2018 923 66 3491 
PUSH 
EBP 
194.9 1532 0 0 0 978 0 12 2 0 0 0 0 429 26 27 3238 
POP all 1219.467 6567 4 20 12 317 52 324 75 264 6 13 4 461 361 358 233 
POP EAX 67 502 0 1 0 67 9 1 2 15 0 0 0 59 141 45 61 
POP EBX 160.5 128 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 15 1 
POP ECX 43.6 287 0 17 6 72 3 165 36 125 3 6 0 74 77 20 21 
POP EDX 37.03333 313 0 0 6 8 3 143 36 119 3 6 0 58 6 27 4 
POP EDI 141.2667 170 0 0 0 13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 20 14 8 4 
POP ESI 181.5333 583 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 31 8 
POP EBP 282.1 934 0 0 0 20 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 101 36 14 31 
INC all 1014.267 8411 5 16 2 687 37 187 15 17 0 5 6 804 923 748 5004 
INC EAX 167.3667 1133 0 16 1 97 22 110 4 3 0 0 0 70 60 62 238 
INC EBX 27.5 307 0 0 0 11 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 22 25 17 37 
INC ECX 23.63333 160 0 0 0 13 0 6 0 0 0 0 6 51 62 20 89 
INC EDX 87.7 1086 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 0 4 0 134 57 271 84 
INC EDI 64.7 754 0 0 0 29 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 14 81 14 100 
INC ESI 85.33333 805 0 0 0 29 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 106 95 50 204 
INC EBP 361.8667 2963 0 0 1 63 2 12 2 1 0 0 0 340 437 108 3835 
DEC all 657.2667 7563 2 3 0 257 83 46 5 49 0 4 1 570 540 359 5672 
DEC 
EAX 
116.1333 1480 1 1 0 31 6 5 0 11 0 0 0 33 172 11 122 
DEC EBX 14.6 175 0 0 0 12 1 1 0 26 0 0 0 2 5 11 4 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CMD NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
DEC ECX 22.83333 136 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 30 21 16 
DEC 
EDX 
22.3 139 0 0 0 6 13 7 0 0 0 0 0 28 90 54 17 
DEC EDI 32.43333 537 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 16 2 12 
DEC ESI 53.53333 695 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 33 10 19 
DEC EBP 209.0333 2546 0 1 0 26 28 0 1 0 0 0 0 258 57 43 5164 
XCHG all 202.4333 2407 0 4 0 283 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 82 157 142 294 
XCHG 
EAX 
126.3333 1686 0 0 0 247 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 38 67 93 186 
XCHG 
EBX 
12.83333 176 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 6 
XCHG 
ECX 
5.666667 41 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 8 33 
XCHG 
EDX 
46.76667 731 0 2 0 15 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 36 18 
XCHG 
EDI 
18.63333 165 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 18 8 
XCHG 
ESI 
12.5 115 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 17 19 
XCHG 
EBP 
12.83333 70 0 0 0 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 20 2 
SHIFT 
LEFT 
126.6333 625 0 10 0 393 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 242 18 142 
SHIFT 
RIGHT 
51.23333 488 0 3 0 56 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 31 92 12 50 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
37.93333 408 0 4 0 20 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 22 9 2 41 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
16.43333 177 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 12 2 49 
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JOP Gadgets for Scanned Applications, Image and Modules 
Table 13 and Table 14 present the results obtained from scanning different binaries and their modules; the results are spread across two 
tables. The average number of gadgets from all binaries scanned is provided. Results have been aggregated for all the gadgets obtained from the 
image along with each binary’s modules, with one number representing the total gadgets found from each. Standard default settings were used. 
Had the settings been modified, the numbers produced likely would increase or decrease. 
 
Table 13. JOP Gadgets for 31 applications (image and associated modules) – Part 1. 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOFF POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
JMP EAX 2417.533 1138 23077 9049 1913 1672 1890 198 1351 1863 860 2620 42 1698 1363 3182 
JMP EBX 21.33333 20 57 21 8 2 19 22 9 2 13 1 13 1 1 31 
JMP ECX 25 34 77 24 16 9 89 25 0 0 0 42 0 6 32 79 
JMP EDX 101.4667 23 53 435 15 34 136 36 22 2 15 82 7 10 11 1022 
JMP EDI 26.06667 34 38 42 21 13 23 54 20 16 21 13 6 13 13 17 
JMP ESI 49.33333 60 69 57 46 32 49 36 38 35 31 55 8 57 40 51 
JMP EBP 13.5 5 27 5 56 13 8 9 7 5 5 5 1 5 5 9 
CALL EAX 8058.567 12044 42154 25796 1061 1124 12928 78 198 9678 194 4442 14 2152 6905 53684 
CALL EBX 4403.933 502 55035 1301 715 525 1968 246 687 4605 372 2250 18 478 660 23812 
CALL ECX 1257.167 5189 7828 382 181 198 10202 64 103 1367 63 2028 12 450 635 4424 
CALL EDX 7359.967 6478 4007 3321 145 290 18072 176 160 179 135 3172 4 845 424 67728 
CALL EDI 6600.133 976 65618 2013 1316 965 4591 507 1335 7585 878 3909 24 1001 1485 38659 
CALL ESI 27484.43 11250 238800 16146 19155 11356 15095 1895 28351 37409 10603 22672 643 16773 13297 42386 
CALL EBP 131.4333 3 65 543 39 18 185 20 4 0 0 272 2 47 280 673 
DG EAX 195 101 1684 431 300 21 531 13 39 85 19 225 1 232 145 470 
DG EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
 
206 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOFF POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
DG ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EAX 1.2 0 16 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 
DG Other EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD all 10837.8 5260 73224 10621 6216 4101 12599 1190 7875 11845 3384 9124 358 5380 5244 34224 
ADD EAX 7370.8 4291 27238 7626 5692 3577 7586 1007 7400 9267 3195 7078 338 4883 4379 18165 
ADD EBX 287.9667 86 1976 1245 121 50 624 28 56 190 17 165 3 67 109 1275 
ADD ECX 552.1 543 7985 272 115 78 376 25 197 312 58 286 7 77 167 2030 
ADD EDX 834.9667 150 5740 92 83 230 318 23 89 1282 32 559 0 134 226 6406 
ADD EDI 561.9333 110 7326 185 144 72 1433 100 110 550 67 343 5 130 162 1824 
ADD ESI 225.2333 19 1168 53 34 28 1727 2 17 162 7 75 4 20 69 1445 
ADD EBP 50.23333 54 605 33 8 7 19 6 8 40 3 47 0 8 28 250 
  
 
207 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOFF POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
SUB all 1550.3 621 13699 1657 461 860 2018 80 829 935 346 1048 7 443 672 7324 
SUB EAX 981.7667 482 7982 1038 404 794 1098 51 558 748 330 672 6 404 553 3892 
SUB EBX 250.6333 112 2506 292 31 26 97 18 235 103 10 77 0 27 57 1507 
SUB ECX 79.63333 46 507 61 13 11 49 4 5 60 2 204 1 9 12 535 
SUB EDX 155.3667 19 1660 45 24 13 57 22 15 66 13 90 0 18 71 1121 
SUB EDI 86.43333 8 1051 17 23 12 28 2 10 28 7 36 0 14 46 552 
SUB ESI 74.9 57 435 2 3 4 10 2 225 10 2 24 0 0 27 451 
SUB EBP 4.6 0 42 1 6 0 1 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 1 17 
MUL all 483.9 592 858 597 598 612 638 11 591 588 586 653 2 590 602 123 
MUL EAX 7.066667 0 42 2 0 0 27 1 2 0 0 20 0 0 9 27 
MUL EBX 0.8 0 12 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
MUL ECX 16.36667 19 42 19 19 20 22 0 19 19 19 22 0 19 21 6 
MUL EDX 6.133333 0 29 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 27 
MUL EDI 2.266667 1 32 1 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 
MUL ESI 2.266667 1 32 1 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 
MUL EBP 301.7333 391 402 391 391 391 395 6 391 391 391 391 0 391 391 3 
DIV all 94.63333 86 550 64 37 32 65 0 29 45 21 76 8 38 64 576 
DIV EAX 94.63333 86 550 64 37 32 65 0 29 45 21 76 8 38 64 576 
DIV EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EDX 94.63333 86 550 64 37 32 65 0 29 45 21 76 8 38 64 576 
DIV EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV all 31935.83 31479 127408 26679 16322 10147 48028 1550 25944 32618 9086 26259 267 15510 14236 129953 
MOV EAX 5005.233 6783 27894 4902 202 330 11225 104 169 1057 85 2475 2 646 2316 35178 
MOV EBX 465.8667 68 6714 212 49 57 402 4 44 297 30 152 7 44 62 1744 
MOV ECX 20179.2 16139 78291 14406 14972 8929 22844 1246 23751 28989 8364 18153 230 13185 10804 51900 
MOV EDX 4152.567 7914 4682 395 153 232 10015 99 157 216 97 2303 0 701 175 32016 
  
 
208 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOFF POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
MOV EDI 359.2333 51 2809 89 65 91 816 18 94 294 49 196 0 69 83 2410 
MOV ESI 1112.3 401 4598 676 813 411 801 25 1621 1608 354 1009 19 765 667 3933 
MOV EBP 49.96667 50 216 63 23 37 59 37 25 25 24 56 2 11 14 171 
MOV 
SHUFFLE all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EAX 
51.1 34 200 134 15 59 788 0 3 10 1 4 0 4 6 124 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBX 
143.2667 7 1646 89 11 35 290 0 7 79 10 38 0 12 11 839 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
ECX 
16799.93 9460 35694 13711 14123 8700 9587 1144 23066 28151 8198 15765 226 11982 10363 41523 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EDX 
20.2 0 26 10 21 32 25 0 10 0 0 0 0 6 0 134 
MOV 
SHUFFLE EDI 
183.5667 17 1513 19 12 46 561 2 12 125 14 77 0 9 19 1368 
MOV 
SHUFFLE ESI 
208.4333 0 1411 34 3 28 167 0 18 174 1 79 0 7 19 2023 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBP 
15.8 18 14 21 15 34 26 6 8 8 6 30 2 10 11 47 
MOV VALUE 
all 
3926.433 386 53829 2933 430 338 4055 244 270 512 231 565 9 572 314 2796 
MOV VALUE 
EAX 
1124.7 139 7902 2567 130 110 1535 90 83 167 68 125 0 85 125 980 
MOV VALUE 
EBX 
184.5333 25 3964 38 24 8 32 2 26 87 11 73 5 16 26 328 
MOV VALUE 
ECX 
1327.8 6 37015 35 122 34 115 6 9 55 2 144 4 316 8 332 
MOV VALUE 
EDX 
1095.5 93 3347 121 92 131 2233 92 96 118 89 103 0 91 98 165 
MOV VALUE 
EDI 
39.6 27 93 39 34 24 31 16 14 18 23 39 0 35 17 255 
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Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOFF POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
MOV VALUE 
ESI 
29.36667 2 157 13 0 7 46 0 3 6 0 23 0 0 8 256 
MOV VALUE 
EBP 
31.6 32 176 42 3 3 33 31 17 17 18 13 0 1 2 99 
LEA all 7558.167 535 146078 3357 701 520 1688 20 816 1419 537 1724 0 976 1185 26951 
LEA EAX 7558.167 535 146078 3357 701 520 1688 20 816 1419 537 1724 0 976 1185 26951 
LEA EBX 19.1 0 132 22 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 6 0 0 0 170 
LEA ECX 5132.5 486 115140 654 641 460 823 17 751 946 441 1031 0 673 591 11020 
LEA EDX 418.9333 15 2192 78 9 14 424 0 2 27 0 134 0 201 42 4520 
LEA EDI 33.06667 4 192 7 4 4 16 0 4 8 4 8 0 8 32 332 
LEA ESI 22.66667 3 163 11 0 0 28 0 1 13 0 0 0 0 15 209 
LEA EBP 4.3 3 15 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 16 0 0 5 52 
PUSH all 36746.2 16255 307395 2877 2726 2366 58244 253 2456 43408 2716 21084 32 7277 16087 266054 
PUSH EAX 8259.567 4767 75670 293 583 345 14067 34 389 4604 407 2881 0 2098 2195 61506 
PUSH EBX 2207.833 131 16801 92 83 133 4298 13 88 1025 243 1431 1 200 1273 16569 
PUSH ECX 2726 3906 10207 48 63 110 1854 0 92 321 71 1560 0 385 1041 29148 
PUSH EDX 2414.7 4464 6477 993 974 143 2459 0 47 1106 41 1957 0 1457 527 22757 
PUSH EDI 2290.8 247 12734 59 51 228 6637 29 189 1133 221 1563 6 480 1413 18867 
PUSH ESI 2669.2 212 17826 27 38 64 15314 8 119 1022 351 2728 15 682 2989 18639 
PUSH EBP 353.8 874 949 167 36 38 131 7 41 66 12 622 0 117 582 3098 
POP all 5302.233 2790 43268 20256 3349 2792 4595 739 2787 5297 1857 5003 65 3240 2551 10972 
POP EAX 161.2333 279 1121 181 79 37 64 1 40 541 18 140 0 74 30 597 
POP EBX 305.3 153 801 4268 175 171 273 0 8 354 16 345 0 161 158 429 
POP ECX 1147.633 1020 1752 1361 1460 1023 1141 178 1185 1379 874 1813 27 1439 994 1143 
POP EDX 1105.1 1025 1797 1357 1451 1013 1163 184 1180 1423 809 1600 25 1294 992 796 
POP EDI 212.2667 2 823 3333 8 7 50 10 6 73 1 243 0 8 98 933 
POP ESI 409.8667 96 6384 3602 16 19 68 21 13 40 10 165 0 13 26 1024 
POP EBP 1046.4 17 20187 5761 20 22 562 281 40 56 19 368 5 20 61 2067 
INC all 3007.4 1822 39342 6655 414 699 1910 88 251 1220 147 1459 11 372 1043 11861 
INC EAX 350.8333 218 2297 1704 161 512 244 15 66 187 40 263 0 81 329 1610 
  
 
210 
Op. Average WDB VMW FLX HXD IDA IMM IEX DEV NOT SOFF POW QUE PEB STA SNA 
INC EBX 100.6 11 1360 50 12 23 329 0 8 74 6 78 0 28 42 352 
INC ECX 70.1 94 860 25 55 12 40 3 5 42 6 74 3 13 108 233 
INC EDX 139.0333 244 726 122 9 3 48 12 10 34 8 168 0 2 15 987 
INC EDI 166.4667 13 1533 412 9 19 91 8 29 242 10 143 2 14 81 934 
INC ESI 402.0333 20 2819 29 20 15 190 7 12 258 11 136 0 16 217 1233 
INC EBP 1376.267 1117 27814 2549 82 64 318 13 62 232 46 276 5 72 84 3566 
DEC all 2172.4 2523 19812 1475 1181 482 1263 75 381 763 203 1602 17 962 626 9288 
DEC EAX 224.8667 205 1597 170 36 17 102 4 52 141 12 107 0 24 105 1472 
DEC EBX 140.7667 18 1388 26 39 20 229 0 18 29 16 36 0 38 24 254 
DEC ECX 75.7 93 1100 18 29 42 47 1 8 18 3 20 0 12 11 258 
DEC EDX 53.93333 82 730 7 7 13 22 0 12 26 4 22 2 8 10 209 
DEC EDI 139.7333 25 1982 69 74 20 71 7 26 33 18 82 2 62 27 582 
DEC ESI 122.2 9 1103 13 33 12 196 20 9 117 7 57 0 9 21 997 
DEC EBP 638.6333 1489 9306 259 214 240 210 11 74 116 56 295 0 158 139 2332 
XCHG all 651.2667 354 3947 316 215 210 431 19 41 409 31 351 11 225 251 3177 
XCHG EAX 264.1667 198 2447 115 40 39 222 14 29 120 14 109 5 28 52 1514 
XCHG EBX 34.13333 4 298 16 10 3 13 2 3 14 3 27 0 7 5 185 
XCHG ECX 34.36667 122 249 18 11 11 172 10 13 22 11 20 0 11 29 87 
XCHG EDX 61.9 3 235 26 4 4 8 0 2 10 3 5 5 3 7 620 
XCHG EDI 34.03333 1 342 13 7 1 27 0 3 42 1 5 0 3 1 314 
XCHG ESI 32.8 0 414 11 7 2 5 0 2 5 0 21 0 0 0 300 
XCHG EBP 25.1 36 255 17 3 1 11 1 4 11 1 7 0 1 6 152 
SHIFT LEFT 784.9 48 17696 63 26 206 120 76 60 390 33 271 10 38 128 1748 
SHIFT RIGHT 154.8 50 2090 159 11 14 44 25 22 53 23 84 8 14 25 723 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
100.6 52 1183 71 25 14 28 13 5 74 2 91 0 13 66 510 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
40.8 13 448 16 2 2 31 0 12 41 2 17 0 7 43 230 
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Table 14. JOP Gadgets for 31 applications (image and associated modules) – Part 2. 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
JMP EAX 2417.533 1735 1631 904 122 1446 1665 2026 1843 1816 1546 22 1731 390 1621 2112 2319 
JMP EBX 21.33333 34 9 1 0 3 19 26 20 31 19 18 19 0 3 218 21 
JMP ECX 25 60 7 1 7 5 7 25 7 12 12 7 7 0 0 160 59 
JMP EDX 101.4667 701 18 1 0 6 23 37 37 40 27 21 22 3 2 203 32 
JMP EDI 26.06667 7 23 14 3 13 23 32 30 25 26 10 23 0 13 196 36 
JMP ESI 49.33333 56 42 29 20 41 57 70 57 52 48 13 52 20 47 212 56 
JMP EBP 13.5 7 10 10 4 14 10 68 11 15 15 4 8 1 7 56 65 
CALL 
EAX 
8058.567 57507 108 85 43 1344 209 206 219 1396 113 60 128 4927 1566 1394 37031 
CALL 
EBX 
4403.93
3 
21284 1278 730 34 3356 1084 1952 468 908 440 43 1665 1330 2991 1381 4621 
CALL 
ECX 
1257.16
7 
1887 138 64 56 156 126 177 167 215 111 33 110 811 169 369 900 
CALL 
EDX 
7359.96
7 
71019 3508 127 3496 180 3498 1192
3 
3510 3524 3501 337
2 
3498 3725 489 293 1160
8 
CALL 
EDI 
6600.13
3 
33238 2833 939 436 3003 2666 3805 1972 3368 1210 38 2176 2350 7116 1992 5010 
CALL 
ESI 
27484.4
3 
26749 4581
2 
1224
3 
1032 3223
2 
3961
9 
2605
7 
1983
2 
3666
1 
1848
0 
253 1972
1 
2305 3551
1 
2219
5 
4080
5 
CALL 
EBP 
131.433
3 
246 11 4 0 1246 13 24 4 20 9 0 6 0 4 205 1708 
DG EAX 195 654 34 13 9 34 31 76 29 87 19 6 25 95 55 386 1222 
DG EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
 
212 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
DG 
BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EAX 
1.2 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
DG Other 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
DG Other 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD all 10837.8 27050 1423
6 
6091 1132 1034
8 
1097
9 
1157
9 
7519 1098
0 
5701 522 5850 2501 1032
0 
9681 1735
6 
ADD 
EAX 
7370.8 12900 1366
6 
5564 935 8584 1044
3 
1072
9 
7035 9912 5264 373 5385 1361 8965 8286 1360
8 
ADD 
EBX 
287.966
7 
1036 111 125 42 212 93 177 90 101 59 36 89 104 183 169 225 
ADD 
ECX 
552.1 2181 193 64 23 238 138 211 121 231 93 28 100 111 163 140 1669 
ADD 
EDX 
834.966
7 
6289 60 71 14 694 61 115 39 422 88 9 53 519 503 748 427 
ADD 
EDI 
561.933
3 
1693 155 185 79 334 169 210 167 228 157 41 163 175 321 220 426 
ADD ESI 225.233
3 
1168 19 73 10 130 26 52 17 65 19 6 29 97 120 96 545 
ADD 
EBP 
50.2333
3 
235 9 4 2 40 8 6 6 3 5 1 5 19 30 18 47 
SUB all 1550.3 6690 1009 497 88 1124 609 739 514 867 497 67 713 404 1156 535 1624 
SUB 
EAX 
981.766
7 
3695 725 447 83 720 531 610 421 788 430 56 456 292 737 450 1021 
SUB 
EBX 
250.633
3 
1257 244 21 7 331 38 56 22 30 25 4 34 35 277 40 313 
SUB 
ECX 
79.6333
3 
502 15 2 2 23 6 17 41 9 6 3 169 7 40 28 199 
SUB 
EDX 
155.366
7 
946 14 22 1 63 29 58 19 31 27 7 51 49 79 31 97 
SUB EDI 86.4333
3 
533 10 12 1 31 15 23 7 17 18 0 15 4 51 22 44 
SUB ESI 74.9 217 224 0 0 261 2 5 5 8 2 2 2 13 249 5 254 
SUB 
EBP 
4.6 24 0 0 0 7 8 7 1 1 0 0 0 3 2 11 6 
MUL all 483.9 104 594 586 14 663 593 609 634 595 593 6 603 27 601 654 611 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
MUL 
EAX 
7.06666
7 
24 7 0 4 2 4 6 4 5 4 4 15 2 0 1 11 
MUL 
EBX 
0.8 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
MUL 
ECX 
16.3666
7 
4 19 19 0 20 19 19 19 19 19 0 19 0 23 26 19 
MUL 
EDX 
6.13333
3 
17 1 0 0 47 0 4 41 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 0 
MUL 
EDI 
2.26666
7 
7 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
MUL ESI 2.26666
7 
7 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
MUL 
EBP 
301.733
3 
0 391 391 6 391 392 392 391 391 391 0 392 7 391 410 391 
DIV all 94.6333
3 
366 38 20 0 65 37 89 39 82 31 0 40 201 100 40 68 
DIV 
EAX 
94.6333
3 
366 38 20 0 65 37 89 39 82 31 0 40 201 100 40 68 
DIV 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
EDX 
94.6333
3 
366 38 20 0 65 37 89 39 82 31 0 40 201 100 40 68 
DIV EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV all 31935.8
3 
11891
7 
4624
0 
9665 4416 2633
1 
3829
1 
3609
0 
2088
9 
3642
4 
1970
5 
385
4 
1920
1 
1094
5 
3191
7 
1970
4 
9605
6 
MOV 
EAX 
5005.23
3 
32618 1705 143 1502 852 1563 5267 1566 1924 1599 145
7 
1558 3105 1239 691 1560
4 
MOV 
EBX 
465.866
7 
1789 69 52 16 378 55 313 84 490 257 14 49 158 263 103 382 
  
 
215 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
MOV 
ECX 
20179.2 43494 3964
7 
8907 575 2268
7 
3301
8 
2156
7 
1591
9 
2998
3 
1470
6 
174 1459
5 
3400 2701
5 
1748
6 
5604
2 
MOV 
EDX 
4152.56
7 
33809 2338 102 2223 263 2318 7760 2314 2416 2258 213
2 
2271 3718 1237 263 2155
7 
MOV 
EDI 
359.233
3 
2325 75 31 44 159 60 83 45 172 47 5 41 159 287 110 273 
MOV 
ESI 
1112.3 3124 2315 363 35 1471 1163 959 826 1328 738 17 578 224 1668 859 1754 
MOV 
EBP 
49.9666
7 
115 31 11 10 86 53 58 59 48 49 35 47 19 23 42 38 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EAX 
51.1 60 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 5 59 14 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EBX 
143.266
7 
881 1 0 0 61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 154 48 44 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E ECX 
16799.9
3 
34808 3841
3 
8714 416 2185
2 
3207
8 
2036
8 
1536
1 
2870
5 
1417
7 
84 1394
3 
1384 2547
4 
1652
8 
3072
8 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EDX 
20.2 122 16 0 6 10 41 43 40 10 6 6 7 0 10 25 40 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EDI 
183.566
7 
1284 8 5 5 93 8 8 8 8 8 3 8 92 156 19 99 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E ESI 
208.433
3 
1981 0 0 0 91 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 84 103 21 85 
MOV 
SHUFFL
E EBP 
15.8 31 10 6 6 64 14 10 14 10 10 4 10 6 12 11 17 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
MOV 
VALUE 
all 
3926.43
3 
2701 4071 318 3810 447 3971 1313
5 
3992 4390 4023 368
6 
4088 427 605 645 698 
MOV 
VALUE 
EAX 
1124.7 1115 1640 132 1484 129 1512 5184 1523 1874 1561 143
4 
1523 145 142 237 262 
MOV 
VALUE 
EBX 
184.533
3 
313 44 45 11 76 27 63 38 48 28 11 25 40 70 32 56 
MOV 
VALUE 
ECX 
1327.8 228 104 3 78 37 125 102 95 142 128 78 222 7 129 153 145 
MOV 
VALUE 
EDX 
1095.5 135 2219 93 2211 105 2222 7672 2222 2224 2220 212
4 
2224 115 101 109 107 
MOV 
VALUE 
EDI 
39.6 192 17 14 16 20 19 24 18 22 17 2 27 21 71 43 36 
MOV 
VALUE 
ESI 
29.3666
7 
225 2 1 2 20 3 4 3 11 3 2 3 41 38 2 5 
MOV 
VALUE 
EBP 
31.6 79 21 5 4 21 39 48 45 38 39 31 37 13 11 30 21 
LEA all 7558.16
7 
27307 951 448 12 1634 1115 681 532 749 671 7 688 1322 3035 1086 3136 
LEA 
EAX 
7558.16
7 
27307 951 448 12 1634 1115 681 532 749 671 7 688 1322 3035 1086 3136 
LEA 
EBX 
19.1 155 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 12 1 8 
LEA 
ECX 
5132.5 11485 925 437 11 883 1096 653 519 731 660 5 677 466 1056 697 1582 
LEA 
EDX 
418.933
3 
4303 10 0 0 15 4 11 4 5 0 0 0 344 22 192 480 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
LEA EDI 33.0666
7 
270 4 4 0 7 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 20 35 5 26 
LEA ESI 22.6666
7 
152 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 19 0 10 
LEA 
EBP 
4.3 8 1 0 0 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 12 
PUSH all 36746.2 25523
1 
1803 1130 167 2707
1 
3099 1636 1353 4620 2590 192 2206 2322
6 
2527
3 
3559 3686
4 
PUSH 
EAX 
8259.56
7 
60507 281 146 17 3723 407 261 161 246 182 30 248 6098 4701 940 7890 
PUSH 
EBX 
2207.83
3 
16297 97 88 12 2265 92 80 52 598 85 16 87 1675 2314 96 1439 
PUSH 
ECX 
2726 27688 94 33 2 909 111 102 85 314 31 2 44 2623 840 96 3603 
PUSH 
EDX 
2414.7 20147 65 14 8 1073 1003 88 79 89 962 8 1014 2312 1174 1003 3875 
PUSH 
EDI 
2290.8 16579 107 114 24 4073 141 119 94 327 75 44 66 1795 1212 97 2009 
PUSH 
ESI 
2669.2 14383 31 33 3 1443 32 43 23 481 505 10 21 2018 934 82 4331 
PUSH 
EBP 
353.8 2093 32 19 2 993 36 55 65 23 14 3 27 429 42 41 3305 
POP all 5302.23
3 
9262 3476 1866 283 3428 3604 4172 3882 3910 3862 104 3587 800 3593 3677 4409 
POP 
EAX 
161.233
3 
653 106 12 3 110 86 70 35 81 34 2 92 60 183 108 215 
POP 
EBX 
305.3 289 163 32 2 162 165 41 160 161 155 2 163 7 163 182 171 
POP 
ECX 
1147.63
3 
1165 1461 854 112 1342 1475 1756 1679 1603 1381 9 1569 244 1507 1483 1769 
POP 
EDX 
1105.1 852 1454 826 115 1272 1459 1694 1759 1564 1379 18 1533 220 1424 1475 1701 
POP EDI 212.266
7 
591 14 2 9 19 13 19 10 10 11 8 11 20 23 13 17 
  
 
218 
Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
POP ESI 409.866
7 
623 11 8 2 23 10 16 14 12 11 2 10 8 10 39 19 
POP EBP 1046.4 1009 33 23 3 37 24 20 17 23 514 4 20 101 53 25 55 
INC all 3007.4 10910 322 154 46 891 2120 2442 256 357 260 56 2073 818 1212 1011 5567 
INC 
EAX 
350.833
3 
1475 93 49 7 169 87 241 42 69 125 6 63 70 131 171 412 
INC EBX 100.6 389 11 5 3 17 14 27 67 12 8 3 13 22 31 23 46 
INC ECX 70.1 207 17 5 4 18 10 48 9 10 7 2 21 53 67 52 149 
INC 
EDX 
139.033
3 
1146 14 3 4 7 18 24 21 20 13 15 17 136 63 282 90 
INC EDI 166.466
7 
982 27 6 2 43 25 36 31 23 17 10 17 17 188 30 221 
INC ESI 402.033
3 
1040 19 10 7 38 1871 1887 16 19 15 7 1876 107 104 62 222 
INC EBP 1376.26
7 
3543 57 31 13 95 42 63 43 71 29 7 31 346 471 146 3887 
DEC all 2172.4 8782 1264 207 324 659 2015 2258 821 1715 570 232 2062 607 1510 1493 7040 
DEC 
EAX 
224.866
7 
1675 54 26 3 78 51 53 25 363 33 3 36 40 220 42 203 
DEC 
EBX 
140.766
7 
184 195 16 178 31 203 221 194 220 196 178 202 2 24 44 39 
DEC 
ECX 
75.7 210 26 8 19 15 30 96 26 26 26 18 30 19 38 24 24 
DEC 
EDX 
53.9333
3 
165 13 4 2 11 24 24 7 11 7 2 10 28 95 61 25 
DEC EDI 139.733
3 
585 31 18 7 30 91 57 43 28 22 2 25 18 86 69 49 
DEC ESI 122.2 763 11 10 2 35 19 46 17 11 10 2 11 43 42 41 62 
DEC 
EBP 
638.633
3 
2667 130 49 48 97 126 148 77 180 78 9 94 262 128 167 5326 
XCHG 
all 
651.266
7 
2851 2210 28 30 466 244 233 225 2039 201 19 224 93 340 347 513 
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Op. Average SNE MAG VUD WM WIN MSP EXP CER TAS REG CM
D 
NOT ACR BRL ICO RES 
XCHG 
EAX 
264.166
7 
1775 216 19 22 269 60 170 58 45 32 11 41 49 88 124 224 
XCHG 
EBX 
34.1333
3 
184 76 3 3 5 11 97 9 5 5 2 9 2 3 20 18 
XCHG 
ECX 
34.3666
7 
55 15 11 12 12 14 20 16 15 13 2 14 15 12 19 44 
XCHG 
EDX 
61.9 749 28 3 3 18 7 27 4 10 5 3 7 4 14 40 24 
XCHG 
EDI 
34.0333
3 
170 4 1 2 7 7 18 4 3 4 2 8 3 3 25 17 
XCHG 
ESI 
32.8 126 2 0 2 1 11 25 2 2 2 2 11 7 0 24 26 
XCHG 
EBP 
25.1 81 3 3 2 94 5 10 4 3 3 2 5 9 2 21 5 
SHIFT 
LEFT 
784.9 1391 28 22 13 418 41 46 32 95 30 8 108 90 269 43 267 
SHIFT 
RIGHT 
154.8 697 46 14 4 72 43 45 35 74 29 20 35 33 109 43 71 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
100.6 559 18 4 12 26 19 45 65 23 16 13 21 22 15 13 70 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
40.8 269 7 2 0 22 4 9 7 9 6 0 1 3 18 3 60 
 
JOP Gadgets Results from Two Applications 
Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, and Table present the results obtained from scanning two sample applications, Snaggit and 
Filezilla, and their modules; the results are spread across two tables.  Here we see the results for the image and all its modules, the 
results for the image itself, and the results for each individual module.  The intent with these tables is to provide a representative 
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sample of how the full results may appear. Both Snaggit and Filezilla present a higher than average number of gadgets. Standard 
default settings were used. Had the settings been modified, the numbers produced likely would increase or decrease. 
 
Table 15. JOP Gadgets for Snaggit.exe and its associated modules – Part 1 
Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
JMP 
EAX 
3182 1053 14 19 63 123 1097 113 0 19 13 5 53 72 
JMP 
EBX 
31 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 
JMP 
ECX 
79 4 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 1 
JMP 
EDX 
1022 912 0 0 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 0 0 5 
JMP 
EDI 
17 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JMP 
ESI 
51 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 3 8 
JMP 
EBP 
9 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
CALL 
EAX 
53684 4275
7 
0 13 0 0 1715 5651 9 0 217 19 0 506 
CALL 
EBX 
23812 1486
3 
255 0 3 14 95 2415 3 13 0 50 3 4058 
CALL 
ECX 
4424 1378 6 0 8 0 202 1330 16 6 0 0 1 205 
CALL 
EDX 
67728 5854
7 
0 0 12 0 2105 5284 96 0 261 0 0 49 
CALL 
EDI 
38659 2077
7 
344 4 9 1 229 2373 5 1 92 82 7 10401 
CALL 
ESI 
42386 1006
0 
11967 14 31 38 125 1528 60 23 264 168 61 9206 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
CALL 
EBP 
673 45 0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 5 
DG 
EAX 
470 264 0 3 1 0 22 54 3 0 22 0 0 5 
DG 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
DG 
BEST 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EAX 
8 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD 
all 
34224 1824
9 
3317 29 48 30 604 3425 81 41 100 72 87 2785 
ADD 
EAX 
18165 8013 3276 23 43 30 192 1716 75 35 55 50 80 1419 
ADD 
EBX 
1275 785 5 0 4 0 32 85 2 3 1 0 0 212 
ADD 
ECX 
2030 1379 4 0 0 0 99 185 0 0 8 3 0 173 
ADD 
EDX 
6406 4786 11 0 0 0 183 365 1 0 16 0 7 486 
ADD 
EDI 
1824 1176 17 4 0 0 15 182 2 2 2 2 0 231 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
ADD 
ESI 
1445 805 3 0 0 0 21 147 1 0 1 2 0 118 
ADD 
EBP 
250 145 0 0 1 0 7 14 0 0 12 1 0 24 
SUB 
all 
7324 4425 360 0 2 26 71 672 3 1 25 12 3 1265 
SUB 
EAX 
3892 2421 137 0 0 1 21 469 3 1 25 9 3 554 
SUB 
EBX 
1507 598 222 0 0 0 17 68 0 0 0 3 3 475 
SUB 
ECX 
535 303 0 0 2 0 17 71 0 0 0 3 0 81 
SUB 
EDX 
1121 519 1 0 0 0 26 74 0 0 0 0 0 428 
SUB 
EDI 
552 122 1 0 0 0 7 20 0 0 0 0 0 380 
SUB 
ESI 
451 129 221 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 69 
SUB 
EBP 
17 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
MUL 
all 
123 67 0 0 0 0 8 21 0 0 0 0 0 23 
MUL 
EAX 
27 17 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
MUL 
EBX 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
MUL 
ECX 
6 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
MUL 
EDX 
27 16 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MUL 
EDI 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
MUL 
ESI 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
MUL 
EBP 
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
all 
576 296 4 0 0 0 39 141 0 0 0 0 0 59 
DIV 
EAX 
576 296 4 0 0 0 39 141 0 0 0 0 0 59 
DIV 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
EDX 
576 296 4 0 0 0 39 141 0 0 0 0 0 59 
DIV 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
all 
129953 9355
8 
11771 1 9 51 3305 10774 126 2 643 44 1 2491 
MOV 
EAX 
35178 2855
5 
23 1 1 0 856 4213 44 0 238 5 0 530 
MOV 
EBX 
1744 972 20 0 0 0 21 135 2 0 2 10 1 481 
MOV 
ECX 
51900 3202
4 
10956 0 6 33 776 2712 7 0 203 7 0 311 
MOV 
EDX 
32016 2723
4 
37 0 0 4 648 3264 69 0 173 3 0 85 
MOV 
EDI 
2410 1524 10 0 0 0 48 160 0 0 4 8 0 466 
MOV 
ESI 
3933 2217 719 0 0 2 67 239 0 0 11 3 0 351 
MOV 
EBP 
171 48 3 0 0 4 14 9 2 2 0 0 0 7 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
EAX 
124 45 0 0 0 0 3 50 0 0 0 0 0 7 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
EBX 
839 470 0 0 0 0 7 69 0 0 0 0 0 229 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
ECX 
41523 2463
8 
10522 0 6 33 708 1205 7 0 203 0 0 118 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
EDX 
134 79 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
EDI 
1368 901 0 0 0 0 38 88 0 0 1 1 0 261 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
ESI 
2023 1509 0 0 0 0 43 118 0 0 11 1 0 234 
MOV 
SHUF
FLE 
EBP 
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 
MOV 
VALU
E all 
2796 1847 32 1 2 8 35 181 112 0 6 2 1 398 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
MOV 
VALU
E EAX 
980 767 4 1 0 0 6 53 42 0 0 0 0 62 
MOV 
VALU
E EBX 
328 168 19 0 0 0 4 11 0 0 0 0 1 107 
MOV 
VALU
E ECX 
332 223 1 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 69 
MOV 
VALU
E EDX 
165 43 3 0 0 4 0 25 68 0 0 0 0 2 
MOV 
VALU
E EDI 
255 157 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 53 
MOV 
VALU
E ESI 
256 155 0 0 0 0 8 27 0 0 0 1 0 51 
MOV 
VALU
E EBP 
99 44 3 0 0 4 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
LEA 
all 
26951 1905
6 
240 0 0 0 1035 1155 0 0 178 49 0 3621 
LEA 
EAX 
26951 5898 2 0 0 0 411 434 0 0 18 19 0 3220 
LEA 
EBX 
170 79 0 0 0 0 5 17 0 0 0 0 0 39 
LEA 
ECX 
11020 9419 236 0 0 0 240 274 0 0 126 30 0 185 
LEA 
EDX 
4520 3387 2 0 0 0 347 334 0 0 26 0 0 60 
LEA 
EDI 
332 190 0 0 0 0 23 36 0 0 0 0 0 60 
LEA 
ESI 
209 77 0 0 0 0 3 56 0 0 8 0 0 57 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
LEA 
EBP 
52 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PUSH 
all 
266054 1664
23 
377 47 15 26 6594 21071 5 8 628 321 10 41855 
PUSH 
EAX 
61506 4217
0 
89 0 0 0 1540 4268 0 1 167 78 0 7977 
PUSH 
EBX 
16569 8506 12 26 0 0 281 1372 1 1 52 40 0 3326 
PUSH 
ECX 
29148 2218
2 
12 0 0 0 1020 1995 0 0 81 10 0 1030 
PUSH 
EDX 
22757 1607
2 
25 0 0 0 1195 2260 0 0 51 0 3 296 
PUSH 
EDI 
18867 1133
8 
21 7 0 0 420 2418 2 0 53 53 0 2021 
PUSH 
ESI 
18639 9840 3 12 0 0 511 3039 0 0 32 34 0 1618 
PUSH 
EBP 
3098 1369 4 0 0 0 52 489 0 0 3 9 0 31 
POP 
all 
10972 6273 83 24 137 171 1165 594 2 36 14 29 83 1206 
POP 
EAX 
597 388 17 0 0 0 9 29 1 0 0 4 0 105 
POP 
EBX 
429 221 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 4 
POP 
ECX 
1143 177 12 7 60 89 3 9 0 18 2 23 40 294 
POP 
EDX 
796 189 15 5 60 81 0 8 0 18 0 0 40 60 
POP 
EDI 
933 495 4 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 406 
POP 
ESI 
1024 943 0 0 0 0 7 26 0 0 7 0 0 16 
POP 
EBP 
2067 838 7 12 2 0 1078 69 0 0 0 2 0 35 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
INC 
all 
11861 7143 92 0 5 3 304 1462 4 0 26 36 13 1843 
INC 
EAX 
1610 1002 34 0 0 0 67 145 0 0 5 1 5 243 
INC 
EBX 
352 181 0 0 0 0 5 79 0 0 0 0 0 54 
INC 
ECX 
233 92 0 0 0 0 21 37 0 0 1 0 0 40 
INC 
EDX 
987 752 4 0 0 0 64 97 0 0 0 0 0 32 
INC 
EDI 
934 364 7 0 0 3 5 320 0 0 0 6 0 45 
INC 
ESI 
1233 679 0 0 0 0 43 244 1 0 9 22 0 162 
INC 
EBP 
3566 2742 11 0 5 0 68 160 3 0 2 3 0 459 
DEC 
all 
9288 5940 66 1 8 12 365 1351 4 4 44 2 4 540 
DEC 
EAX 
1472 986 24 0 0 7 48 187 0 0 0 0 0 148 
DEC 
EBX 
254 100 1 0 0 0 9 125 0 0 0 0 0 5 
DEC 
ECX 
258 126 0 0 0 5 2 69 1 0 0 0 0 39 
DEC 
EDX 
209 151 0 0 0 0 1 15 0 0 0 0 0 2 
DEC 
EDI 
582 272 5 0 0 0 2 255 0 4 0 0 0 15 
DEC 
ESI 
997 592 1 0 0 0 22 301 0 0 0 0 0 23 
DEC 
EBP 
2332 2078 0 0 0 0 22 104 0 0 0 1 0 70 
XCHG 
all 
3177 2290 2 0 0 0 17 199 0 0 7 0 0 217 
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Op. Snagit3
2.exe all 
Snagi
t 
32.ex
e 
gdiplu
s.dll 
imagehl
p.dll 
CRYPT3
2.dll 
shlwap
i.dll 
Opencv 
_core24
9.dll 
PDFLi
b.dll 
KERNEL3
2.DLL 
IMM32.
DLL 
Scrolling 
Capture.
dll 
MSVCP1
00.dll 
IPHLPAPI
.DLL 
mfc100
u.dll 
XCHG 
EAX 
1514 1295 1 0 0 0 7 96 0 0 7 0 0 60 
XCHG 
EBX 
185 166 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
XCHG 
ECX 
87 58 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 7 
XCHG 
EDX 
620 546 1 0 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 0 0 9 
XCHG 
EDI 
314 287 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 
XCHG 
ESI 
300 196 0 0 0 0 9 31 0 0 0 0 0 11 
XCHG 
EBP 
152 129 0 0 0 0 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 11 
SHIFT 
LEFT 
1748 696 4 0 0 0 19 100 4 4 10 9 0 570 
SHIFT 
RIGH
T 
723 437 8 0 0 0 12 50 2 0 1 0 0 153 
ROTA
TE 
LEFT 
510 332 1 0 0 0 7 30 0 0 20 1 0 49 
ROTA
TE 
RIGH
T 
230 148 5 0 0 0 4 12 0 0 11 1 0 21 
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Table 16. JOP Gadgets for Snaggit.exe and its associated modules – Part 2 
Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
JMP 
EAX 
28 49 5 21 43 0 3 155 154 0 57 23 0 
JMP 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 
JMP 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 0 0 
JMP 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 14 0 
JMP 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 
JMP 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 6 6 0 6 0 0 0 8 0 
JMP 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CALL 
EAX 
291 0 472 204 71 7 226 1177 0 25 4 320 0 
CALL 
EBX 
585 60 213 14 143 7 253 500 0 61 0 204 0 
CALL 
ECX 
162 0 301 6 6 8 104 640 0 0 4 41 0 
CALL 
EDX 
133 0 236 96 0 0 185 682 0 19 0 23 0 
CALL 
EDI 
1104 73 226 14 935 23 381 915 0 69 3 591 0 
CALL 
ESI 
1624 387 93 116 4077 228 224 1047 0 103 39 903 0 
CALL 
EBP 
241 0 13 0 0 0 79 196 0 28 0 0 0 
DG 
EAX 
8 0 20 7 6 1 1 18 0 0 1 34 0 
DG 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
DG 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
BEST 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
DG 
Other 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG 
Other 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD 
all 
1554 126 395 99 1803 61 244 770 0 48 47 209 0 
ADD 
EAX 
430 111 223 75 1744 56 90 224 0 20 43 142 0 
ADD 
EBX 
56 0 9 3 5 5 27 31 0 0 2 8 0 
ADD 
ECX 
35 8 12 1 26 0 10 70 0 0 0 17 0 
ADD 
EDX 
135 5 67 15 3 0 93 213 0 10 0 10 0 
ADD 
EDI 
64 2 26 3 4 0 6 68 0 2 2 14 0 
ADD 
ESI 
206 0 35 0 0 0 15 73 0 11 0 7 0 
ADD 
EBP 
8 0 22 0 0 0 2 10 0 2 0 2 0 
SUB 
all 
97 5 29 9 19 3 81 183 0 6 1 26 0 
SUB 
EAX 
64 1 20 3 14 1 32 96 0 1 0 16 0 
SUB 
EBX 
11 0 5 2 4 2 8 85 0 0 1 3 0 
SUB 
ECX 
9 0 3 0 1 0 24 15 0 5 0 1 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
SUB 
EDX 
14 4 5 0 3 0 22 20 0 0 1 4 0 
SUB 
EDI 
7 4 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 1 2 0 
SUB 
ESI 
9 0 1 4 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 2 0 
SUB 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
all 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV all 16 0 0 1 2 8 3 5 0 1 0 1 0 
DIV 
EAX 
16 0 0 1 2 8 3 5 0 1 0 1 0 
DIV 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
EDX 
16 0 0 1 2 8 3 5 0 1 0 1 0 
DIV 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
DIV 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
all 
261 362 329 355 3947 88 361 941 0 8 2 523 0 
MOV 
EAX 
52 1 164 107 6 0 70 266 0 0 0 46 0 
MOV 
EBX 
14 1 3 2 3 0 8 30 0 0 0 39 0 
MOV 
ECX 
37 354 41 126 3787 79 91 215 0 2 2 131 0 
MOV 
EDX 
52 0 71 101 42 0 70 149 0 0 0 14 0 
MOV 
EDI 
29 0 0 4 11 1 39 59 0 0 0 47 0 
MOV 
ESI 
37 6 2 4 95 6 70 80 0 0 0 24 0 
MOV 
EBP 
25 0 5 0 3 2 7 20 0 0 0 20 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE 
EAX 
2 0 3 0 0 0 8 4 0 0 0 2 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE 
EBX 
12 0 0 0 0 0 7 26 0 0 0 19 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE 
ECX 
9 354 4 21 3609 79 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE 
EDX 
0 0 4 0 34 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE EDI 
19 0 0 0 0 0 29 13 0 0 0 17 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE ESI 
15 0 0 4 0 0 30 55 0 0 0 3 0 
MOV 
SHUFF
LE 
EBP 
10 0 0 0 2 2 6 18 0 0 0 2 0 
MOV 
VALU
E all 
15 1 7 21 6 1 12 43 0 0 0 65 0 
MOV 
VALU
E EAX 
9 1 2 0 0 0 4 24 0 0 0 5 0 
MOV 
VALU
E EBX 
0 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 12 0 
MOV 
VALU
E ECX 
0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
MOV 
VALU
E EDX 
1 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 14 0 
MOV 
VALU
E EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 1 8 9 0 0 0 6 0 
MOV 
VALU
E ESI 
3 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 
MOV 
VALU
E EBP 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 18 0 
LEA 
all 
194 0 447 33 66 0 120 444 0 1 0 312 0 
LEA 
EAX 
40 0 162 5 0 0 43 146 0 1 0 243 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
LEA 
EBX 
0 0 22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 0 
LEA 
ECX 
95 0 99 22 62 0 26 172 0 0 0 34 0 
LEA 
EDX 
46 0 118 6 4 0 48 119 0 0 0 23 0 
LEA 
EDI 
5 0 10 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 0 
LEA 
ESI 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA 
EBP 
0 0 36 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 
PUSH 
all 
5900 23 3478 669 168 19 2809 11864 22 438 13 3271 0 
PUSH 
EAX 
1665 0 502 163 17 0 407 1589 0 118 0 755 0 
PUSH 
EBX 
406 0 227 38 8 1 235 1451 0 60 1 525 0 
PUSH 
ECX 
852 0 310 60 37 0 382 992 0 61 0 124 0 
PUSH 
EDX 
919 0 476 39 20 0 432 894 0 31 0 44 0 
PUSH 
EDI 
404 0 241 66 20 0 296 1222 0 37 0 248 0 
PUSH 
ESI 
571 0 431 73 6 0 414 1704 0 45 0 306 0 
PUSH 
EBP 
214 0 323 6 4 0 75 473 0 13 0 33 0 
POP all 76 98 24 42 91 153 27 75 308 17 116 128 0 
POP 
EAX 
4 4 0 0 7 0 5 9 0 1 0 14 0 
POP 
EBX 
2 3 0 0 0 150 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 
POP 
ECX 
9 44 9 21 32 0 9 20 154 9 57 45 0 
POP 
EDX 
2 46 0 17 32 0 3 1 154 0 57 8 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
POP 
EDI 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 11 0 
POP 
ESI 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 
POP 
EBP 
1 0 0 3 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 12 0 
INC all 180 153 80 21 18 2 53 299 0 34 0 90 0 
INC 
EAX 
9 8 2 1 3 0 2 60 0 4 0 19 0 
INC 
EBX 
0 0 0 7 0 0 5 20 0 0 0 1 0 
INC 
ECX 
0 1 35 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 
INC 
EDX 
8 0 2 6 1 0 1 14 0 0 0 6 0 
INC 
EDI 
6 139 1 2 5 0 4 19 0 0 0 8 0 
INC 
ESI 
22 2 0 0 0 0 4 39 0 0 0 6 0 
INC 
EBP 
2 1 4 4 2 2 7 45 0 2 0 44 0 
DEC 
all 
197 80 38 18 253 9 55 186 22 31 16 42 0 
DEC 
EAX 
14 4 1 2 2 1 17 26 0 1 0 4 0 
DEC 
EBX 
4 0 0 1 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 1 0 
DEC 
ECX 
1 1 0 4 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC 
EDX 
2 0 16 7 1 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 22 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC 
ESI 
7 0 1 1 7 0 5 25 0 0 0 12 0 
DEC 
EBP 
2 0 0 3 1 0 6 13 22 0 0 10 0 
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Op. Ltkrn15
u.dll 
WINTRU
ST.dll 
Lttwn15
u.dll 
VideoCom
mon.dll 
RPCRT
4.dll 
COMCTL
32.dll 
Ltdis15
u.dll 
Trackerbi
rd.dll 
GDI3
2.dll 
Ltimgclr1
5u.dll 
ADVAPI
32.dll 
MSVCR1
00.dll 
MSIMG
32.dll 
XCHG 
all 
88 0 139 0 10 150 6 28 0 0 0 24 0 
XCHG 
EAX 
6 0 16 0 8 0 1 13 0 0 0 4 0 
XCHG 
EBX 
2 0 8 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 
XCHG 
EDI 
0 0 14 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG 
ESI 
1 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SHIFT 
LEFT 
162 0 8 9 5 3 12 68 0 4 0 61 0 
SHIFT 
RIGHT 
7 0 2 0 7 0 4 23 0 0 0 17 0 
ROTA
TE 
LEFT 
37 0 2 0 1 0 1 22 0 7 0 0 0 
ROTA
TE 
RIGHT 
2 0 4 1 3 0 2 16 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 17. JOP Gadgets for Filezilla.exe and its associated modules – Part 1 
Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
JMP EAX 9049 7560 0 15 154 66 154 57 0 12 
JMP EBX 21 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
JMP ECX 24 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JMP EDX 435 412 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 
JMP EDI 42 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
JMP ESI 57 9 6 6 0 6 0 0 6 7 
JMP EBP 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CALL EAX 25796 25690 7 0 0 0 0 4 9 45 
CALL EBX 1301 1033 7 0 8 1 0 0 3 27 
CALL ECX 382 263 8 9 9 6 0 4 16 6 
CALL EDX 3321 3183 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0 
CALL EDI 2013 862 23 44 25 4 0 3 5 9 
CALL ESI 16146 1147 228 19 1534 86 0 39 60 107 
CALL EBP 543 539 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EAX 431 412 1 0 3 0 0 1 3 4 
DG EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
DG BEST 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EAX 
6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ECX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD all 10621 6053 61 31 220 94 0 47 81 94 
ADD EAX 7626 3328 56 28 189 84 0 43 75 75 
ADD EBX 1245 1209 5 2 1 6 0 2 2 0 
ADD ECX 272 201 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 6 
ADD EDX 92 63 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 
ADD EDI 185 66 0 0 20 3 0 2 2 13 
ADD ESI 53 36 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 
ADD EBP 33 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SUB all 1657 1281 3 0 14 0 0 1 3 9 
SUB EAX 1038 692 1 0 6 0 0 0 3 1 
SUB EBX 292 274 2 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 
SUB ECX 61 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SUB EDX 45 24 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 7 
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Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
SUB EDI 17 4 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 
SUB ESI 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
SUB EBP 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL all 597 5 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MUL EAX 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL ECX 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EDI 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL ESI 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EBP 391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV all 64 31 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EAX 64 31 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EDX 64 31 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV all 26679 14379 88 12 580 7 0 2 126 140 
MOV EAX 4902 4801 0 1 5 1 0 0 44 19 
MOV EBX 212 193 0 2 6 0 0 0 2 0 
MOV ECX 14406 3097 79 6 544 0 0 2 7 66 
MOV EDX 395 279 0 0 7 0 0 0 69 2 
MOV EDI 89 39 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV ESI 676 47 6 1 15 0 0 0 0 13 
MOV EBP 63 23 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 29 
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Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EAX 
134 134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBX 
89 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
ECX 
13711 2741 79 6 520 0 0 2 7 66 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EDX 
10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EDI 
19 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
ESI 
34 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBP 
21 9 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 
MOV 
VALUE all 
2933 2658 1 4 32 2 0 0 112 42 
MOV 
VALUE 
EAX 
2567 2485 0 1 5 1 0 0 42 11 
MOV 
VALUE 
EBX 
38 27 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
VALUE 
ECX 
35 12 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
VALUE 
EDX 
121 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 2 
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Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
MOV 
VALUE 
EDI 
39 24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
VALUE ESI 
13 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
VALUE 
EBP 
42 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
LEA all 3357 2817 0 0 74 0 0 0 0 1 
LEA EAX 3357 57 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA EBX 22 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA ECX 654 124 0 0 72 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA EDX 78 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA EDI 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA ESI 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA EBP 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PUSH all 2877 997 19 9 999 20 22 13 5 71 
PUSH EAX 293 147 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 13 
PUSH EBX 92 56 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 7 
PUSH ECX 48 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 
PUSH EDX 993 38 0 0 937 0 0 0 0 0 
PUSH EDI 59 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 23 
PUSH ESI 27 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
PUSH EBP 167 155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
POP all 20256 17164 153 30 261 121 308 116 2 36 
POP EAX 181 156 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 
POP EBX 4268 4111 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POP ECX 1361 5 0 14 121 60 154 57 0 1 
POP EDX 1357 2 0 14 118 57 154 57 0 7 
POP EDI 3333 3327 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
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Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
POP ESI 3602 3588 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POP EBP 5761 5748 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
INC all 6655 6531 2 1 7 0 0 0 4 20 
INC EAX 1704 1671 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
INC EBX 50 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INC ECX 25 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INC EDX 122 111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
INC EDI 412 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
INC ESI 29 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
INC EBP 2549 2517 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 
DEC all 1475 1035 9 7 21 45 22 16 4 10 
DEC EAX 170 154 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC EBX 26 6 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC ECX 18 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
DEC EDX 7 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC EDI 69 3 0 0 2 40 0 0 0 0 
DEC ESI 13 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC EBP 259 139 0 0 3 0 22 0 0 7 
XCHG all 316 136 150 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EAX 115 95 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EBX 16 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG ECX 18 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EDX 26 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EDI 13 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG ESI 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EBP 17 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SHIFT 
LEFT 
63 37 3 4 0 4 0 0 4 3 
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Op. filezilla.exe 
all 
filezilla.ex
e 
COMCTL32.D
LL 
MPR.DL
L 
COMDLG32.D
LL 
WINMM.DL
L 
GDI32.d
ll 
ADVAPI32.d
ll 
KERNEL32.D
LL 
msvcrt.d
ll 
SHIFT 
RIGHT 
159 131 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 19 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
71 66 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
16 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 18. JOP Gadgets for Filezilla.exe and its associated modules – Part 2 
Op. WSOCK32
. DLL 
NETAPI32
. dll 
powrprof.dll SHELL32.dl
l 
Normaliz.dl
l 
ole32.dll CRYPT32.dl
l 
WS2_32.dl
l 
USER32.dl
l 
OLEAUT32.dl
l 
JMP EAX 0 56 21 753 0 70 63 28 27 13 
JMP EBX 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JMP ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JMP EDX 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
JMP EDI 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JMP ESI 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 8 0 
JMP EBP 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CALL EAX 0 0 0 17 0 1 0 0 18 5 
CALL EBX 0 0 0 183 0 13 3 9 3 11 
CALL ECX 0 0 3 19 0 5 8 3 15 8 
CALL EDX 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 0 28 0 
CALL EDI 0 0 2 520 0 56 9 331 69 51 
CALL ESI 0 1 8 9462 0 653 31 326 474 1971 
CALL EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
DG EAX 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 1 
DG EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST EAX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG BEST ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. WSOCK32
. DLL 
NETAPI32
. dll 
powrprof.dll SHELL32.dl
l 
Normaliz.dl
l 
ole32.dll CRYPT32.dl
l 
WS2_32.dl
l 
USER32.dl
l 
OLEAUT32.dl
l 
DG BEST EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EAX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DG Other EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ADD all 0 2 12 2733 0 265 48 164 410 306 
ADD EAX 0 2 12 2643 0 250 43 159 359 280 
ADD EBX 0 0 0 9 0 2 4 0 2 1 
ADD ECX 0 0 0 53 0 4 0 1 1 4 
ADD EDX 0 0 0 17 0 1 0 0 4 2 
ADD EDI 0 0 0 11 0 6 0 1 44 17 
ADD ESI 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 2 
ADD EBP 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 
SUB all 0 0 0 299 0 5 2 1 24 15 
SUB EAX 0 0 0 292 0 4 0 1 23 15 
SUB EBX 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 1 0 
SUB ECX 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 
SUB EDX 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 
SUB EDI 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
SUB ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SUB EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL all 0 0 0 576 0 0 0 0 9 0 
MUL EAX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL ECX 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. WSOCK32
. DLL 
NETAPI32
. dll 
powrprof.dll SHELL32.dl
l 
Normaliz.dl
l 
ole32.dll CRYPT32.dl
l 
WS2_32.dl
l 
USER32.dl
l 
OLEAUT32.dl
l 
MUL EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EDI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL ESI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MUL EBP 0 0 0 385 0 0 0 0 6 0 
DIV all 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 2 
DIV EAX 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 2 
DIV EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ECX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EDX 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 2 
DIV EDI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV all 0 0 0 8619 0 460 9 413 184 1660 
MOV EAX 0 0 0 6 0 2 1 0 20 2 
MOV EBX 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV ECX 0 0 0 8236 0 423 6 361 118 1461 
MOV EDX 0 0 0 4 0 9 0 0 24 1 
MOV EDI 0 0 0 8 0 2 0 23 16 0 
MOV ESI 0 0 0 342 0 23 0 29 4 196 
MOV EBP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EAX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EBX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
ECX 
0 0 0 8073 0 423 6 289 116 1383 
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Op. WSOCK32
. DLL 
NETAPI32
. dll 
powrprof.dll SHELL32.dl
l 
Normaliz.dl
l 
ole32.dll CRYPT32.dl
l 
WS2_32.dl
l 
USER32.dl
l 
OLEAUT32.dl
l 
MOV 
SHUFFLE 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE EDI 
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV 
SHUFFLE EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
MOV VALUE 
all 
0 0 0 24 0 1 2 0 54 1 
MOV VALUE 
EAX 
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 19 0 
MOV VALUE 
EBX 
0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV VALUE 
ECX 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MOV VALUE 
EDX 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 
MOV VALUE 
EDI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 
MOV VALUE 
ESI 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOV VALUE 
EBP 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
LEA all 0 0 0 423 0 36 0 6 0 0 
LEA EAX 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
LEA EBX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA ECX 0 0 0 418 0 34 0 6 0 0 
LEA EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA EDI 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEA EBP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PUSH all 0 8 3 388 0 199 15 6 22 81 
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Op. WSOCK32
. DLL 
NETAPI32
. dll 
powrprof.dll SHELL32.dl
l 
Normaliz.dl
l 
ole32.dll CRYPT32.dl
l 
WS2_32.dl
l 
USER32.dl
l 
OLEAUT32.dl
l 
PUSH EAX 0 0 0 54 0 22 0 0 0 37 
PUSH EBX 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 1 1 
PUSH ECX 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 26 
PUSH EDX 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 4 
PUSH EDI 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 2 8 
PUSH ESI 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 
PUSH EBP 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POP all 0 114 48 1556 0 77 137 48 50 35 
POP EAX 0 0 0 9 0 10 0 0 0 0 
POP EBX 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 
POP ECX 0 56 21 723 0 30 60 23 24 12 
POP EDX 0 56 21 721 0 31 60 23 24 12 
POP EDI 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
POP ESI 0 0 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POP EBP 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 1 
INC all 0 1 1 66 0 4 5 2 7 4 
INC EAX 0 0 0 27 0 2 0 0 0 0 
INC EBX 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INC ECX 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 
INC EDX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
INC EDI 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
INC ESI 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INC EBP 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 2 3 4 
DEC all 0 8 3 159 0 2 8 81 5 40 
DEC EAX 0 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DEC EBX 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC ECX 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DEC EDX 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Op. WSOCK32
. DLL 
NETAPI32
. dll 
powrprof.dll SHELL32.dl
l 
Normaliz.dl
l 
ole32.dll CRYPT32.dl
l 
WS2_32.dl
l 
USER32.dl
l 
OLEAUT32.dl
l 
DEC EDI 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 5 0 1 
DEC ESI 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DEC EBP 0 0 2 40 0 0 0 42 4 0 
XCHG all 0 0 0 8 0 4 0 0 11 0 
XCHG EAX 0 0 0 3 0 4 0 0 11 0 
XCHG EBX 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
XCHG ECX 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 
XCHG EDX 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EDI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG ESI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XCHG EBP 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SHIFT LEFT 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 1 
SHIFT RIGHT 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 
ROTATE 
LEFT 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ROTATE 
RIGHT 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
 
 
  
 
252 
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE OUTPUT OF GADGETS 
Appendix B provides sample output of gadgets for different operations. The purpose of 
Appendix B is simply to provide an illustration of how the output may appear.  The examples 
chosen are brief or truncated, whereas in actual practice the quantity of gadgets produced could 
number in the hundreds or thousands. Figure 1 illustrates MOV Val output from WinRAR.exe, 
where EDI is the target for the MOV operation.  Figure 2 depicts JMP EDX output from 
Respond.exe.  
Figures 3 and 4 showcase dispatcher gadget output. Dispatcher gadgets are necessities for 
JOP to function, and both depict excellent gadgets, although EAX is the least desirable register 
for dispatcher gadgets. This is because EAX is the most commonly used register. Figure 3 
illustrates truncated Dispatcher Gadget EAX output from Snagit.exe, while figure 4 depicts 
Dispatcher Gadget Other EAX output from Filezilla.exe. 
 
Figure 26. MOV Val EDI output from WinRAR.exe . 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 13 Mod: WinRAR.exe 
mov edi, 0x8b000001    0x4abd87 (offset 0xa9d87) 
sbb eax, 0x516608    0x4abd8c (offset 0xa9d8c) 
push 0x65    0x4abd91 (offset 0xa9d91) 
push ebp    0x4abd93 (offset 0xa9d93) 
call ebx    0x4abd94 (offset 0xa9d94) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#2 Ops: 13 Mod: WinRAR.exe 
mov edi, 1    0x40c981 (offset 0xa981) 
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push 0x69    0x40c986 (offset 0xa986) 
push ebx    0x40c988 (offset 0xa988) 
call esi    0x40c989 (offset 0xa989) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#3 Ops: 12 Mod: WinRAR.exe 
mov edi, 1    0x40c981 (offset 0xa981) 
push 0x69    0x40c986 (offset 0xa986) 
push ebx    0x40c988 (offset 0xa988) 
call esi    0x40c989 (offset 0xa989) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#4 Ops: 10 Mod: WinRAR.exe 
mov edi, 1    0x40c981 (offset 0xa981) 
push 0x69    0x40c986 (offset 0xa986) 
push ebx    0x40c988 (offset 0xa988) 
call esi    0x40c989 (offset 0xa989) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#5 Ops: 8 Mod: WinRAR.exe 
mov edi, 1    0x40c981 (offset 0xa981) 
push 0x69    0x40c986 (offset 0xa986) 
push ebx    0x40c988 (offset 0xa988) 
call esi    0x40c989 (offset 0xa989) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#6 Ops: 10 Mod: COMCTL32.dll 
mov edi, 0xff5750c3    0x5bfb7d1b (offset 0x35d1b) 
adc eax, 0x5bff8654    0x5bfb7d20 (offset 0x35d20) 
call esi    0x5bfb7d25 (offset 0x35d25) 
 
  
 
254 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#7 Ops: 13 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0x448b69e9    0x69e8038d (offset 0x7e38d) 
and al, 0x20    0x69e80392 (offset 0x7e392) 
call eax    0x69e80394 (offset 0x7e394) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#8 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0x448b69e9    0x69e8038d (offset 0x7e38d) 
and al, 0x20    0x69e80392 (offset 0x7e392) 
call eax    0x69e80394 (offset 0x7e394) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#9 Ops: 8 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0x448b69e9    0x69e8038c (offset 0x7e38c) 
and al, 0x20    0x69e80392 (offset 0x7e392) 
call eax    0x69e80394 (offset 0x7e394) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#10 Ops: 7 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0x448b69e9    0x69e8038d (offset 0x7e38d) 
and al, 0x20    0x69e80392 (offset 0x7e392) 
call eax    0x69e80394 (offset 0x7e394) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#11 Ops: 12 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0x4d8b69e9    0x69e87512 (offset 0x85512) 
or byte ptr [ebx + 0x98b0451], cl    0x69e87518 (offset 0x85518) 
call esi    0x69e8751e (offset 0x8551e) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
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#12 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e590f0 (offset 0x570f0) 
call esi    0x69e590f5 (offset 0x570f5) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#13 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e59160 (offset 0x57160) 
call esi    0x69e59165 (offset 0x57165) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#14 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e591d0 (offset 0x571d0) 
call esi    0x69e591d5 (offset 0x571d5) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#15 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e59315 (offset 0x57315) 
call esi    0x69e5931a (offset 0x5731a) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#16 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e595a1 (offset 0x575a1) 
call esi    0x69e595a6 (offset 0x575a6) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#17 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e59621 (offset 0x57621) 
call esi    0x69e59626 (offset 0x57626) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#18 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
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mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e596a1 (offset 0x576a1) 
call esi    0x69e596a6 (offset 0x576a6) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#19 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0xcf8b69e9    0x69e5977b (offset 0x5777b) 
call esi    0x69e59780 (offset 0x57780) 
 
@MOV Val*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#20 Ops: 11 Mod: USER32.dll 
mov edi, 0x4d8b69e9    0x69e87513 (offset 0x85513) 
or byte ptr [ebx + 0x98b0451], cl    0x69e87518 (offset 0x85518) 
call esi    0x69e8751e (offset 0x8551e) 
 
# MOV Value EDI WinRAR.exe total: 5 
# MOV Value EDI COMCTL32.dll total: 1 
# MOV Value EDI USER32.dll total: 14 
# Grand total MOV Value EDI : 20 
 
Figure 27.  JMP EDX output from Respond.exe 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 13 Mod: Respond.exe 
push ecx    0x5c165a (offset 0x1bf65a) 
or byte ptr [ecx - 0x1276b], cl    0x5c165b (offset 0x1bf65b) 
inc dword ptr [ecx - 0x12743]    0x5c1661 (offset 0x1bf661) 
jmp edx    0x5c1667 (offset 0x1bf667) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#2 Ops: 13 Mod: Respond.exe 
inc edx   0x5c214d (offset 0x1c014d) 
or byte ptr [ecx - 0x1237b], cl    0x5c214e (offset 0x1c014e) 
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inc dword ptr [ecx - 0x12343]    0x5c2154 (offset 0x1c0154) 
jmp edx    0x5c215a (offset 0x1c015a) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#3 Ops: 13 Mod: Respond.exe 
push ecx    0x5c2a6a (offset 0x1c0a6a) 
or byte ptr [ecx - 0x11f6b], cl    0x5c2a6b (offset 0x1c0a6b) 
inc dword ptr [ecx - 0x11f43]    0x5c2a71 (offset 0x1c0a71) 
jmp edx    0x5c2a77 (offset 0x1c0a77) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#4 Ops: 13 Mod: Respond.exe 
mov dword ptr [esp + 4], ecx    0xc923ed (offset 0x8903ed) 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#5 Ops: 12 Mod: Respond.exe 
or byte ptr [ecx - 0x1276b], cl    0x5c165b (offset 0x1bf65b) 
inc dword ptr [ecx - 0x12743]    0x5c1661 (offset 0x1bf661) 
jmp edx    0x5c1667 (offset 0x1bf667) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#6 Ops: 12 Mod: Respond.exe 
or byte ptr [ecx - 0x1237b], cl    0x5c214e (offset 0x1c014e) 
inc dword ptr [ecx - 0x12343]    0x5c2154 (offset 0x1c0154) 
jmp edx    0x5c215a (offset 0x1c015a) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#7 Ops: 12 Mod: Respond.exe 
or byte ptr [ecx - 0x11f6b], cl    0x5c2a6b (offset 0x1c0a6b) 
inc dword ptr [ecx - 0x11f43]    0x5c2a71 (offset 0x1c0a71) 
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jmp edx    0x5c2a77 (offset 0x1c0a77) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#8 Ops: 12 Mod: Respond.exe 
ror byte ptr [edi], cl    0x6c9241 (offset 0x2c7241) 
test dword ptr [ebp - 0x73000000], ecx    0x6c9243 (offset 
0x2c7243) 
dec ebp    0x6c9249 (offset 0x2c7249) 
shr al, 1    0x6c924a (offset 0x2c724a) 
push eax    0x6c924c (offset 0x2c724c) 
jmp edx    0x6c924d (offset 0x2c724d) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#9 Ops: 12 Mod: Respond.exe 
add dword ptr [ebx - 0x2d7ad7b0], ecx    0xc923e5 (offset 
0x8903e5) 
je 0x8903f3    0xc923eb (offset 0x8903eb) 
mov dword ptr [esp + 4], ecx    0xc923ed (offset 0x8903ed) 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#10 Ops: 12 Mod: Respond.exe 
rcl dword ptr [edx - 0x17aa0000], 0x53    0xd6ac91 (offset 
0x968c91) 
arpl word ptr [eax], ax   0xd6ac98 (offset 0x968c98) 
add byte ptr [esi - 0x18], dl    0xd6ac9a (offset 0x968c9a) 
jmp edx    0xd6ac9d (offset 0x968c9d) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#11 Ops: 11 Mod: Respond.exe 
mov dword ptr [esp + 4], ecx    0xc923ed (offset 0x8903ed) 
  
 
259 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#12 Ops: 10 Mod: Respond.exe 
test dword ptr [ebp - 0x73000000], ecx    0x6c9243 (offset 
0x2c7243) 
dec ebp    0x6c9249 (offset 0x2c7249) 
shr al, 1    0x6c924a (offset 0x2c724a) 
push eax    0x6c924c (offset 0x2c724c) 
jmp edx    0x6c924d (offset 0x2c724d) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#13 Ops: 10 Mod: Respond.exe 
push eax    0xc923e7 (offset 0x8903e7) 
sub byte ptr [ebp - 0x76f98b2e], al    0xc923e8 (offset 0x8903e8) 
dec esp   0xc923ee (offset 0x8903ee) 
and al, 4    0xc923ef (offset 0x8903ef) 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#14 Ops: 9 Mod: Respond.exe 
sub byte ptr [ebp - 0x76f98b2e], al    0xc923e8 (offset 0x8903e8) 
dec esp   0xc923ee (offset 0x8903ee) 
and al, 4    0xc923ef (offset 0x8903ef) 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#15 Ops: 9 Mod: Respond.exe 
add byte ptr [esi - 0x18], dl    0xd6ac94 (offset 0x968c94) 
push ebx    0xd6ac97 (offset 0x968c97) 
arpl word ptr [eax], ax   0xd6ac98 (offset 0x968c98) 
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add byte ptr [esi - 0x18], dl    0xd6ac9a (offset 0x968c9a) 
jmp edx    0xd6ac9d (offset 0x968c9d) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#16 Ops: 8 Mod: Respond.exe 
add byte ptr [eax], al    0x6c91d3 (offset 0x2c71d3) 
add byte ptr [ebp - 0x3d1733b3], cl    0x6c91d5 (offset 0x2c71d5) 
jmp edx    0x6c91db (offset 0x2c71db) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#17 Ops: 8 Mod: Respond.exe 
add byte ptr [eax], al    0x6c9232 (offset 0x2c7232) 
add byte ptr [ebp + 0x63e8cc4d], cl    0x6c9234 (offset 0x2c7234) 
jmp edx    0x6c923a (offset 0x2c723a) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#18 Ops: 8 Mod: Respond.exe 
add byte ptr [eax], al    0x6c9245 (offset 0x2c7245) 
add byte ptr [ebp + 0x50e8d04d], cl    0x6c9247 (offset 0x2c7247) 
jmp edx    0x6c924d (offset 0x2c724d) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#19 Ops: 8 Mod: Respond.exe 
test edx, edx    0xc923e9 (offset 0x8903e9) 
je 0x8903f3    0xc923eb (offset 0x8903eb) 
mov dword ptr [esp + 4], ecx    0xc923ed (offset 0x8903ed) 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#20 Ops: 7 Mod: Respond.exe 
sal byte ptr [esi + eax - 0x77], cl    0xc923ea (offset 0x8903ea) 
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dec esp   0xc923ee (offset 0x8903ee) 
and al, 4    0xc923ef (offset 0x8903ef) 
jmp edx    0xc923f1 (offset 0x8903f1) 
 
# JMP EDX total: 20 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 12 Mod: UxTheme.dll 
jmp eax    0x71b3839e (offset 0x3639e) 
add al, byte ptr [eax]    0x71b383a0 (offset 0x363a0) 
add byte ptr [edi], cl    0x71b383a2 (offset 0x363a2) 
test byte ptr [ebp - 0x7efffffd], bl    0x71b383a4 (offset 0x363a4) 
jmp edx    0x71b383aa (offset 0x363aa) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#2 Ops: 10 Mod: UxTheme.dll 
add al, byte ptr [eax]    0x71b383a0 (offset 0x363a0) 
add byte ptr [edi], cl    0x71b383a2 (offset 0x363a2) 
test byte ptr [ebp - 0x7efffffd], bl    0x71b383a4 (offset 0x363a4) 
jmp edx    0x71b383aa (offset 0x363aa) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#3 Ops: 8 Mod: UxTheme.dll 
jmp dword ptr [esi - 0x2d001f3e]    0x71b0888b (offset 0x688b) 
loope 0x6883    0x71b08891 (offset 0x6891) 
jmp edx    0x71b08893 (offset 0x6893) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#4 Ops: 8 Mod: UxTheme.dll 
add byte ptr [edi], cl    0x71b383a2 (offset 0x363a2) 
test byte ptr [ebp - 0x7efffffd], bl    0x71b383a4 (offset 0x363a4) 
jmp edx    0x71b383aa (offset 0x363aa) 
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# JMP EDX total: 4 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 13 Mod: WININET.dll 
cmp ebp, dword ptr [edx]    0x631ad3ac (offset 0x1ab3ac) 
add byte ptr [eax], al    0x631ad3ae (offset 0x1ab3ae) 
lcall 0x2a:0x3c3be2ab    0x631ad3b0 (offset 0x1ab3b0) 
add byte ptr [ecx], bl    0x631ad3b7 (offset 0x1ab3b7) 
jmp edx    0x631ad3b9 (offset 0x1ab3b9) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#2 Ops: 12 Mod: WININET.dll 
sub al, byte ptr [eax]    0x631ad3ad (offset 0x1ab3ad) 
add byte ptr [edx + 0x3c3be2ab], bl    0x631ad3af (offset 0x1ab3af) 
sub al, byte ptr [eax]    0x631ad3b5 (offset 0x1ab3b5) 
add byte ptr [ecx], bl    0x631ad3b7 (offset 0x1ab3b7) 
jmp edx    0x631ad3b9 (offset 0x1ab3b9) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#3 Ops: 11 Mod: WININET.dll 
add byte ptr [eax], al    0x631ad3ae (offset 0x1ab3ae) 
lcall 0x2a:0x3c3be2ab    0x631ad3b0 (offset 0x1ab3b0) 
add byte ptr [ecx], bl    0x631ad3b7 (offset 0x1ab3b7) 
jmp edx    0x631ad3b9 (offset 0x1ab3b9) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#4 Ops: 10 Mod: WININET.dll 
add byte ptr [edx + 0x3c3be2ab], bl    0x631ad3af (offset 0x1ab3af) 
sub al, byte ptr [eax]    0x631ad3b5 (offset 0x1ab3b5) 
add byte ptr [ecx], bl    0x631ad3b7 (offset 0x1ab3b7) 
jmp edx    0x631ad3b9 (offset 0x1ab3b9) 
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*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#5 Ops: 9 Mod: WININET.dll 
lcall 0x2a:0x3c3be2ab    0x631ad3b0 (offset 0x1ab3b0) 
add byte ptr [ecx], bl    0x631ad3b7 (offset 0x1ab3b7) 
jmp edx    0x631ad3b9 (offset 0x1ab3b9) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#6 Ops: 7 Mod: WININET.dll 
loope 0x1ee886    0x631f08d4 (offset 0x1ee8d4) 
add byte ptr [eax], al    0x631f08d6 (offset 0x1ee8d6) 
jmp dword ptr [eax]    0x631f08d8 (offset 0x1ee8d8) 
push edi    0x631f08da (offset 0x1ee8da) 
jmp edx    0x631f08db (offset 0x1ee8db) 
 
# JMP EDX total: 6 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 8 Mod: SHELL32.dll 
in eax, 0xe2    0x69a69dfd (offset 0x267dfd) 
dec dword ptr [ebp - 0x1a17ebb2]    0x69a69dff (offset 0x267dff) 
jmp edx    0x69a69e05 (offset 0x267e05) 
 
# JMP EDX total: 1 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 8 Mod: ole32.dll 
add byte ptr [edi], cl    0x68f2699f (offset 0x2499f) 
test dword ptr [edx - 0x7efffec2], edi    0x68f269a1 (offset 0x249a1) 
jmp edx    0x68f269a7 (offset 0x249a7) 
 
# JMP EDX total: 1 
# Grand total JMP EDX total: 32 
  
 
264 
Figure 28. Truncated Dispatcher Gadget EAX output from Snagit.exe  
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 9 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
or cl, byte ptr [ebx - 0x743774f0]    0x6fff8b (offset 0x2fdf8b) 
inc edx   0x6fff91 (offset 0x2fdf91) 
sub al, 0x5e    0x6fff92 (offset 0x2fdf92) 
jmp eax    0x6fff94 (offset 0x2fdf94) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#2 Ops: 8 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
add al, ch    0x7fac19 (offset 0x3f8c19) 
and bh, byte ptr [edx + 0x595affdc]    0x7fac1b (offset 0x3f8c1b) 
jmp eax    0x7fac21 (offset 0x3f8c21) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#3 Ops: 8 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
add al, ch    0x88c3d8 (offset 0x48a3d8) 
arpl word ptr [edx + 0x595affd3], sp    0x88c3da (offset 0x48a3da) 
jmp eax    0x88c3e0 (offset 0x48a3e0) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#4 Ops: 8 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
add al, ch    0x88c4af (offset 0x48a4af) 
mov word ptr [ecx + 0x595affd3], fs    0x88c4b1 (offset 0x48a4b1) 
jmp eax    0x88c4b7 (offset 0x48a4b7) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#5 Ops: 13 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
sal byte ptr [ebx + ebx - 0x75], 0x4b    0x404ea0 (offset 0x2ea0) 
add al, 0x8b    0x404ea5 (offset 0x2ea5) 
adc dword ptr [ebx + 0x6a0442], ecx    0x404ea7 (offset 0x2ea7) 
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call eax    0x404ead (offset 0x2ead) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#6 Ops: 13 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
add al, byte ptr [ebx - 0x3074fb3c]    0x409ce9 (offset 0x7ce9) 
mov dword ptr [ebp - 0x1c], 0    0x409cef (offset 0x7cef) 
call eax    0x409cf6 (offset 0x7cf6) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#7 Ops: 13 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
test ecx, ecx    0x44177a (offset 0x3f77a) 
add dword ptr [eax], eax    0x44177c (offset 0x3f77c) 
add byte ptr [eax + 0x428b178b], dl    0x44177e (offset 0x3f77e) 
add al, 0x8b    0x441784 (offset 0x3f784) 
iretd     0x441786 (offset 0x3f786) 
call eax    0x441787 (offset 0x3f787) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#8 Ops: 13 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
adc byte ptr [ebx - 0x3474c9], cl    0x46292b (offset 0x6092b) 
rcl byte ptr [eax - 0x75], cl    0x462931 (offset 0x60931) 
inc esi    0x462934 (offset 0x60934) 
add al, 0x8b    0x462935 (offset 0x60935) 
iretd     0x462937 (offset 0x60937) 
call eax    0x462938 (offset 0x60938) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#9 Ops: 13 Mod: Snagit32.exe 
dec dword ptr [ebx + 0x5411e8d8]    0x4fccc7 (offset 0xfacc7) 
sti     0x4fcccd (offset 0xfaccd) 
call dword ptr [eax - 0x75]    0x4fccce (offset 0xfacce) 
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inc edi    0x4fccd1 (offset 0xfacd1) 
sbb al, 0x53    0x4fccd2 (offset 0xfacd2) 
call eax    0x4fccd4 (offset 0xfacd4) 
 
[truncated] 
 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX Snagit32.exe total: 264 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX imagehlp.dll total: 3 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX CRYPT32.dll total: 1 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX opencv_core249.dll total: 22 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX PDFLib.dll total: 54 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX KERNEL32.DLL total: 3 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX ScrollingCapture.dll total: 22 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX mfc100u.dll total: 5 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX Ltkrn15u.dll total: 8 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX Lttwn15u.dll total: 20 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX VideoCommon.dll total: 7 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX RPCRT4.dll total: 6 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX COMCTL32.dll total: 1 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX Ltdis15u.dll total: 1 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX Trackerbird.dll total: 18 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX ADVAPI32.dll total: 1 
# Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX MSVCR100.dll total: 34 
# Grand total Dispatcher Gadgets for EAX: 470 
 
Figure 29. Dispatcher Gadget Other EAX output from Filezilla.exe 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#1 Ops: 13 Mod: filezilla.exe 
pop es    0x7a02d7 (offset 0x39e2d7) 
shl eax, 2    0x7a02d8 (offset 0x39e2d8) 
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lea eax, dword ptr [eax + eax*2 + 0x7a02f2]    0x7a02db (offset 
0x39e2db) 
shr edx, 1    0x7a02e2 (offset 0x39e2e2) 
jmp eax    0x7a02e4 (offset 0x39e2e4) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#2 Ops: 13 Mod: filezilla.exe 
pop es    0x7a0387 (offset 0x39e387) 
shl eax, 2    0x7a0388 (offset 0x39e388) 
lea eax, dword ptr [eax + eax*2 + 0x7a03a2]   0x7a038b (offset 
0x39e38b) 
shr edx, 1    0x7a0392 (offset 0x39e392) 
jmp eax    0x7a0394 (offset 0x39e394) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#3 Ops: 12 Mod: filezilla.exe 
shl eax, 2    0x7a02d8 (offset 0x39e2d8) 
lea eax, dword ptr [eax + eax*2 + 0x7a02f2]    0x7a02db (offset 
0x39e2db) 
shr edx, 1    0x7a02e2 (offset 0x39e2e2) 
jmp eax    0x7a02e4 (offset 0x39e2e4) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
#4 Ops: 12 Mod: filezilla.exe 
shl eax, 2    0x7a0388 (offset 0x39e388) 
lea eax, dword ptr [eax + eax*2 + 0x7a03a2]   0x7a038b (offset 
0x39e38b) 
shr edx, 1    0x7a0392 (offset 0x39e392) 
jmp eax    0x7a0394 (offset 0x39e394) 
 
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^ 
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#5 Ops: 12 Mod: filezilla.exe 
shr al, 1    0xd8d116 (offset 0x98b116) 
and eax, 1    0xd8d118 (offset 0x98b118) 
ret     0xd8d11b (offset 0x98b11b) 
lea esi, dword ptr [esi]   0xd8d11c (offset 0x98b11c) 
jmp eax    0xd8d120 (offset 0x98b120) 
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APPENDIX C: DEFINITIONS 
Code-Reuse Attack: A code-reuse attack makes use of existing instructions in the process 
virtual memory in an unintended fashion. An attacker can utilize ROP or JOP gadgets to achieve 
arbitrary computation, to disable protections, or to set up shellcode to be executed 
JOP: JOP is short for Jump-Oriented Programming. It is an advanced code-reuse attack 
that makes use of chunks of instructions existing in the virtual memory of the process that end 
with an indirect jump or call.  JOP requires a dispatch table and both dispatcher and functional 
gadgets. 
ROP: ROP is short for Return Oriented Programming. It is a code-reuse attack that makes 
use of chunks of instructions existing in the virtual memory of a process that terminates with a 
RET instruction or return. The return functions as the “glue” that binds the instructions together, 
allowing for control flow to be ordered. 
Gadget: A gadget is a carefully selected chunk of instructions that terminates in a control 
flow instruction, such as a ret or an indirect jump or call. These are “strung” together to allow for 
an attacker to execute arbitrary computation. 
Dispatcher Gadget: The dispatcher gadget is a carefully selected gadget that modifies the 
dispatch table in a predictable manner. This allows an attacker to order the control flow in a JOP 
exploit. Functional gadgets will typically go to the dispatcher gadget, which then will move the 
instruction pointer to the next functional gadget within the dispatch table. 
Dispatch Table: The dispatch table provides the virtual memory addresses for all 
functional gadgets used in JOP.  
Disassembly: Disassembly is the end result of machine language being translated into 
Assembly language.  
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Assembly: Assembly is a low-level programming language that is specific to the 
architecture it is to be run on.  
Opcodes: Opcodes are representations of machine code that exist in hexadecimal format.  
Opcode-splitting: Opcode-splitting is the process of starting execution in the middle of a 
line of machine code instructions on architectures that lack alignment. This can result in machine 
code being executed in a manner unintended by the compiler, resulting in unintended Assembly 
instructions being executed. 
 
